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Abstract
This dissertation presents the results of an empirical investigation into the nature, 
causes and consequences of the export activity from the point of view of the firm. It 
comprises five essays, analysing the following topics:
- Chapter 1 investigates the dynamics of export behaviour among British small and 
medium sized firms (SMEs) in the nineties. We develop a dynamic model of 
entry decision in a foreign market that takes into account both unobserved firm 
heterogeneity and genuine state dependence. After controlling for unobservable 
firm heterogeneity, we find that up to 75 percent of export persistence in the data 
is explained by ’’true” state dependence, and that this dependence is greater among 
old companies than young companies. Moreover, observable firm characteristics 
such as size and ownership play a significant role in distinguishing exporters from 
non-exporters.
- Chapter 2 reports the results of an empirical investigation of the determinants of 
export diversification among Spanish exporters. The lack of theory, the unclear 
past empirical evidence and the use of the census of Spanish exporting firms jus­
tifies the use of semi-parametric regression techniques to characterise the pattern 
of export diversification as a firm becomes more internationalised. Unlike other 
studies, the finding suggests that the success of strong export-orientated firms relies 
heavily on both product and market specialisation.
- Chapter 3 analyses the role of information spillovers in the export destination de­
cision by SMEs. W ith uncertainty and sunk entry costs, small firms will tend 
to export to countries where other local exporters have previous experience as in­
formation is cheaper and more reliable. In our application for Spain, the findings 
suggest that geographical agglomeration of exporting firms of the same industry 
selling to one destination significantly affects the probability of small-medium sized 
firms exporting to the same destination. The probability to export to one particu­
lar destination is also (positively) affected by firm characteristics such as size and 
export intensity, and gravitational factors such as the level of development and the 
physical proximity of the destination country.
- Chapter 4 examines the measurement of market power in an international duopoly 
market, the ceramic tile industry, over the period 1988-1998. After estimating the 
marginal costs of each competitor export group, we use both cross-section and time- 
series techniques to evaluate the degree of competition in this industry. The results 
suggest that Italian producers are ’’leaders” and Spanish producers are ’’followers” 
in a market characterised by substantial positive
- Chapter 5 investigates the relationship between export activity and technical effi­
ciency using a large panel of firms in the UK manufacturing industry during the 
nineties. The findings show a positive impact of export status on long-run efficiency 
among those industries in which the UK reveals a comparative disadvantage, sug­
gesting the important role played by firm competitiveness to overcome industry 
comparative disadvantage factors. In our analysis of short run efficiency changes, 
we do not find evidence that efficiency improves as firms become export dependent, 
markups.
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0.3 Introduction
This dissertation presents the results of an empirical investigation on the behaviour of exporting 
firms: the determinants of the export decision, the marketing strategy of regular exporters, and 
the consequences of exporting on firm efficiency and profitability. First, we investigate the 
characteristics of those firms that engage in trade using a multiperiod discrete choice model 
(chapter 1). Second, we examine the determinants of both export diversification and the 
selection of export markets (chapter 2 and chapter 3). Third, we focus on the measurement of 
competition in the international markets (chapter 4). Fourth, we focus on the measurement 
and determinants of the efficiency differences between exporting firms compared with their 
non-exporting counterparts (chapter 4). This introduction provides the motivation and a brief 
outline.
Growing liberalisation, integration and competition in world economies since the post-war 
period have been responsible for the increasing engagement of firms in exporting activities. The 
export trade has grown exponentially from approximately $40 billion in 1945 to more than $5 
trillion in 1998, a value that exceeds the gross national products of each nation in the world 
except the USA. Export activity has been one of the fastest growing economic activities, con­
sequently exceeding the rate of growth in world economies output over the past three decades. 
Consequently, the contribution of exports to total world economic activity has increased con­
siderably in recent years, and currently accounts for approximately 23 percent of world gross 
domestic output (World Trade Organisation, 1999).
Export activities are important for the economic well-being of a nation as well as a criti­
cal factor in the economic development process. From a macroeconomic perspective, exports 
increase the demand for domestic production, enrich the foreign exchange rate reserves and pro­
vide employment. In microeconomic terms, exporting can give individual firms a competitive 
advantage, improve their financial position, increase capacity utilisation, and raise technological 
standards.
Concerning the important role of exporting, governments continuously undertake export
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stimulation programs. In developing countries, export-growth economic policy has been em­
phasised as a strategy for economic development. Export growth is important not only in 
developing economies but in developed economies as well. For example, the steady decline in 
the U.S. share of world exports of manufactured goods between 1955 and 1977 led the U.S. 
government to list export stimulation as one of its national goals in 1978.
In order to develop an effective promotion program undertaken by governments or by firms 
themselves, it is necessary to understand the factors that influence export operations and how 
these factors interact. Traditional trade theory is concerned mainly with factors that are 
noncontrollable by the firm. The role of the individual firm and its controllable factors such as 
product mix, organisation and size have received little attention in the economic literature until 
very recently. The renewed interest among economists in investigating the empirical regularities 
of export supply is explained by recent advances on microeconomic theory of export supply and 
easier access to available microdata, compared to past emphasis on aggregate exports and 
studies of export demand.
The main objective of this dissertation is to assess at the micro level the empirical signif­
icance of the export supply on firm behaviour and performance. The rest of the dissertation 
is structured in five chapters. Chapter 1 studies the dynamics of export behaviour using a 
panel data of 1679 small and medium sized firms following the 1991 recession. We use a simple 
dynamic model of entry decision in a foreign market by a profit-maximising firm to disentangle 
the effects of unobserved firm heterogeneity and genuine state dependence. We also control for 
the ’’initial conditions” problem that arises when the start of the observation period does not 
coincide with the start of the stochastic process generating firms’ export decisions. The results 
show that observed persistence in export behaviour is explained by a mix of firm heterogenity 
and state dependence due to irreversible investment. After controlling for unobservable firm 
heterogeneity, we find that up to 75 percent of export persistence in the data is explained by 
state dependence, and that this dependence is greater among old companies than young compa­
nies. Moreover, observable firm characteristics such as size and ownership play a significant role 
in distinguishing exporters from non-exporters. In addition, some industry-level characteristics
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such as export spillovers or macroeconomic influences such as the volatility of exchange rates 
exhibit a positive impact on export decision while others such as market destination uncertainty 
or industry growth rate of exports have no effect on export decision in our results. Finally, we 
find no evidence that the 1991 recession influences firms’ export decision in subsequent years as 
the hypothesis of serial correlation in the error term is rejected by the data. This suggests both 
that our findings provide a valid indication of the SMEs ’’typical” export behaviour in the face 
of significant exogenous macroeconomic instability, and that only very large shocks influence 
potential and actual exporters’ willingness to participate in export markets.
Chapter 2 investigates the determinants of export diversification. The international business 
literature assumes that increased involvement in exporting encourages diversification to a larger 
number of countries. If volatility of profits increases with the proportion of revenues from 
abroad, firms will diversify exports as a strategy for risk-spreading in order to ensure an stable 
cash flow in international markets and to increase the probability of staying in the international 
markets. There are also reasons for firms to become more specialised as they become more 
export-orientated. If international trade theories predict that comparative advantage forces or 
stimulates industry specialisation, why do we not expect exporters to become more specialised 
in production and marketing to succeed in exporting. Concentration of exports can be viewed 
as a strategy of firm internationalisation by achieving economies of scale in production and 
distribution.
Using a unique data set (the distribution of export sales by product and country of all 
Spanish manufacturing firms with more than 20 workers in 1988), we develop firm-level indices 
of export diversification by both product and destination. Next we analyse empirically the op­
timal marketing strategy of exporters using semi-parametric regression techniques to represent 
graphically the export diversification trajectory of a representative firm, as its sales become 
more export-orientated. In our application for the Spanish case, we find that exporters opt for 
a strategy of market diversification in the early stages of internationalisation. As expected, light 
exporters begin selling to few markets. As they become more export-orientated they explore 
new destinations, exhibit a more even distribution of sales across destinations and choose a
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sample of more heterogeneous countries. After reaching certain level of exports, the number 
of destinations becomes fixed, the selection of destinations is more homogenous and the distri­
bution of export value tends to be more concentrated in a few destinations. Finally, we find a 
negative correlation between product diversification and firm internationalisation in almost all 
the analysed industries. The finding suggests that the success of export-orientated exporters 
relies heavily on product specialisation.
Chapter 3 proposes an empirical model of firms’ decision about export destinations. We 
estimate a multinomial logit model for the probability that a firm exports to a particular desti­
nation. The choice of markets is dependent on three factors: information spillovers, distance, 
and economic size. With uncertainty and sunk entry costs, small firms will tend to export to 
large countries in order to enhance the scale of production, to close countries to reduce the 
transport cost, and to countries where other local exporters have previous experience as infor­
mation is cheaper and more reliable. The basis for our study is data on exports by country of 
destination of 5229 Spanish manufacturers in 1988. We construct different indicators of geo­
graphical concentration of exporters selling to specific destinations to identify the origin of the 
information spillovers: localisation, MNEs or urbanisation economies. The findings suggest 
that geographical agglomeration of exporting firms selling to one destination significantly affects 
the probability of small-medium sized firms exporting to the same destination. The source of 
information spillovers is localisation externalities, that is, concentration of domestic exporters 
of the same industry. There is no evidence that the presence of multinationals or urbanisation 
economies significantly affects the choice of destination of exporters in our sample. The signif­
icance of localisation economies persists in spite of controls, which shows how the probability 
to export to one particular destination is also (positively) affected by firm characteristics (size 
and export intensity), and gravitational factors (level of development and physical proximity of 
the destination country).
Chapter 4 combines three different approaches to estimate market power in an international 
duopoly model: evaluation of the firm’s pricing-to-market policy, calculation of the residual de­
mand of each exporter group, and estimation of an structural model of demand and supply.
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Advantages, disadvantages and complementaries between the approaches are discussed. These 
techniques are implemented using data on prices and quantities of Italian and Spanish exporters 
of ceramic tiles, the two world-wide leaders over the period 1988-1998. In the cross-section 
analysis of market power across destinations, the results suggest that Italian producers are 
’’leaders” and Spanish producers are ’’followers” in a market characterised by substantial pos­
itive markups. The time series analysis of the French export market reveals that there are 
positive markups in the short run, but they disappear in the long run.
Chapter 5 investigates the relationship between export activity and technical efficiency. We 
address two specific questions: 1) Is this relationship affected by the trade-orientation of the 
industry that the firm belongs to?; 2) How does ownership affect this relationship? To answer 
the questions, we use a sample of 2279 UK manufacturing firms in selected industries over 
the period 1992-1998. Results can be summarised as follows. First, the data suggest higher 
levels of efficiency for exporting firm relative to domestic-orientated firms. Second, firms that 
export a small fraction of their sales have marginally lower efficiency levels that firms with high 
propensity to export. Therefore, the descriptive statistics suggest that the superior efficiency 
performance of exporters is mainly due to their export status, not the export intensity of sales. 
Third, the econometric analysis confirms that export activity has a positive impact on the 
long run efficiency performance, after controlling for firm size, age and foreign participation 
in capital assets. Moreover, we show that the link between export activity and efficiency 
is stronger among firms operating in import competing industries. These findings suggest 
firm-specific attributes such as managerial quality or internal organisation play an important 
role in the exporting firms’ performance in sectors with comparative disadvantage, compared 
to sectors in which exporting firms benefit from the comparative disadvantage forces in the 
country they compete in abroad. Fourth, competition abroad has a weak impact on short run 
efficiency improvement, compared to other sources of competition such as yardstick competition 
or competition in the domestic market. In general, controlling for ownership does not change 
the results about the lack of impact of foreign competition on efficiency changes.
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C hapter 1
The decision to enter and exit 
foreign markets. Evidence for UK  
SMEs
1.1 Introduction
One stylised fact in international trade is the persistence of trade flows at the aggregated level. 
Baldwin (1988) and Dixit (1989) set up the micro-foundations for persistence in trade based 
on the idea of hysteresis. If the exchange of goods between countries requires some ’’sunk” 
investment and firms perceive demand and prices abroad as uncertain, the optimal strategy by 
firms will be a ”wait-and-see-attitude”. In this environment, the export participation decision of 
a firm will be strongly conditioned by how difficult is to distinguish permanent from transitory 
profit opportunities. Only large changes in the firm conditions or its environment will stimulate 
entry /exit into foreign markets. Small changes will have no effect so firms will remain in the 
same export status period after period.
Earlier empirical investigations by Ait-Sahalia (1994) and Giovannetti and Saimiei (1996) 
found mixed evidence of the hypothesis of hysteresis leading entry/exit decisions using aggregate 
trade data for US, Japan, Germany and UK. They unfortunately provide only an indirect test for
14
state dependence in the export decision since the aforementioned analytical model of entry/exit 
is based on individual behaviour.1
Although there is persistence in trade flows, recent empirical evidence using plant and firm 
level data show that the transition rates into and out of export markets are relatively high in 
both developed and developing countries. Bernard and Jensen (1995, 1999) for US [1976-1987] 
find that 18 percent of exporting plants left the export market and 9 percent of nonexporters 
began foreign shipments in an average year. Bernard and Wagner (1997) for Germany [1978- 
1989] report 8  percent of exporting plants left the export market and 14 percent of nonexporters 
began foreign shipments in an average year. Aitken et al. (1997) for Mexico [1986-1989] report 
an striking 47 percent entry rate into foreign markets for large companies in the four-years 
period after trade liberalisation. Robert and Tybout (1998) for Colombia [1981-1989] observe 
that 10 percent of exporting plants cease exporting and 5 percent of nonexporters began foreign 
shipments in an average year. Liu et al. (1999) note that 10 percent of firms in the electronic 
Taiwanese industry that exported in 1990 did not export in 1992 and 12 percent of firms did not 
export in 1990 but enter by 1992. Bonacorssi (1992) and Aw et al. (1997) provide evidence of 
higher turnover rates in foreign markets for small-medium firms than for large firms in Italy and 
Taiwan, respectively. Both studies suggest the presence of minimal sunk costs as explanation 
for high turnover rates.
The vast majority of empirical models on export participation are static and include only 
observable firm-specific characteristics (Glejser et al., 1980; Braunerhjielm, 1999). However, 
dynamic models are needed to evaluate the importance of new factors such us permanent unob­
servable firm heterogeneity and genuine state dependence in the firm’s decision to sell abroad. 
Roberts and Tybout (1997) find strong evidence of state dependence as key factor explaining 
the export decision among Colombian manufacturing plants: the initial ’’sunk cost” invest­
1The pass-through exchange rate model model also explains persistence in exported quantities based on price 
adjustment in non-competitive markets. If market shares are perceived as a kind of investment made through 
costly creation of consumer reputation, and of distribution networks, changes in environment conditions such 
as an appreciation of the domestic currency, will induce exporters to absorb the new costs in the markups to 
maintain competitiveness (Froot and Klemperer, 1989). Again, firms will exhibit persistence in their export 
status.
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ment or learning from exporting is completely depreciated after two years without exporting. 
Bernard and Jensen (1997) discover that within-industry plant heterogeneity is as important as 
state dependence in explaining export decision among US manufacturing firms. These findings 
suggest that some, and only some firms self-select into export activity since exporting demands 
specific plant characteristics.
This paper contributes to these recent empirical literature estimating a dynamic model of 
entry/exit decision using a large panel data of UK manufacturing firms over the period 1992- 
1998. Unlike previous studies, we focus on small and medium enterprises (SME) to evaluate 
the importance of state dependence and firm heterogeneity in the export decision.
There are several reasons why the perspective of a smaller firm to international operations 
is very different from the one of larger firms. The amount and quality of resources, such as 
managerial resources, educated employees, capital and capacity, is typically lower among SMEs 
compared to large firms. This point is reinforced by the fact that a firm’s ability to find 
and utilise external resources such as public institutions or cooperative firm networks much 
depends on its own resources. Another important consequence of ’’smallness” is that the firm 
is responsive to unique and random factors.
The traditional approach to exporting behaviour by SMEs describes it as a slow process 
where the firm gradually increases its commitment to international operations (Bilkey and 
Tesar, 1978). SMEs first start from being not interested in exporting, then filling possible 
unsolicited export orders, selling to psychologically close countries or using foreign markets as 
residual destinations, and ending to committed involvement in international marketing. The 
slow and cautious nature of the process follows from greater perceived uncertainty and risk 
associated with international business decisions compared to home-market operations. This 
’’stages model” of international marketing is too universal as it explicitly ignores the decision­
making of the firm as well as the industry characteristics in which the firm operates. ” Smallness” 
implies lack of resources and information, concentration of the decision-making, and greater 
concern about risk and uncertainty. It seems plausible to assume that costs of exporting, such 
as costs from product adaptation, market research, advertising and marketing or possible sales
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organisation abroad, may be marked if the firms itself is small. If export activity involves 
learning behaviour and SME’s commitment in the process of internationalisation determines its 
benefit, it will be more profitable to start exporting early than late. In that case, small young 
companies are more likely to start exporting than small old companies that never exported 
before.
The cautiousness of the internationalisation process by SMEs can be seen to be due to 
the costs of commitments to international marketing are partly sunk. In the decision of in­
ternationalization, waiting can have a value especially if a firm experiences uncertainty about 
the commitment to exporting, due to some random component in the entrepreneur’s skills, or 
perceived uncertainty related to the future exchange rate. Under this circunstances, if the 
expected adoption of exporting involves sunk cost, such a marketing campaign to settle the 
firm’s position in the foreign markets, the firm will do better postponing its decision. This is 
because by waiting it can avoid the subnormal return from exporting that would realise if the 
exchange rate became less favourable for the firm. Therefore, past export experience by SMEs 
becomes crucial to understand its export decision every year.
The firm’s decision maker in SMEs is the most important person influencing the export­
ing process. First, ownership structure (i.e. independent versus subsidiary or domestic-owned 
versus foreign-owned) will be crucial to understand the firm’s commitment in the export de­
cision. Second, unobservable managerial characteristics such as skills, perception of risk in 
international markets or attitute towards diversification of markets, may account for the bulk 
of export decision and they need to be taken into account in the model of SMEs decision to 
export.
Econometrically, the estimation of a dynamic model of export participation is complex. The 
adequate specification of the econometric model becomes crucial to estimate the determinants 
of export decision since persistence could depend not only on past experience, but also on 
unobserved firm heterogeneity or purely autocorrelated random shocks. In addition, the model 
should take into account the extra problem of endogenous ’’initial conditions”, that is, the gap 
between the origin of the stochastic process generating the sequence of export decisions for each
17
firm ( or year of set up of the company) and the first year of the window of observations over 
the period of analysis.
The data consist on 1679 small-medium sized (<250 workers) firms with less than 35 years 
operating in the manufacturing industry in 1992. Compared to other studies, our data shows a 
relatively low entry/exit rate in/out foreign markets every year (on average, about 3 percent). 
The results show that such an observed persistence in export behaviour is explained by a mixed 
of ’’true” state dependence and firm heterogeneity, while the existence of purely autocorrelated 
shocks is rejected by the data. After controlling for unobservable firm heterogeneity, we find 
that up to 70 percent of export persistence in the data is explained by state dependence, and 
that this dependence is greater among old companies than young companies. Observable 
firm-specific characteristics also are important determinants of export status: medium-sized 
foreign-owned firms are more likely to be exporters than small-sized domestic-owned firms. 
We find mixed evidence of industry-level characteristics affecting firm’s decision to export. On 
the one hand, there is no evidence of correlation between perceived uncertainty about the export 
market destinations or growth rates in export markets and the firm’s export decision. On the 
other hand, the results show a positive impact of spillovers in export decision measured by 
geographical concentration of manufacturing activity.
The remainder of the chapter is set out as follows. First we develop a simple dynamic 
econometric model of the export participation decision. Next we present the data and the 
econometric results. A final section summarises the findings and concludes.
1.2 A n empirical m odel of export decision
Recent reseach has examined the determinants of firms’ entry into and exit from the export 
sector. We briefly summarise the theoretical model and its empirical counterpart, before 
detailing the econometric concerns inherent in the reduced form estimation of the model. 2 
We consider a monopolistic competition industry in which each firm faces a downward sloping
2 See Roberts and Tybout (1998) for more details.
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demand curve in the markets where it operates, yet views itself as being too small to strategically 
influence the behaviour of other producers. The domestic and foreign demands for the firm’s 
product are
<li = faPiiUi i = A, B  (1.1)
where p^are the prices in each market i, fa captures the usual demand shifters (domestic and 
foreign income levels and other goods’ prices) in each market i. The elasticity of demand e» is 
larger than one and u* reflects instability and uncertainty about exchange rates. If X  = (fa, Ui), 
the current period gross operating profits can be written
Ttit(X ,Z ,F ,Y u )  =  R it( - ,X ,Y it) -c v(-,Z)
= ( p V )  +  ( p V )  -  c”(-, Z) -  F(1 -  Yit-i) (1.2)
where Ru  is the total revenue function, cv(-, Z) is the variable cost of producing total output 
and F  captures entry sunk-costs in the export market. Yu is an indicator function such that Yu 
is equal to one if the decision to export in period t is positive, and zero otherwise. The demand 
shifters X  affect firm’s profitability through revenues while industry-specific and firm-specific 
factors Z  affect firms’ profitability through changing variable costs. For simplicity we maintain 
the expression for the variable costs function as being independent of the export decision.3
If firms can price discriminate between foreign and domestic markets, producers would sim­
ply participate in foreign markets -  choosing the profit-maximising level of exports -  whenever 
the condition marginal revenue is equal to marginal cost is satisfied. In the absence of firm- 
specific sunk costs (F=0), there exists a threshold such that, given demand conditions, all firms 
with a marginal variable costs below the threshold self-select into export activities4.
The presence of sunk costs or non-recoverable fixed cost of entry in the international markets
3 The general form of cost structure can be modified in order to emphasise specific factors that may affect the 
decision to export : (i) production cost complementarities - Bassevi (1970) ; (ii) learning-by-exporting - Clerides 
et al (1998) ; (iii) spillovers by neighbouring exporting firms in the same region and/or industry - Aitken (1997). 
These extra factors can be easily included and tested in the empirical model, conditional to data availability.
4 A similar result holds when we assume that the variable cost function is separable by market destination.
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explains the dynamics of trade reaction to exchange rate or trade policy changes. The fixed
investment costs of exporting are represented by the cost of setting up a dealership network,
advertising or marketing research. For simplicity we will assume that entry costs recur in full if 
the firm exits the export market for any amount of time. Firms will export if expected profit 
net of entry costs is positive, Yu =  1 if nu(’) > 0 .5
D ynam ic specification
In a multi-period framework our profit function becomes
Vit = A max Et ( [7riay»a] ) (1.3)
9 ,9 >Yit={l,oo) \ s = t  /
where Et is an expectations operator conditioned on the set of information available at time 
t, and 8 is the one-period discount rate. We assume that firms never wish to liquidate. This 
expression is equivalent to the firm choosing whether to export in each period since we allow 
the firm to always pick the within period profit maximising quantities in each market. The 
Bellman’s optimality principle states that the processes {<JuiQiti t°  the firm’s program are 
the period-by-period solutions to the sequence of Bellman’s Equation
Vu=  max {nitYit + SEt+ilVit+itfYit]} (1.4)
qA,qB,Yu
A firm that did not export in period t -1 will choose to export in period t, i.e. Yu =  1 if
*u(y«t = 1) -  7Tft(y« =  0) +  6Et+1 [Vit+1(-)(Yu =  1)] -  6Et+1 [Vu+^ ){ Y u  =  0)] >  F( 1 -  YU-i)
(1.5)
The left-hand side term represents the current net operating profits from total sales in the 
domestic and foreign market plus the expected discounted future payoff from remaining an 
exporter. The right-hand side term contains the sunk-cost fee associated with new entry or 
re-entry. Incumbent exporters continue exporting and non-exporters begin exporting whenever
5Note that the firm maximises total profits inc lu d in g  both domestic and foreign sales. We allow the possibility 
that selling abroad itself is not profitable but the firm gets higher profits producing for both markets than selling 
only in the domestic market due to the possibility of economies of scale in production
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the first term is larger than the second term. Note that the first term must be larger for non­
exporters than for incumbent exporters due to start-up costs. We define the latent variable 
Y*t as current net operating profits plus the expected future return from being an exporter in 
period t, that is, the left part of equation (1.5).
Theoretical models suggest that sunk costs create hysteresis in the sense that they widen 
the range of profits between those firms that enter and those firms that exit. In addition, 
sunk costs causes a firm to treat exit differently from entry. Therefore, firms that exit and 
re-enter the export market may pay different start-up costs than firms that never exported. 
Specifically, define F° as the start-up cost for a non-exporter with no previous experience and 
as the start-up cost faced by a firm that last exported j  — 1 years ago (note that F 1= 0). 
This generalisation of equation (1.5) implies that the ith  firm will export in year t, Yu =  1 
whenever
J
Y;t > F ° -  £ ( F °  -  F*)Yit-j (1.6)
J=1
where Yu-j is one if the firm last exported in year t-j and zero otherwise. Now the condition 
to start exporting can be written as a dynamic discrete choice process
. =  f 1 if IS  -  Fo > -  E U ( * °  -  n  -
lt \  0 otherwise J
R educed-form  equation
The export participation equation (1.7) needs to be transformed into an estimable equation. 
We start expressing the latent variable as a reduced form in exogenous observable factors 
that affect the expected future profitability of the firm xu  =  (Xu, Zit,tpt), which includes 
firm-specific factors, industry characteristics, and a temporal component reflecting common 
aggregated shocks, <pt} and an individual error term eu,
Y?t — F° =  xu(3 +  eu (1.8)
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We also assume the sunk entry costs faced for all the companies that enter in different years 
are identical (FJ =  F,Vj >  1) and 7  = F° — F. The representation of the export market 
participation decision becomes
JT if xuP  +  'yYit-i +  eit > 01 
Y a = \  0  otherwise J  (L9)
E conom etric  issues
Our empirical model for firm i at year t is
Vit =  x itP +  72/it- 1 +  £it where t  =  2, T  and i = 1, N  (1-1°)
where y*t denotes the unobservable firm propensity to export, xu  is a vector of observable 
characteristics affecting y*t and ea is the unobservable error term. A firm is observed to be an 
exporter when the profitability of its action crosses a threshold (zero in this case), that is, if
V u  >  0-
Our dynamic specification suggests that firms exporting in the past are more likely to export 
today. Persistence in export activity can be due to many factors. It might be that it is necessary 
for a certain set of observable or unobservable characteristics to become an exporting firms so 
once a firm starts exporting it carries on every year. Another possibility is that firms that want 
to export have to incur relevant sunk costs to start so the experience of exporting one year alters 
the future likelihood of exporting. Finally, highly correlated positive shocks may induce firms 
to export one year after another independently of whether firm characteristics are adequate 
or the firm has previous export experience. These three conceptually distinct explanations of 
export persistence plus the additional problem in our dynamic specification of the correlation 
between the initial period observations and the unobservable firm characteristics are discused 
below.
M odelling s tru c tu ra l dependence and  popu la tion  heterogeneity
Past exporting experience may change the future export history of a firm, since the spectrum 
of options is altered. This is what happens in a model of exports that combines the presence of
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sunk costs with uncertainty in the foreign markets. The permanent effect of past experience on 
future outcomes is termed structural dependence. Alternatively, some firms export every year 
because they have some unobservable characteristics that increase their propensity to export. 
This second explanation is called population heterogeneity (Heckman, 1981a)
Several structural dependences have to be considered about export persistence by individual 
firms: 1) the state dependence, i.e. how the previous state occupied by a firm (exporting or no 
exporting) affects the current state; 2 ) the duration dependence, i.e. the experience effect of 
how many years a firm has been an exporter or not in the past; 3) the output dependence, i.e. 
companies export continuously when they have very high export-sales ratio. The term yn -i in 
our empirical specification captures state dependence.
Population heterogeneity is assumed to be captured by a firm-specific time-invariant com­
ponent in the error term such that eu is written as
eit = a i+ u it (1 .11)
where both a* and ua  are orthogonal to each other and independent of the observable exogenous 
characteristics xu  for all i and t. If we assume that ua is independent normal distributed with 
mean zero and variance <7„, we can use conventional computational techniques to estimate 
a dynamic probit model as a random effect model. In order to marginalise the likelihood, 
we assume that a* is independent normal distributed with mean zero and variance (j\ and is 
independent of the un. However, if a* is not independent of for all t and i, the maximum 
likelihood estimates will be inconsistent due to omitted variable bias. To account for a possible 
correlation over time between the unobservable characteristics and the covariates in a random 
effect model, Chamberlain (1984) suggests to account for this problem by assuming that a» is 
a linear function in the means of all the time-varying covariates, a* =  xlxj) +  a*,
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y*t = x it/3 +  Xi'i/j +  'yya-i +  a* +  uit where t = 2 ,...,T  and i = 1 , N  (1-12)
M odelling p erm an en t shocks
The structure of the error term ua in equation (1.11) is important in the interpretation of the 
nature of export persistence. For example, if shocks are purely transitory, coviua, un -\)  =  0, 
then relatively large entry costs will lead to persistence in exporting (or non-exporting) while 
small entry costs will allow firms to enter and exit the market more often. Persistent shocks, 
u a  =  i&Uit-1  +  / i i t  with v j  near one, can overcome the effects of large entry costs. Firms 
perceiving a positive shock today believe that their good fortune will persist and that the value 
of entry is large. Unmodelled persistence in the error term structure would be picked up by 
the lagged endogenous variable and thus incorrectly interpreted as high entry costs.
Vit =  XitP +^7V> +  72/it-1 +  a» +  uit where uit =  Tznit- \  +  fJ.it (1.13)
A dynamic probit model with an autorregresive error term can be estimated using simulated 
smooth maximum likelihood with the GHK (Geweke, Hajivassiliou, Keane) simulator (Borsh- 
Supan and Hajivassiliou, 1993).
T he in itia l conditions p roblem
The initial conditions problem arises when the start of the observation period does not 
coincide with the start of the stochastic process generating individuals’ exporting ’’first” ex­
perience. Technically the problem occurs if yn  is correlated with the unobservable a*. The 
problem arises because the beginning of the observation period in our sample does not coincide 
with the start of the stochastic process generating firm’s past status. Since it is possible that 
there is a history of past decisions, we account for this problem following Heckman (1981c) and 
first specify a reduced form equation for the initial observation as follows:
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rfi=A*i + TJi (1.14)
where var(rifo) =  cr^  and z* is a vector of strictly exogenous instruments, including variables 
relevant in period 1 along with pre-sample information affecting the likelihood of exporting.
We define corr(ot^rfo) = p as the correlation between a*, the unobservable heterogeneity 
parameter, and 77*, the error term in the initial condition equation. To account for p ^  0, we 
use a linear specification, in terms of orthogonal error components,
r)i = dai + uil (1.15)
By construction a* and u,i are orthogonal to one another, then 9 =  ° \ =  an(i
var(un) = <7^(1 — p2). Moreover, we assrnne that the initial observation y»i is uncorrelated
with un and also un  is uncorrelated with xa  for all i and t. Substitute (1 .1 1 ) in (1.10) and 
(1.15) in (1.14) to obtain
y*t =  x itP +  +  IV it-i +oti+Uit where t = 2,..., T  and i =  1 ,..., N  (1.16)
Vii ~  Az* +  6ai +  un  where t=  1 and i =  1,..., N  (1*17)
In the estimation of the two equation model we use a two-step method suggested by Orme 
(1997), in the spirit of Heckman’s standard sample selection correction method which is a valid 
approximation in the case of small values of p. 6 To account for the correlation between the 
initial condition and the unobserved heterogeneity a*, we define an alternative specification for 
a*
6Arulampalam et al. (1998) have implemented succesfully Orme’s two-step estimation method to study 
unemployment persistence.
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oti =  Srji +  Wi (1.18)
By construction, % and W{ are orthogonal to one another , S = ^ - t and var(a.i) =  cr^(l — p2). 
The random effect probit model, under the new specification of a* becomes
y*t =  X it(3 +  Xi'tjj +  'yyu-i +  Srji + Wi + uit where t  = 2,..., T  and i =  1,..., N  (1.19)
The model has two firm-specific random error components in (1.19) rj^Wi. Under the 
assumption of bivariate distribution of (77^  a*), E[wi/yn] =  0 but E l^ /y n ]  =  e*, where e* =  
by construction. Since u*t is assmned to be orthogonal to the regressors xu, we 
can treat W{ as the usual time-invariant error component in the random effect probit model 
provided we can correct for the unobservable 77*. Since e* is a probit generalised error in the 
probit equation (1.18) we can replace 77* by its conditional expectation in (1.19) and estimate 
the random effect probit model equation with an additional regressor e» under the assumption 
of normality
y*t =  x it(3-\-xii(j +  72/tt-i +  Sei +  Wi + uit where t =  2, ...,T  and i =  1 ,..., N  (1-20)
A test of the null hypothesis that p =  0 is given by the t-statistic of the coefficient of the 
additional regressor e*.7 If we impose a factor analytical structure in the error term, that is, 
the correlation between successive errors for the same individual is a constant,
7 Unfortunately, the assumption of bivariate normality of (77^ a») implies that Wi (the new error compo­
nent that enters the random effects probit model specification) has variance va r(w i\yu ) =  <j \ ( \  — p 2£ i)  where 
£? =  — - — ——j-7 2 • Orwe (1997) shows, from Monte-carlo results, that the heteroskedasticity producing
A  Z i ) )  •
inconsistent parameter estimates disappears for small values of p. The condition of ’’small p” is also required for 
var{w i) =  a
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r =  corr{wi +  uit, Wi +  uit- i )  =  9 ^  9- t=2,...,T  (1-21)
t l  O f
so r  is the proportion of the variance attributed to the unobserved individual heterogeneity in 
the total variance of the error term. If we normalise o \  =  1 an estimate of p is approximated 
by 8 ( ^ r - ) 1 2^ where 6 is the coefficient attached to the probit generalised error variable e*.
As shown in Heckman (1981b), under the additional assumption that Wi and ua are jointly 
multi-variate normal, this model can be easily estimated by noting that the distribution of y*t 
conditional on Wi,xa, and yu -i is independent normal.
(1.2 2 )
7 S ~ <ra ~ \---- V i t - i ------ e»-------Wi
O' u  O n 0 \i  J
(1.23)
8 ~ . o a ~ \— e» -1----- Wi I
Ou Ou J
(1.24)
where Wi = ^  and $  is the distribution function of the standard normal variate.
* f f a
Normalising the variance of uu, o \ — 1 for all t to obtain and marginalising the conditional 
likelihood for yu with respect to the Wi gives the likelihood function for the sample,
roo THi / (II ^  K2yit ~  ^  +  ^  +  72/it-1 +  Sei +  (TaWi)] (f>{w)dw} (1.25)
t J ~°° *=2
The random effects probit model with such a restriction on the error covariance matrix 
can be estimated using Gaussian-Hermite Quadrature approximations to univariate integrals 
(Butler and Moffit, 1982).8
8This paper utilises the econometric package LIMDEP 7.0 for the estimation of the random effect probit. 
LIMDEP 7.0 uses the normalisation a \  =  1 instead of the overall variance (Greene, 1998). If we want to compare 
our results with those of the pooled probit model, Arulampalam (1999) shows that the estimated coefficients of 
the random effect probit model using LIMDEP should be multiplied by a factor y / l  — r .where r  is the proportion 
of the variance that is attributed to the individual specific error component in the total unexplained variation.
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1.3 D ata and variables description
T ransition  ra te s
In order to implement our empirical model we need a large panel data of firms with infor­
mation about their export status. The data used in this work are based on firm-level data from 
UK manufacturing industry between 1992 and 1998. Firm-level data was obtained from bal­
ance sheets and annual reports in FAME database (Financial Analysis Made Easy). The data 
includes total sales, destination of sales -domestic and exports, year of registration in Company 
House, ownership, geographic location, employment, wages, profits, fixed assets, operating costs 
and four digit industry codes in which firms operate. Our sample contains 1679 firms with less 
than 250 employees in 1992. Appendix l.A. explains the construction of the data set as well as 
details of the variables used in the paper.
The number of firms that change their export status at least once over the period 1992- 
1998 is 215 (12.8 % of the sample). Table 1.3 shows the transition rates into and out of 
the export market for our sample of UK companies across years. The first row of conditional 
probabilities shows the probability of being a regular exporter. The second row presents the 
probability to cease exporting, conditional on being an exporter the previous year, and the 
third row presents the probability of being a new exporter (that is, the probability to export at 
time t+1, conditional on not exporting at time t). The conditional probabilities to maintain 
the export status are very high, above 97% across years. The probability of being an entrant 
in 1993 conditional on not exporting in 1992 was only 4% and the probability of exiting in 
1993 conditional on exporting in 1992 was only of 1%. In subsequent years, these conditional 
probabilities vary from 5%-6% for new entrants and l%-2% for exiters. Table 1.3 suggests that, 
based on raw data, there is considerable persistence in the export decision measured on annual 
data, even though our sample represents only those firms with higher probability a priori to 
change their export status.
D escrip tion  o f variables in th e  dynam ic p ro b it m odel
In our empirical model of the export participation decision (1.20), the main explanatory
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variables are firm-specific characteristics and the export status in the previous year. In addition, 
the initial condition equation required the inclusion of pre-sample characteristics that may affect 
the decision to export before 1994, our first year observation. The variation in net expected 
profits from exporting is captured through four time-varying firm characteristics (size, labour 
quality, managerial skills and financial situation), three time-invariant firm characteristics over 
the period (year of creation of the company, ownership and number of industries in which the 
firm operates), a constant term , a variable of export prices, 14 industry dummies defined at the 
two-digit SIC92 level and a set of 4 regional dummies (Scotland, North of England, Midlands 
and Wales, South of England). Macroeconomic shocks are captured through time dummies for 
each year. The past export status enters in interactive form with age to account for differences 
in the perceived sunk investment in exporting depending on firm experience.
The size of the firm is measured by total tangible assets and it is expected to have a positive 
impact on the probability to export. The size of a firm is used as a proxy for past success, 
lower average costs, better information and easier access to financial external resources. Where 
fixed costs to exporting are important, the likelihood of exporting should increase with firm 
size. Large firms also benefit from economies of scale in production and marketing. Labour 
productivity and directors’ wages are included as a proxy for labour quality and managerial 
skills, respectively. Again, it is expected that more productive firms or firms with a better 
managerial team will exhibit higher propensity to export. Finally, the return on sales is included 
to reflect the financial situation of the firm in each period.
The age of the company is expected to have a positive impact on the likelihood of exporting. 
The older the company the larger the accumulated experience in the product market. Two 
dummy variables are created. The first one takes a value of one for firm set up between 1970 
and 1980, zero otherwise. The second dummy variable takes value of one for firms set up after 
1980. As far as age captures experience, older companies should exhibit a larger propensity to 
export.
As we have emphasised previously, control over the decision to export in SMEs depends 
critically on ownership structure. We include two dummy variables for domestic-owned sub­
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sidiaries and foreign-owned subsidiaries, leaving domestic-owned independent firms as a bench­
mark. Decision makers in subsidiaries benefit from the interaction with other decision makers 
of the company group. Foreign-owned subsidiaries are the ones that more can benefit from the 
access to the resources that the parental firm has abroad. Therefore, we expect a positive 
impact of subsidiary ownership on export propensity, particularly among foreign-owned ones.
We also include a dummy for product diversification that takes value of one if the firm 
operates in more than one industry and zero otherwise. Product diversification may stimulate 
exports as strategy of market diversification. 9
In addition to industry dummies we include as an explanatory variable the ratio of foreign 
to domestic prices to reflect the attractiveness of foreign markets relative to domestic markets. 
This index of export price competitiveness was obtained as the ratio between the unit value 
index of manufactured exports and the producer price index in UK manufacturing at four digit 
SIC92 industries. Export unit values over the period 1993-1998 are from ”UK Markets” and 
’’Product Sales and Trade” both published by ONS.
In Appendix l.B  we show that export status and firm performance are closely related, at 
least during the switching year. To avoid endogeneity problems between export status and firm 
performance, all the time varying characteristics have been lagged one period.
Our pre-sample information contains industry-level variables that measure export spillovers, 
exchange rate shocks, foreign demand shocks and destination market uncertainty. These extra 
variables are included in the ’’initial condition” equation to identify additional factors that may 
influence the firm decision to be exporter or non-exporter in years previous to our ’’observa­
tions window” 1994-1998. All the variables refer to the period 1990-1993. Motivated by the 
findings of Aitken et al. (1997) about the significant correlation between the decision to export 
and geographic spillovers in Mexico after trade liberalisation in 1985, we construct a measure 
of geographic concentration in a particular industry activity as the share of region-industry 
activity (measured by employment, Ejk) in national activity divided by the region share of ac­
9 In Chapter 2 we will pay special attention to the relationship between product diversification and market 
diversification.
30
tivity in national activity. The region-industry concentration of employment Ejk is defined as
p # y' p t
^  ^ ^  ^  g." where jj is a region and k is a three-digit SIC80 industry in 1992. Note that
we use an index of geographic concentration of activity concentration to capture concentration 
in export activity. To the extent that both indices are correlated and export spillovers matters, 
the export participation decision will be enhanced among small and medium sized companies 
in highly geographically concentrated industries.
We construct two industry-specific indicators of foreign demand conditions during the period 
1990-1993 to capture positive shocks that may induce some firms to enter into foreign markets. 
The first one is the industry growth rate of exports. The second variable is a proxy for the extent 
of economic and political uncertainty of the destination markets using the CBI Industrial Trends 
Survey. One of the questions of the CBI Industrial Trends Survey for manufacturing exports is 
about the factors that firms perceive will limit their ability to export. Our explanatory variable 
is constructed as the percentage of responses claiming from question 15 of CBI Industrial 
Trends Survey that political and economic problems abroad are important factors constraining 
exporting. The CBI Survey data is available for 50 manufacturing industries. We use previous 
research by Temple and Urga (1997) for a correspondence with 81 three-digit SIC80 industries.
Finally, the export hedging literature suggests that higher volatility of the exchange rate rises 
expected profitability of exporting and stimulates exports (Ungern-Stemberg and Weizsacker, 
1990). The volatility of the exchange rate was measured as the standard deviation of the 
industry monthly growth rate of the exchange rate between 1990 and 1992. The trade-weighted 
nominal value of the British pound is computed for 21 OECD countries using the average of 
monthly nominal exchange rates (Source: International Financial Statistics). The trade-weight 




Table 1.4 reports the estimates of the dynamic probit model using the two-step estimation 
procedure. The first column reports the estimates of the initial condition equation. This is 
a static probit model of export decision including pre-sample information characteristics for 
the year 1993. Model 1 column 2 reports the estimates for the period 1994-1998 under the 
assumption of no correlation between the time-varying firm level covariates and the error term. 
Next, Model 2 column 3 reports the results of the specification with correlation between time- 
varying covariates and error term. In the columns 4 and 5 (Model 3 and 4) we re-estimate the 
model to check the robustness of the estimated parameters by selecting only a panel of the two 
extreme years, 1994 and 1998.
Our preferred specification is Model 2, which allows for correlation between the covariates 
and the error term. When testing for the endogeneity of the initial conditions, the null hy­
pothesis of 6 =  0 is easily rejected by the data (t-statistic=20.3). We are also able to recover 
an estimate of p = corr(ai, 77J  from the estimate of <5, the residual term in the initial condi­
tion probit, using the expression 8 (see the econometric section for more details). The
estimate of p is 0.560 (0.689 * ^ ~ o~S oP )- 10
After controlling for corr(oti, 77J ,  the results indicate that the presence of unobservable 
firm heterogeneity is important. In all estimated models the variance of the unobservable 
heterogeneity as a proportion of total unexplained variance, r, lies between zero and one and 
it is statistically significant. Therefore, the pooled probit is rejected in favour of the random 
effect probit model.
State dependence
We interact the lagged export status variable with age, in order to investigate whether the 
relationship between previous and current export status is different for young, less experienced 
firms than for mature, well-experienced firms. The importance of state dependence is likely to
10 It remains unsolved whether p  =  0.56 in our preferred model is small enough to ensure consistent estimated 
parameters. We are quite confident since previous research by Arulampalam (1998) obtained the same esti­
mated coefficients for all covariates using both Orme’s two-step estimation approach and two-equation maximum 
likelihood estimation for an estimated p  with value above 0.6.
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vary with age. Case-studies have shown that young SMEs are more likely to receive unsolicited 
orders to export compared to mature, more experienced firms (Lautanen, 2000). If so young 
firms will find easy to entry-exit foreign markets without incurring in any ’’sunk” cost. By 
constrast, mature SMEs are more likely to have developed previous relationships abroad so they 
are more dependent on export sales. It is also possible that age differences in the magnitude 
of state dependence emerge as a result of differences in product markets conditions faced by 
young and more mature firms. New SMEs in the 1980s and 1990s are more export-oriented 
compared to older SMEs, which had more difficulties to start exporting in the 1970s so they 
have traditionally produced only for the domestic market. If so, we should expect to observe 
young SMEs trying to penetrate foreign markets, if necessary several times, in order to succeed 
as exporters. Alternatively, the greater ability of mature firms to enter or to exit foreign markets 
responding to current shocks would reveal the importance of experience and learning by doing 
in exporting.
The results in Table 1.4 show a positive and significant coefficient on the lagged export 
status variables, suggesting that there is state dependence in export activity for both young 
firms (aged less than 15 years) and mature firms (aged more than 15 years). In all the models 
there is little difference between the magnitude of the coefficients for young and more mature 
firms. Although the difference is small, the coefficients of the lagged export status for firms 
set up after 1980 is slightly larger than for companies set up before 1980.11
Observed firm heterogeneity.
Several observable firm characteristics seem to have a positive impact on the propensity to 
export. In Model 1 , firm size, labour productivity and directors’ wage (as proxy for managerial 
quality) have a positive and statistically significant impact on the decision to export. The 
indicator of financial performance, the rate of return on sales, has no effect on the decision to 
export.
11 Various interactions of age with lagged export status were tried, including aged 10 and 20. Age 15 was chosen 
in the preferred specification based on the likelihood value. Since the models are estimated as probabilities, 
there is no restriction on the values of the coefficients on lagged export status. This is in contrast to time-series 
analysis, where the absolute value of the coefficient needs to be less than unity for stationarity.
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The positive coefficient of subsidiary ownership reveals that foreign-owned subsidiaries are 
more likely to export than domestically-owned subsidiaries and independent companies. The 
negative sign of the coefficient of age suggests that young companies are less likely to export 
compared to mature companies. Industry diversification has a positive effect on the decision 
to export, but the coefficient is not statistically significant in most of the specifications. Time, 
regional and industry dummies were also included to pick up economy-wide trends. However, 
a joint test of significance was rejected for all three groups of dummies.
The export price variable has a positive effect on the decision to export but it is not sig­
nificant. As pointed out by Roberts and Tybout (1997), this could be explained by the 
inclusion of time dummies that have already controlled for general movements in relative prices 
so industry-specific prices reflect simply deviations from the average trend. The exclusion of 
the time dummies in our regression did not change the sign and significance of the variable 
export prices. Another explanation is that the use of unit values to construct export prices 
indices introduced too much noise into the constructed variable.
When we control for the possible correlation between the covariates and the error term 
(Model 2), the only time-variant characteristic that remains statistically significant is firm size. 
The coefficients of ownership and age remain unaffected while the coefficient on diversification 
becomes weakly significant, suggesting that more diversified firms are more likely to export.
The initial conditions equation (Column 1 ) provides an additional list of industry-level 
explanatory variables on the propensity to export in 1993. Both geographic concentration of 
the manufacturing activity and exchange rate volatility are positively correlated with export 
participation, although the coefficient of the second variable is only significant at 10  percent. 
The two additional pre-sample variables, the growth rate of industry exports and an indicator 
of country-destination perceived instability by exporters, showed no effect on the decision to 
export in our sample. The rest of variables in the initial condition equation coincide in sign 
and significance with those in the random effect model.
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1.4 .1  S ta te  d ep en d en ce, h eterogen eity  and  ex p o rt p rob ab ilities
The positive and significant coefficient on the lagged dependent variables suggest that there 
is a state dependence in the decision to export for both young and mature companies. Next 
we calculate various probabilities from our preferred estimated model (Model 2) and compare 
these to the raw aggregate probabilities, in order to see how much of the estimated export 
persistence probabilities are attributed to ’’true” state dependence. This calculations, carried 
out following Chamberlain (1984), are presented in Table 1.5. The first panel records of 
raw aggregate probabilities, and the other two panels record the predicted probabilites for the 
pooled probit model (incorrect specification) and the model with unobservable heterogeneity 
and endogenous initial condition (correct specification).
We take each firm and calculate the predicted probabilities of being an exporter conditional, 
first on being an exporter the previous period, and secondly on being a non-exporter in the 
previous period, and then we average over the sample members. Our calculations therefore 
keep firm characteristics constant. Our calculations indicate (for a randomly chosen firm from 
a particular age group, conditional on previous exporting status) the probability of observing 
this individual exporting in the current time period. Since each calculation is carried out for 
each individual by changing their previous export status the diference between probabilities 
gives the contribution due to true state dependence.
The main points to note about the predicted probabilities are the following. First, we find 
that, in the raw data, young firms show greater state dependence, although the difference is quite 
small. However, these raw calculations do not take into account that changes in observed and 
unobserved characteristics may influence the probability of being exporting at a particular point 
in time. Second, as expected, the models which treat the initial observation as endogenous and 
include unobservable heterogeneity, attribute a smaller percentage of the observed persistence to 
genuine state dependence (75 percent). This is in contrast to the pooled probit model that treat 
the initial observation as exogenous which attribute a very large percentage of the persistence 
effect to genuine state dependence (97 percent). This implies that one obtains a massively 
upward biased estimate of genuine state dependence if one does not adequately control for
35
possible endogeneity of the initial state and unobservable heterogeneity.
Next we investigate the impact of unobservable firm heterogeneity on the probability of 
becoming an exporter. Table 1.6 reports the predicted probabilities for two ’’representative” 
SMEs. The first column describes the two types of firms. The first has ’’negative” attributes to 
be an exporter - independent, young, operating in only one industry and with low size, labour 
productivity and directors’ remuneration. The second is a firm with ’’positive” attributes to 
be an exporter - that is, foreign subsidiary, mature, with diversified production, large size, 
higher productivity and greater directors’ remuneration. The second column in Table 1.6  
indicates the distance to the population mean of those unobservable firm attributes distributed 
randomly across firms that are relevant in the export participation decision. The benchmark 
is zero deviation so favourable unobservable attributes are measured as one or two positive 
standard normal deviations. The last two columns indicate whether the firm has previous 
export experience.
After controlling for observable firm characteristics and past export experience, we identify 
the marginal impact of unobservable heterogeneity across firms. Suppose that the distribution 
of the manager’s attributes towards internationalisation of the firm is captured by our firm effect. 
Our results suggest that a firm with negative ’’attributes” and no previous export experience 
will have an increase of 6 percent in the probability of exporting if it recruits a manager with 
a pro-exporting attitude (from 0.06 to 0.12). Overall, the distribution of the unobservable 
component contributes to the probability to export among unexperienced exporters around 6  
percent. For a firm with positive attributes and previous export experience, the increase in 
the probability to export is only 0.003 percent (from 0.996 to 0.999).
1.4 .2  R ob u stn ess
In this section we discuss three issues: (1) the change in panel structure; (2) the importance of 
autocorrelated random shocks; (3) the predictive capacity of the model.
First we check whether our results are sensitive to the sample period. In the last two 
colums of Table 1.4 we report the results for the model for only two years (1994 and 1998).
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Compared to Model 1 and 2, the results do not change for the variables capturing past ex­
perience, unobservable heterogeneity and endogenous initial conditions on the participation 
decision. However, time-invariant characteristics become statistically insignificant when we as­
sume no correlation between the covariates and the error term (Model 3). Only the coefficients 
of firm size and foreign-owned subsidiary are robustly significant in the model with correlation 
between covariates and error term (Model 4).
Another important issue is whether the inclusion of autocorrelated shocks modifies previous 
findings about export persistence. For that purpose we have estimated a multiperiod dynamic 
probit model allowing for serial correlation in the error term. To simplify the estimation we have 
assumed that the initial conditions are exogenous and have reduced the number of estimates, 
relative to Model 2. The reason for a more parsimonious specification was the difficulties of 
computing the standard errors in the full model. We expect that the estimation is still valid to 
test for autocorrelation in the error term. Table 1.7 reports the results of our preferred estima­
tion using 50 draws in the GHK simulator. The estimated coefficient for the autorregressive 
parameter in the error term -0.052 but it is not statistically different from zero. Therefore 
we are able to reject the hypothesis of permanent shocks as explanation for export persistence. 
This finding also ensures that the estimated coefficients in Table 1.4 are not inconsistent after 
allowing for the presence of serial autocorrelation in the error term.
To evaluate the goodness of fit of our model we compare the actual and predicted patterns of 
export market participation. We report the predicted export trajectories from Model 2 in Table 
1.4. 12 Table 1.8 shows the distribution of the actual and predicted export status path over 
the period 1994-1998. Each path is composed by a sequence of {0,1}. For example {1 ,1 ,1,1,1} 
represents the sequence for an stable exporter and {0 ,1 ,0 ,1 ,0 } for a firm that enters and exits 
the foreign market each year. The number of firms that change their export status more than
12 An alternative approach is to carry out some simple test of our preferred model, such as the standard 
goodness of fit chi-squared tests (Chamberlain, 1984, Andrew, 1988). The approximate distribution of the test 
statistic is a chi-squared only if the expected frequencies that enter the denominator of the test statistic are at 
least 5. Unfortunately any combinations of cells is arbitrary, so we decide not to carry on with the calculations. 
Roberts and Tybout (1997) made groups of export trajectories to implement Andrew’s omnibus test.
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once is extremely reduced, only 2.5% of the total sample in a five-year period.13 As it can 
be easily checked, our model overpredicts the number of regular exporters and non-exporters 
against those firms with irregular export behaviour. However, the model is still able to identify 
correctly a sixth of those firms switching export status over the period 1994-1998.
1.5 Conclusions
This paper provides the first empirical evidence on the export decision by UK firms. In doing 
so we estimate a dynamic probit model using a large panel of small and medium sized firms 
for the period 1992-1998. In that dynamic framework we consider the impact of previous 
export experience, individual firm characteristics and transitory shocks. We also control for 
the initial conditions problem that arises when the beginning of the observation period does not 
coincide with the beginning of the stochastic process generating fims exporting experiences. The 
estimation of the first period as a cross-section probit model requires the inclusion of additional 
factors affecting export decision: geographical spillovers, exchange rate volatility, growth of 
exports and perceived uncertainty of destination countries. After estimation the model is used to 
disentangle the effects of unobserved firm heterogeneity and true state dependence on observed 
export persistence.
The results suggest that both state dependence and firm heterogeneity are important in the 
export decision. The probability to export one year conditional on exporting the previous year, 
holding firm characteristics constant, is 75 percent. The importance of sunk costs falls with 
the age of the company, although the difference is very small. Older firms exhibit higher state 
dependence than young companies. The greater ability of older firms to enter or to exit foreign 
markets responding to current shocks reveals the important role played by experience and 
learning by doing in exporting. Although state dependence is high, firm heterogeneity among 
British SMEs also contributes to explain export persistence. Some SMEs export because only
l3Roberts and Tybout (1997) find that only 5% of firms switch their export status more than once among all 
Colombian plants in a six-year period. Bernard and Jensen (1997) observe rates above 12% for US plants in a 
seven-year period. Bonaccorsi (1992) reports a rate of 40% for Italian plants in a ten-year period.
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a few firms have the necessary characteristics to take advantage of favourable shocks. Firm 
size and foreign ownership are the most important observable characteristics dintinguishing 
exporters from non exporters.
We also test hypotheses about spillovers, exchange rate shocks, foreign demand shocks and 
perception of uncertainty about export destinations from the recent literature on trade and 
firms. We find a positive but weak role of geographic spillovers on the export decision by 
SMEs. In line with the export hedging literature, greater exchange rate volatility stimulates 
export participation decision. The rest of variables have no noticiable effects on exporting in 
our sample. The last results should be taken with caution since these industry-level variables 
are used in a static model of firm decision.
There are future lines of research. First, Roberts and Tybout (1997) found evidence of 
an uneven response of firm export participation in different industries to changes in exchange 
rates. As our dataset becomes larger in years and firms, we will investigate the sensitivity of 
the individual export participation and volume of exports to changes in exchange rates within 
industries. Second, a different response of export supply (participation vs value of exports) 
to changes in exchange rates will help to improve export promotion policies depending on the 
population target. If most of the effort has been paid on understanding the consequences 
of direct subsidies for stable exporters, little effort has received the effectiveness of export 
incentives such as access to information or learning on new exporters performance.
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1.6 A ppendix l.A s D ata description.
The empirical data used in the present study are mainly taken from FAME (Financial Analysis 
Made Easy). It is a financial database on CD-ROM containing major public and private 
companies from Jordan Watch and the Jordan Survey database. It is collected by Jordans 
and Bureau Van Dyck for commercial use and it includes balance sheet data, profit and loss 
statements and some complementary information on all UK firms that satisfy one or more 
of these criteria: Turnover greater than £700,000; Shareholder Funds greater than £700,000; 
Profits before tax greater than £40,000. This accounts for about 110,000 firms. It also contains 
a sample of 100,000 small-medium sized firms that satisfy one or more of these criteria: Turnover 
greater than £250,000; Current Assets or Liabilities greater than £250,000; profits before tax 
greater than £25,000.
We use the filters of FAME to select companies operating primarily in the manufacturing 
industry (SIC92 codes 1511 to 3663). FAME provided information for 25240 over the period 
1992-1998, but some firms are repeated due to consolidated accounts (group accounts, holding 
accounts). In these cases we keep the individual and not the group. We have also eliminated 
repeated companies that changed legal status from limited company (LTD) to public limited 
company (PLC) during the period. The number of firms is reduced to 24115.
Our sample of firms is obtained after the following filters:
(i) companies with complete information for seven consecutive years (4759);
(ii) companies without measurement errors. The data was trimmed to eliminate possible 
outliers. Observations with total sales, employment, wages or tangible assets changing more 
than 150 percent in one year were excluded (4312);
(iii) companies classified in manufacturing activity before 1992 according to the 3 digit 
SIC80 classification (4168);
(iv) companies with less than 250 workers in 1992 (3023);
(v) firms that were set up after 1955 (2510);
(vi) firms operating in industries with export intensity above 10 percent in 1992 (1769);
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The justification for the sample selection procedures (iv)-(vi) is twofold. We believe that 
this sample is valid to represent the population of firms that are more likely to suffer a change in 
their export status, that is, young small and medium sized companies competing in exporting 
industries. The final data set contains 7 annual observations for 1679 companies; a total of 
11753 observations.
Firm-level variables
The following variab es are obtained directly from FAME database
Name Definition FAME Code
Sales Turnover P&L 1
Home sales UK Turnover P&L 2
Exports Export Turnover P& L3
Operative costs Total expenses related to production activity P&L 5
Profits Profits before tax P&L 14
Employment Total number of employees P&L 26
Wage Total remuneration, including directors’ remuneration P&L 23
Directors’ wage Directors’ remuneration P&L 24
Tangible assets Land, building, fixtures, plant & vehicles Balance 31
Debt Long term liabilities Balance 85
Total Assets Fixed assets plus current assets Balance 70
Industry code Four-digit SIC codes (up to ten); both SIC92 and SIC80 -
Age Year of registration in Company House -
Industry Main activity by 4 digit SIC92 code -
Diversification Whether firm operates in more than one 3 digit SIC92 Code -
Location Region location according to postcode -
Number of directors Number of directors excluding Company Secretary Director List
Subsidiary Whether the company is subsidiary or independent Shares List
Foreign owned Whether parental firm of subsidiary is foreign Shares List
Industry-level variables
Name Definition Source, period
Export prices 4 digit SIC92 export unit values index UK Markets Report, 1993-94
Product Sales&Trade, 1995-98
Output prices 4 digit SIC92 output price index Sector Review, 1993-1998
Region-industry 3-digit SIC80 share of region-industry AES, 1992
concentration in total employment
Exchange Rate 3-digit SIC80 standard deviation of industry IFS, EUROSTAT, 1990-93
volatility monthly growth rate of exchange rate
Export growth rate 4-digit SIC92 industry growth rate of exports Sector Review, 1990-93
Export Uncertainty Percentage of responses in Survey claiming CBI Industrial Trends Survey
political and economic problems abroad is an 1992
important factor constraining export decision
1.7 A ppendix l.B : D o changes in export status affect firm per­
formance?
Tables 1.1 displays several features of the data after classifying each firm into five different export 
status: (1) new entrants, (2) exiters, (3) irregular exporters - firms that switch export status 
more than once- (4) stable exporters and (5) non-exporters. We distinguish three measures 
of performance: size, profitability and productivity. Total sales, employment and fixed assets 
capture the firm size evolution. We observe that exporters are larger than non-exporters, and 
that entrants and exiters are larger than non-exporters but smaller than regular exporters. 
New exporters show substantially high growth rates of sales, fixed assets and employment 
while exiters have significantly lower growth rates, compared to both stable exporters and 
non-exporters.
In order to measure profitability we use two standard corporate finance ratios, return on 
sales and return on assets. In addition, we include total debt-to-output as a measure of leverage. 
In levels, the three ratios are similar for all companies. However, the evolution of the ratios is
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particularly illustrative of the change that a firm observes when its export status changes. New 
entrants and exiters show a significant increase in the return rates compared to the other firms, 
while non-exporters and irregular exports suffer gradual deterioration in the return rates. The 
leverage ratio of all firms improved during the period.
Finally, we analyse the evolution of firm productivity, wage per worker, directors’ wages 
and average operative costs. The best indicators correspond to new exporters. They show very 
high levels of labour productivity compared to the rest of firms. As a result, new entrants also 
show greater growth rates in wages.
The analysis of the measures of firm performance reveals that the transition from one export 
status to another matters to better understanding firm performance. Export decision affects 
the evolution of the main determinants of firm behaviour such as profitability, productivity or 
size, and therefore current success and future survival.
We can complement the descriptive analysis with a simple regression analysis to evaluate 
the impact of export status changes on firm performance. In several papers Bernard and his 
colleagues (referenced in Bernard and Jensen, 1999) have examined the differences between 
exporters and non-exporters using the regression equation yu = bo + b\xu +  biZu +  uu where 
the dependent variable yu is an indicator of firm performance, Xu is a dummy variable for 
current export status and zu is a vector of other firm characteristics. If the coefficient of the 
export-dummy is positive and significant, then an export premium for the firm characteristic 
exists. Here we measure the export premium effect by comparing the performance of entrants 
versus exiters in our sample of UK SMEs. The export decision is discrete and can change 
in only two ways. A non-exporter might decide to export one year, or an exporter might stop 
exporting one year or forever. We decompose the change in export status into indicators for 
entering into foreign market and leaving it, and examine the possibility that the two decisions 
do not have the same impact on firm performance measured by six variables: (1) E M  P L  : 
the log of number of employees (2) D SA L  : the log of domestic sales, (3) P D T V : the log of 
labour productivity or total turnover per employee (4) WAGE: the log of wage per employee,
(5) D IR E : the log of average director’s wage, and (6 ) ROS: the return on sales as measure of
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profitability.
The empirical model of export premium on firm performance is
At/it =  P A x it +  Vzit + Auft (1.26)
where y is the variable measuring performance, x  is the indicator of export status and z  is a
vector of firm and industry covariates. We decompose the change in export status into the
following:
E N TR Yt =  1 if xt = 1 and xt- 1  =  0; 0 otherwise
E X IT t  =  1 if xt =  0  and x t- \  =  1 ; 0  otherwise (1-27)
STAYt =  1 if xt =  1 and xt- 1  =  1 ; 0 otherwise
The last combination (which reflects the non-exporting decision) is absorbed into the intercept.
We estimate then
A yit =  a ltENTRYit +  a2tE X IT it +  a3tSTAYu +  A (1.28)
where A y a = yu — yu- 1  and Auu  is defined similarly.14
Each coefficient gives the increase in annual growth rates for entrants, exiters and regular 
exporters, relative to non-exporters every year. First, we will test whether the coefficients are 
constant over time. Next, we test whether exporters in both years perform differently than 
non-exporters. Finally, we test whether the coefficient for a new exporter in one year is equal in
14 An equivalent specification is
A yu  =  7 it*«-i +  l 2 tx it +  'y3 tx itx i t - i  +  TjZit +  A u it (1.29)
where au = 72t> a21 =7it» «3t = 7 u  +72t +73t- Under the null hypothesis of no export performance premium 
o-it — —o-2t =  P,  f l 3 t = 0 ,  t  =  2 , . . . , T
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absolute value but opposite in sign to the coefficient on the company that stops exporting that 
year. Each estimation allows for additional covariates such as age, firm size and lagged return 
on sales to enter freely into each change equation. In addition a set of industry and regional 
dummies are included.
The results of imposing time-invariant coefficients for each equation are reported in Table 
1.2. In the first panel the restriction is that the coefficients do not change over time. For 
the variables employment, return on sales, wage per worker we reject the null hypothesis. For 
domestic sales, labour productivity and director’s wage we accept that the coefficients are 
constant over time. In all the cases the coefficient of export switch for entrants is positive and 
the coefficient for exiters is negative. The second panel on the table constraints the coefficient 
on STAY to zero. The hypothesis that regular exporters perform equal than non-exporters is 
accepted for all the indicators except director’s wage. Maintaining the hypothesis that the 
restriction ct$t =  0  is correct, the last panel presents the results of constraining a\t =  —an 
V£ Again there is evidence in favour of the equal but opposite restriction on the coefficients 
of ENTRY and EXIT. It is strongly accepted in four cases - employment, domestic sales and 
productivity and director’s wage. Thus there is evidence of symmetry in the decision to exit 
compared to the decision to entry impact on the firm performance.
We conclude that new exporters have a substantial increase in the growth rates in employ­
ment, wages, sales and productivity compared to non-exporters. On average the estimated 
coefficient varies from 5% in productivity to 1% in wages. Companies that decide to interrupt 
the exporting activity suffer significant losses in employment, employees’ wage, director’s wage, 
total sales and productivity. The negative estimated impact on the growth rates varies from 
-7% in director’s wage to -3% in employment or productivity. We conclude that the bulk of the 
evidence is in favour of the restrictions a n  =  0 and ait =  — 02t* Akin with Bernard and Jensen 
findings for US, the results show that firms switching export status undergo dramatic contem­
poraneous changes in size, wage and productivity. Firms experiment a substantial improvement 
the year they switch from non-exporters to exporters while exiters have a quantitatively equiv­
alent performance, but with opposite sign.
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Table 1.1: Trajectories of firm characteristics by export status.
EXPORTER STATUS VARIABLE Mean Std. Dev. Change
NEW EXPORTER Total sales (£000) 8800 10135 151.30
Number firms=87 Home sales (£000) 8386 9953 129.81
Age=1977 Exports (£000) 414 1379 -
Employment 78 82 59.65
Total assets (£000) 5791 7263 66.91
Return on sales (%) 0.03 0.12 4.53
Return on assets (%) 0.07 0.15 6.73
Debt-output ratio(%) 0.15 0.57 -6.96
Average operative cost (£) 0.71 0.17 8.02
Labour productivity (£000) 167 198 41.07
Wage per worker (£) 18951 6608 31.86
Average director's wage (£) 37586 26582 59.70
EXITER Total sales (£000) 5707 5764 28.66
Number firms= 42 Home sales (£000) 5456 5635 39.37
Age=1976 Exports (£000) 251 581 -
Employment 72 76 8.79
Total assets (£000) 3490 3605 21.39
Return on sales (%) 0.04 0.13 6.49
Return on assets (%) 0.03 0.23 8.20
Debt-output ratio(%) 0.08 0.30 -4.22
Average operative cost (£) 0.71 0.16 7.47
Labour productivity (£000) 127 154 -6.13
Wage per worker (£) 19844 9633 22.85
Average director's wage (£) 30691 19801 17.18
IRREGULAR EXPORTER Total sales (£000) 6561 7130 64.93
Number firms: 86 Home sales (£000) 5925 5945 62.19
Age=1976 Exports (£000) 636 2882 -
Employment 71 51 20.07
Total assets (£000) 3955 4451 24.15
Return on sales (%) o.ot 0.42 -3.78
Return on assets (%) 0.06 0.15 -0.52
Debt-output ratlo(%) 0.07 0.16 -1.24
Average operative cost (£) 0.75 0.32 3.74
Labour productivity (£000) 147 305 24.20
Wage per worker (£) 18073 9601 10.92
Average director's wage (£) 32004 21928 22.57
STABLE EXPORTER Total sales (£000) 10169 15311 57.05
Number firms: 996 Home sales (£000) 6681 10485 86.37
Age=1977 Exports (£000) 3487 8809 -7.78
Employment 93 79 34.17
Total assets (£000) 7191 12189 18.40
Return on sales (%) 0.04 0.20 0.54
Return on assets (%) 0.07 0.23 2.31
Debt-output ratlo(%) 0.08 0.19 -4.12
Average operative cost (£) 0.71 0.20 7.05
Labour productivity (£000) 144 227 14.67
Wage per worker (£) 19712 8550 21.54
Average director's wage (£) 46493 31195 84.97
NO EXPORTER Total sales (£000) 5352 6471 58.22Number firms=468 Home sales (£000) 5352 6471 58.22Age=1976 Exports (£000) 0 0 0.00
Employment 60 68 24.31
Total assets (£000) 3510 5682 15.34
Return on sales (%) 0.05 0.37 -1.57
Return on assets (%) 0.08 0.99 -1.49
Debt-output ratfo(%) 0.25 1.32 -6.18
Average operative cost (£) 0.73 0.26 1.41
Labour productivity (£000) 142 376 22.47
Wage per worker (£) 17800 7501 21.26
Average director's wage (£) 36183 27133 46.26
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Table 1.2: The effect of current entry/exit foreign markets on UK firm performance (1993-1998). 













F-test (d.f =15) 22.79 * 14.79 17.35 26.29 ** 32.70 *** 8.91
Start 0.026 0.028 0.051 0.002 0.013 0.011
[1.952] [1.323] [3.302] [0.291] [1.305] [0.376]
Exit -0.034 -0.017 -0.042 -0.037 -0.005 -0.079
[2.305] [1.695] [2.402] [3.277] [0.444] [2.122]
Stay -0.001 -0.009 -0.005 -0.002 0.0009 0.017
[0.387] [1.632] [1.620] [0.973] [0.412] [2.254]
Adding restriction Stay=0
F-test (d.f =16) 23.56* 17.45 19.79 27.23 ** 32.87 *** 13.97
Start 0.026 0.035 0.055 0.004 0.013 0.024
[2.087] [1.637] [3.639] [0.440] [1.255] [0.814]
Exit -0.033 -0.011 -0.038 -0.036 -0.005 -0.068
[2.274] [1.456] [2.204] [3.192] [0.496] [1.947]
Adding restriction Start=- Exit
F-test (d.f =17) 23.67 16.03 20.36 33.21 *** 33.12** 14.97
Heteroscedasticity-robust t-statistics in brackets Specifications 3 to 6 allow to enter firm size, age, return on sales 
and d um m ies  for industry and region. *** significant at 1% level , ** significant at 5% level and * significant at 
10% level




















Export Export 0.987 0.975 0.983 0.977 0.977 0.980 0.980
No export 0.013 0.025 0.017 0.023 0.023 0.020 0.020
No export Export 0.048 0.064 0.066 0.051 0.064 0.059 0.059
No export 0.952 0.936 0.934 0.949 0.936 0.941 0.941
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TABLE 1.4: Dynamic probit model of export participation












and error te rm 1
MODEL 3
1994 and 1998 only 
(No correlation 
between covariates 
and error te rm )
MODEL 4
1994 and 1998 only 
(With correlation 
between covariates 
and error te rm )
Constant -2.771 ** (0.384) -5.734 ** (0.913) -6.968 “ (1.112) -4.533 ~ (0.990) -4.663 “ (1.089)
Laaaed derrendent variable
Exported last year * (age>15) 1.390 ** (0.172) 1.315 “ (0.178) 2.786 •* (0.263) 2.781 ** (0.272)
Exported last year * (age<15) 1.643 ** (0.140) 1.588 ** (0.144) 2.907 “  (0.241) 2.910 ** (0.244)
Time-varvina firm level variables
ln(Capital Stock) (t-1) 0.144 “ (0.013) 0.439 •* (0.009) 0.309 * (0.139) 0.275 ** (0.069) 0.292 ** (0.065)
In(Productivity) (t-1) 0.102 ~ (0.027) 0.394 ** (0.107) 0.121 (0.253) 0.212 ** (0.105) 0.252 (0.317)
ln(Directors' Wage) (t-1) 0.182 ** (0.025) 0.324 ** (0.095) 0.063 (0.162) 0.183 * (0.105) 0.080 (0.252)
Return on sales (t-1) -0.003 (0.075) 0.054 (0.574) 0.243 (0.776) 0.177 (0.667) 0.116 (0.987)
Time-Invariant firm variables
Subsidiary/domestic owned 0.317 ** (0.042) 0.249 * (0.146) 0.503 «* (0.201) 0.132 (0.203) 0.141 (0.208)
Subsidiary/foreign owned 0.488 ~ (0.068) 0.687 ** (0.242) 0.723 ** (0.267) 0.293 (0.234) 0.304 * (0.182)
Set up between 1970 and 1980 -0.182 ** (0.052) -0.342 ** (0.179) -0.376 * (0.195) -0.170 (0.183) -0.159 (0.189)
Set up after 1980 -0.214 ** (0.042) -0.324 * (0.196) -0.345 * (0.201) -0.132 (0.197) -0.137 (0.209)
Diversification 0.026 (0.044) 0.249 (0.183) 0.273 * (0.169) 0.022 (0.180) 0.024 (0.186)
Relative exDort Drlce 0.033 (0.040) 0.002 (0.090) 0.034 (0.239) 0.242 (0.647) 0.232 (0.238)
Industry dummies No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Realonal dummies No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year dummies No Yes Yes Yes No
Pre-samDle Information
Regional industry concentration, 1992 0.025 * (0.014)
Growth rate of exports 1990-93 -0.001 (0.118)
Country-destination inestability 1992 -0.046 (0.225)
Volatility exchange rate 1990-93 0.242 “ (0.102)
Residual from Initial condition probit 0.689 “ (0.058) 0.835 “ (0.041) 0.804 ~ (0.171) 0.810 ” (0.178)
Variance of unobservable heterogeneity
as % of total unexplained variance (r) 0.602 ** (0.101) 0.634 ** (0.102) 0.310 * (0.164) 0.313 * (0.168)
Log Likelihood -2987.15 -930.32 -899.47 -407.58 -407.32
Log Likelihood with r=0 -1152.89 -928.98 -411.54 -411.77
Constant only log-likelihood -3456.89
Number of firms 1679 1679 1679 1679 1679
Number observations 1679 8395 8395 3358 3358
In parenthesis standard errors; ** significant at the 1 % level; * significant at the 5% level
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Table 1.5: State dependence - raw probabilities and predicted probability.
Firm with age Firm with age
> 15 years <15 years
Raw Data Probabilities
[1] [2]
1 Exporting at t-1 Exporting at t 0.9776 0.9791
2 Non-exporting at t-1 Exporting at t 0.0612 0.0573
3 Non-exporting at t-1 Non-exporting at t 0.9388 0.9427
4 Exporting at t-1 Non-exporting at t 0.0224 0.0209
Predicted probabilities holding characteristics constant
Pooled Probit Model
5 Keep same export status in t-1 and t 0.9617 0.9693
6 Change export status between t-1 and t 0.0721 0.0834
9 State dependence 0.8896 0.8859
10 As percentage of raw probability [9/(3-4)] 0.9707 0.9610
Random Effect Probit Model
11 Keep same export status in t-1 and t 0.8953 0.8791
12 Change export status between t-1 and t 0.1166 0.1093
13 State dependence 0.7787 0.7698
14 As percentage of raw probability [13/(3-4>] 0.7497 0.7428
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Table 1.6: Predicted probability of exporting







Independent -2 0.000 0.770
Set up after 1980 -1 0.004 0.836
No-diversified 0 0.065 0.900
25th percentile of 1 0.123 0.940
time-variant characteristics 2 0.180 0.978
Foreign subsidiary -2 0.041 0.969
Set up before 1970 -1 0.082 0.988
Diversified 0 0.149 0.996
75th percentile of 1 0.209 0.999
time-variant characteristics 2 0.275 0.999
The firm effect is one-time the standard deviation with respect to the mean. 
Table 1.7: SML estimation of dynamic probit model of export
Variables Coefficient S.E.
Constant -2.448 ** (0.079)
Lagged export status 3.583 ** (0.062)
Log(capital stock) 0.119 W * (0.022)
Return on sales 0.079 (0.128)
Set up after 1980 0.032 (0.058)
Diversification 0.055 (0.066)
Foreign-owned subsidiary 0.125 * (0.067)
Export price -0.001 (0.094)





Number of firms 1679
Number of observations 8395
For estimation we use the GAUSS program SSML, kindly provided by Vassilis Hajivassiliou. Note that the 
specification of the model is more parsimonious than the one estimated using the random probit model without 
autocorrelated error term (Model 2). The excluded variables are directors’ wage, labour productivity, dummy 
for set up before 1970 and a dummy for domestic subsidiaries
”Rho” represents the variance of the unobservable heterogeneity as percentage of the total explained variance.
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00000 28.36% 31.15% 00111 0.81% 0.15%
00001 0.98% 0.30% 01011 0.12% 0.07%
00010 0.17% 0.15% 01101 0.06% 0.00%
00100 0.12% 0.00% 01110 0.17% 0.07%
01000 0.12% 0.07% 10011 0.12% 0.00%
10000 0.35% 0.00% 10101 0.00% 0.00%
00011 0.92% 0.45% 10110 0.00% 0.00%
00101 0.00% 0.00% 11001 0.12% 0.00%
00110 0.12% 0.07% 11010 0.29% 0.00%
01001 0.00% 0.00% 11100 0.40% 0.07%
01010 0.06% 0.00% 01111 1.61% 0.30%
01100 0.12% 0.00% 10111 0.29% 0.00%
10001 0.00% 0.00% 11011 0.00% 0.00%
10010 0.12% 0.00% 11101 0.52% 0.00%
10100 0.12% 0.00% 11110 1.10% 0.45%
11000 0.58% 0.07% 11111 62.31% 66.54%
Table 1.9: Statistical summary of variables
Variables Mean Std. Dev. Minimum Maximum
Export status 0.689 0.462 0 1
Lagged export status*setup<1980 0.274 0.446 0 1
Lagged export status*setup>1980 0.414 0.492 0 1
ln(Capital Stock) (t-1) 6.420 1.281 2.302 10.612
ln(Productivity) (t-1) 4.229 0.733 2.542 8.045
ln(Wage) (t-1) 4.696 0.734 2.771 7.425
Return on sales (t-1) 0.024 0.113 -0.781 0.484
Subsidiary/domestic owned 0.510 0.500 0 1
Subsidiary/foreign owned 0.190 0.392 0 1
Set up between 1970 and 1980 0.281 0.449 0 1
Set up after 1980 0.415 0.493 0 1
Diversification 0.719 0.433 0 1
Relative export price 0.814 13.05 44.3 140.93
Pre-sample information
Regional industry concentration, 1992 1.197 1.005 0.001 12.20
Growth rate of exports 1990-93 12.96 25.71 -48.52 55.29
Country-destination inestability 1992 0.301 0.146 0.045 0.731
Volatility exchange rate 1990-93 2.975 0.312 2.147 3.688
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Chapter 2
Internationalisation and export 
diversification: A semi-parametric 
approach.
2.1 Introduction
While Chapter 1 looked at the export participation decision, the next two chapters examine 
the marketing strategy of exporting firms. Chapter 2 investigates how different firms approach 
the international market place in terms of the number of products they sell and the number of 
countries they export to. In Chapter 3 we will search what factors determine which markets 
firms export to.
Export diversification of a single-product firm can be defined as the degree of spread of 
sales over different foreign markets. There is a common belief that increased involvement in 
exporting encourages diversification to a larger number of countries. This can be attributed to 
several reasons. First corporate resources increase as the firm moves to more advanced levels of 
exporting, allowing a broader market focus. Second, the market spreading strategy minimises 
risks and exploits opportunities better than a concentrated strategy. Third, the problems in 
managing business in different foreign markets tend to diminish as the firm acquires more
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export experience. However, it is unclear what the limits of diversification are. Note first 
that the number of countries is not the only dimension that matters with respect to export 
diversification. Exporting firms diversify not only in destination but also in the products that 
they sell abroad. Exporters might become more diversified across markets because they produce 
more than one product and different products have different markets. Alternatively, large firms 
tend to be multiple-product so they may expand exports through product dispersion. Moreover, 
it is not completely clear why firms should always become more diversified as they become 
more export dependent. If international trade theories predict that comparative advantage 
forces stimulate industry specialisation, why not expect to see firms becoming more specialised 
in their export activities? If diversification as a strategy for risk-spreading ensures a stable 
cash flow in international markets, concentration of exports can be viewed as a strategy of firm 
internationalisation by achieving economies of scale in production and distribution.
If the number of empirical studies about industry diversification has increased rapidly in 
recent years, there is a lack of research on export diversification. Most studies about firm 
export activity have focused on the determinants of export participation and export intensity 
due to the fact that export diversification at firm level is very data demanding. In this 
chapter we use the complete distribution of export sales by product and country for a large 
sample of manufacturing Spanish exporters in 1988. With such a detailed information we can 
answer some unsolved questions about export diversification. (1) Does export diversification 
always increase with firm internationalisation?; (2) Is there any difference between market 
diversification and product diversification as firms become more export-orientated?; (3) Besides 
the firm export/sales ratio, which other firm or industry characteristics have a significant impact 
on export diversification?
To test the hypothesis whether more export-orientated firms exhibit higher product and 
market dispersion of sales, we proceed in two steps. First, we contruct indices of export di­
versification by destination and by product, separately, which increase with the number of 
markets (products), the uneven distribution of the value of sales, and the extent of hetero­
geneity between markets (products). Second, we use semi-parametric regression techniques
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to analyse the internationalisation-diversification relationship. After controlling for firm and 
industry characteristics that may affect the internationalisation-diversification profile, we rep­
resent graphically the export diversification trajectory of a representative firm, as it becomes 
more export-orientated.
In our application to the Spanish case, we find that exporters opt for a strategy of market 
diversification in the early stages of internationalisation. Light exporters begin selling to few 
markets. As they become more export-orientated they explore new destinations, exhibit a more 
even distribution of sales across destinations and/or choose a sample of more heterogeneous 
countries. After reaching a certain level of exports as proportion of total sales, the number 
of destinations is fixed, the selection of destinations is more homogenous and the distribution 
of export value tends to be more concentrated in few destinations. Thus there is not a linear 
relationship between market diversification and firm internationalisation. Finally, we find a 
negative correlation between product diversification and firm internationalisation in almost all 
the analysed industries. The findings suggest that the success of export-orientated exporters 
relies heavily on product specialisation.
In Section 2 we explain the methodology used in the rest of the chapter. Section 3 describes 
the data and Section 4 examines the determinants of market and product diversification of 
Spanish manufacturing exports, with special attention to the role of firm internationalisation. 
A summary of the major findings and conclusions is reported in Section 5.
2.2 Research approach.
Our first step is to measure export diversification. Traditionally, product diversification has 
been defined as the spread of sales across different industries, and market diversification as the 
spread of exports across different destinations. With available information about products and 
markets, the optimal strategy seems to be the construction of two indices of export diversi­
fication, one by markets (the geographic diversification index) and another by products (the 
product diversification index). The indices are based on the work by Gollup and Mohanan
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(1991). The indices are designed so that they are sensitive to the number of distinct markets 
(products) that the firm exports to, the changes in the distribution of export value to these 
markets (products), and the extent of heterogeneity among the markets (products). When 
Gollup and Mohanan compared their index with the standard Herfindahl-based index, they 
found that the diversification index that accounts for heterogeneity doubled when the unit of 
production was the firm instead of the establishment. Therefore, it is important to control for 
heterogenity when we use firm-level data.
The geographic diversification index (GDI) of exports is equal to one minus the Herfindahl 
index, corrected by a measure of heterogeneity,
G D I = i  
2
(2.1)
where n  is the total number of destination markets measured by countries, is the share of 
sales in a country i over the total exports and cr^ - is a ’’distance” function quantifying the 
heterogeneity between markets i and j }  Appendix 2.1. describes the properties of the index 
in detail.
The first term in GDI identifies the effect of changing the number of markets on the index. 
It varies directly with the number of export markets. The second term focuses on market 
distribution of sales and it is based on the maintained hypothesis that diversification decreases 
as sales shift more and more to a single destination. Holding the number of markets fixed, the 
index GDI decreases as a firm adopts a more uniform market distribution. The index posits that 
a firm exporting to n markets having a 1/n  share in the firm’s total exports is more diversified 
that another firm exporting to the same number of markets but with one representing, say, 90% 
of firm sales. The third term captures the notion of ’’heterogeneity” among destinations. If 
two countries share common characteristics (i.e. proximity, same economic or geographic area,
^ o t e  that the first two terms can be expressed as one minus the Herfindahl index 1 — H  — 1 ~ Y l  s i =
and similar level of development), they should be treated as one single market. Dissimilarity 
between destinations should contribute positively to the index of diversification. The distance 
function Oij is constructed as
J  _  djj -m in [ d ik,djk]
13 max [dik, djk] -  min [dik, djk\
where dik , djk is the physical distance (in kilometers) between the capitals of country i(j) and 
any other country in the world k to where the firm exports, a%j takes a maximum value of 1 
if d{j =  max(dik,djk), that is, the largest possible distance between two countries, and takes 
value of 0 if d{j =  imn(dik,djk). We also calculated the heterogeneity component using the 
absolute difference in income per capita between pairs of countries. Although both measures 
of heterogenity were highly positive correlated (p = 0.83), we prefer the use of distance as 
indicator of heterogeneity since it embodies the concepts of ’’Geography” and transport costs.
Summarising, ceteris paribus, GDI is an increasing function of the number of destinations, 
varies directly with an increasing equal distribution of sales by markets, and increases with 
greater dissimilarity between destinations.
The index of product diversification (PDI) of exports is constructed in a similar way. Here 
Si takes the value of the exports of the distinct i four-digit Combined Nomenclature product as 
percentage of the total exports of the firm. The distance function is constructed as
(Tij —
0 CN3i = CN3j
0.5 i f  CN2i = CN2j, CN3i ±  CN3j
1 CN2i ^  CN2j
(2.3)
where CN2  and CN3 stand for the Combined Nomenclature product group aggregated at two 
and three digit, respectively. When a firm exports two products belonging to the same three 
digit product group, both products are treated as homogenous (cr^ - =  0), and if they belong to 
two different two digit industry codes there are treated as heterogeneous products (<T{j =  1).
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For the intermediate case we assign an arbitrary value of one-half.
After constructing the two indices, the next step is to analyse the relationship between in­
ternationalisation and diversification. Aw and Batra (1998) have investigated whether market 
diversification, through exports, can be viewed as an alternative for product diversification. 
They showed that small sized firms in Taiwan prefer market diversification to product diver­
sification. They also found that large single-product companies are domestic-orientated while 
large exporters are also multiple-product firms. In some way we extend their empirical research 
by examining the determinants of export diversification by product and destination.
While there is strong evidence of a positive relationship between size and diversification, 
the internationalisation- diversification profile of the exporting firm remains unsolved. To 
analyse this relationship we use semi-parametric regression techniques. The advantage of this 
econometric technique is that we do not have to impose any ad hoc parametric form between 
the dependent variable, the diversification index, and the explanatory variable of interest, the 
export/sales ratio. There are four reasons that justify our approach: the past empirical evidence 
is unclear, there is a lack of theoretical framework, our data set is very large, and the technique 
is particularly useful for inter-industry comparisons.
Past empirical evidence is scarce and mixed. Hirsh and Lev (1971) used firm-level survey 
data to analyse the determinants of export geographical diversification in three countries. They 
found that the export/sales ratio was positively associated with diversification in Israel, nega­
tively in Denmark and there was no correlation in Netherlands. For Spain, Alonso y Donoso 
(1994) found that statistically the relationship between export propensity and destination di­
versification was non-lineal. So far we do not know any other studies that analyse the strategy 
of diversification of exporting firms, and no study has dealt with product diversification.
Marketing strategy theories provide reasons for export diversification to increase or decrease 
with the process of internationalisation of the firm. Once a firm becomes an exporter, it must 
choose between spreading its efforts among numerous products or markets and concentrating 
on a small number of products or markets. The decision can be viewed as being dependent on a 
trade-off between profitability and risk in the export activity. Total risk is reduced by increasing
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the number of products or markets whenever there is no strong correlation between risks facing 
firms in production or in different markets (Hirsch and Lev, 1971). This kind of investment is not 
cost-free. Foreign entry involves sunk costs that reduce profits. Moreover, if there are economies 
of scale in marketing, concentration will yield higher total returns than when the effort is spread 
thinly over several products and markets (Basevi, 1970). It is expected that diversification and 
firm size have a positive relationship, while firm size and export/sales ratio have a non-linear 
relationship. We may expect export/sales ratio and diversification to be positively correlated 
in early stages of internationalisation but it becomes unclear how the relationship evolves as 
the export sales ratio approaches to one. The use of semi-parametric regression techniques 
eliminates the impact of firm size on both the diversification and export/sales profile before 
drawing the profile between these two variables.
Empirically, the use of Kernel functions is not recommended when the number of obser­
vations is small because of the asymptotic bias in the estimation. Since our data set consists 
of 5229 firms, the use of this technique is adequate. Finally, cross-industry differences may 
be very important to characterise the export/sales-diversification profile. In our application, 
semi-parametric regression techniques make inter-industry comparisons easier due to the use of 
graphs.
2.3 Export diversification in Spain.
Recent studies have analysed the pattern of industry diversification of Spanish manufacturers 
in the eighties and nineties, but there is no research on the pattern of export diversification. 
Suarez (1993) and Merino and Rodriguez (1998) find that, on average, 70 percent of large sized 
firms and 90 percent of small sized firms do not diversify, without noticeable changes over time. 
Second, there is a strong association between firm size and number of industries in which the 
firm operates, but a weak relationship between firm size and diversification intensity. Finally, 
the portfolio diversification varies substantially with the primary industry activity of the firm.
To investigate the determinants of export diversification in Spain we use an original data
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set which contains information on the value of exports and imports, broken down by product 
and country destination, for all Spanish exporters of manufactures that employ more than 20 
staff and export above one million pesetas (~3000 ECU) in 1988. The data is based on firm 
records from Spanish Customs. A private marketing company called CAMERDATA completed 
the original data with information about total sales, employment by size range, foreign capital 
participation in ownership, industry activity (3 digit NACE) and geographic localisation by 
province. The final number of firms with complete information is 5229.2 For each company ex­
ports are classified according to the four-digit Combined Nomenclature codes (Eurostat, 1991). 
Firm-level data is complemented with industry-level data obtained from Spanish Industrial 
Census, 1988. Geographic distribution of manufacturing employment activity is available for 
30 aggregated industries and 50 provinces. The national-industry level variables from the In­
dustrial Census are (3 digit NACE) industry concentration, advertising expenditure, and R&D 
expenditure data.3
We start describing briefly the extent of internationalisation and export diversification by 
Spanish manufacturers in 1988. The average export/sales ratio by size group is presented in 
Table 1. There is a U-shaped relationship between firm size and export/sales ratio. Firms with 
less than 100 workers and firms with more than 5000 have export/sales ratios above average, 
while medium sized firms have export/sales ratio below average. Our findings are very similar 
to those reported by Bonaccorsi (1992) using Italian manufacturing census data.
Table 2 displays the frequency of export diversification. Each cell contains the percentage
2 The selection of firms was affected not only by missing information (mainly on sales and ownership structure), 
but also by the exclusion of countries and products:
-Exports/imports to/from Andorra;
-Exports/imports classified to/from  ’’special destinations” (destination codes 899-999);
-Exports/imports corresponding to non-manufacturing activities according to ’’Table of Correspondence CN- 
NACE” (Eurostat, 1991).
Although we had no access to the original data of all manufacturing exporters, there is not reason to think 
against the representativity of the sample.
3The correspondence between the Industrial Census codes and NACE codes is straightforward. The NACE 
codes are mapped with the CN codes using EUROSTAT, Table of Correspondence CN-NACE (1991). A complete 
description of the statistical sources of the data, the construction of the variables, and the correspondence between 
industrial codes can be obtained from the following authors: Castillo (1994) for CAMERDATA data set; Callejdn 
and Costa (1996) for province-industry employment data in the Industrial Survey; Gil and MAnez (1996) for R&D 
and advertising data in the Industrial Survey; and Requena (1996) for the industry concentration indices in the 
Industrial Survey.
62
of firms within a size group or export/sales ratio segment exporting certain number of products 
or exporting to some number of countries. Above 74% of firms exported more than one product 
and 82% exported to more than one country. Looking at the firm characteristics, there is a 
positive correlation between firm size and the number of products and markets of exports, while 
the relationship between the export/sales ratio and diversification is unclear.
Table 2 only exploits one dimension of diversification, the number of products or markets 
that a firm exports, but it does not give us any guidance about how diversification changes 
with the distribution of export sales or with the heterogeneity of the products and markets. 
For example, instead of using numbers of markets (products), we could say that a firm is 
diversified if the percentage of exports in secondary markets (products) is above 10 percent. 
Table 3, column 1 and 3, shows the percentage of firms whose main product (market) represents 
less than 90 percent of total exports. Column 2 and 4 indicate the average proportion of export 
sales in secondary products (markets), among diversified exporters. Again, the frequency of 
diversification is quite high. The number of diversified exporters increases with both firm size 
and internationalisation. A diversified exporter, on average, has 35 percent of export sales in 
secondary products and 45 percent in secondary markets.
Table 4 presents the mean values of GDI and PDI using the Herfindahl index and the 
Gollop and Mohanan index. The value of all the indices varies between zero and one. By 
construction the correction proposed by Gollop and Monahan always reduces its values relative 
to the Herfindahl index.
For the full sample, the Herfindahl GDI index varies between 0 and 0.95 with average value 
of 0.42, while the Gollop and Mohanan GDI index varies between 0 and 0.55 with average value 
of 0.24. The Herfindahl PDI index varies between 0 and 0.94 with average value of 0.24, while 
the Gollop and Mohanan PDI varies between 0 and 0.65 with average value 0.17. Although the 
use of different correction terms for GDI and PDI makes comparisons difficult, heterogeneity 
seems to be greater in the product portfolio than in the geographical portfolio.
The same indices are calculated for five selected industry groups, which account for 82 
percent of the total sample. The industries are (1) Food and drink, (2) Textile, clothing and
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footwear, (3) Metal, ceramic and glass products, (4) Chemical, rubber and plastic, and (5) 
Engineering products. Cross-industry comparison reveals that heterogeneity in firm character­
istics among exporters of different industries is quite substantial. For example, compared to the 
engineering industry, exporters in the textile industry are smaller, less export-dependent, less 
geographically diversified, and more production diversified. The next section explores econo- 
metrically the relationship between export diversification and firm internationalisation, after 
controlling for other firm and industry characteristics. To account for such inter-industry dif­
ferences, we perform our econometric analysis of the determinants of export diversification for 
each industry group separately.
2.4 Semi-parametric regression analysis
We investigate the relationship between export/sales ratio and diversification (PDI and GDI) 
using the semi-parametric estimation techniques, following Robinson (1988). The econometric 
model is
y = x'(3 + 0(z) +  u (2.4)
where y is the index of diversification (PDI or GDI) and x  is a n  x k vector of exogenous 
characteristics that affect the dependent variable linearly. The variable, z, the ratio between 
exports and total sales, is the non-parametric component of the model, that is, O(-) is unknown. 
The error term u has mean zero and finite variance, and E[u\x,z]  =  0. The estimation 
procedure has two steps. In the first step we estimate the vector of parameters (3 using OLS 
after transforming the model (2.4) in
y - E ( y \ z )  = (x -  E(x\z))'(3 + u (2.5)
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where E(y \z )  and E(x \z )  are non-parametric estimations of E ^ ( y  \z) and E ^ ( x  \z) using 
Kernel function. We use a high-order Kernel function to reduce the asymptotic bias in the 
estimation and the ’’bandwidth” parameter is chosen following the least square cross-validation 
method (Lee, 1998).4 In the second step, to obtain the relationship between international­
ization, measured by export/sales ratio (z), and the extent of diversification we estimate the 
non-parametric kernel regression
E ( y - x ' p \ z )  = 9(z) (2.6)
where ft is the OLS estimated parameters.
The parametric variables in x  are all firm specific: size, foreign ownership, import activity 
and an indicator of province-industry concentration of employment in manufactures. When the 
equations are estimated industry by industry the vector x  includes three additional variables: an 
index of industry concentration and two indicators of product differentiation based on R&D and 
advertising spending. The expected sign of the relationship between the vector x  of explanatory 
variables and the measures of export diversification is discussed briefly. Table 5 presents some 
statistical descriptive of the variables.
One stylised fact about diversification is the non-negative relationship between firm size 
and industry diversification. 5. Firm size may affect export diversification in various ways. As 
firms grow they find it more difficult to increase their share in the domestic market, so in order 
to grow further firms have to look for foreign markets. Moreover, large firms usually possess 
enough resources to access several foreign markets simultaneously. Furthermore, many large 
firms are multiple-product so they expand exports through product dispersion. Firm size is 
therefore expected to be positively associated with any strategy of export diversification. In 
the regresion analysis we use a set of four dummy variables for size, measured by number of
4We use a programme written in GAUSS to run the regressions.
BSee, among others, Grinyer and Yasai-Ardekani (1981), Gollop and Monahan (1991), Aw and Batra (1998), 
Merino de Luca and Rodriguez (1999)
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employees ([21-50], [51-100], [101-200] and [>200]). The smallest sizeband is ommited to avoid 
the multicollinearity problem.
Our second explanatory variable is foreign-ownership. For Spain, Castillo (1994) and Merino 
and Salas (1996) show that foreign-owned firms have significantly higher export participation 
and export propensity than domestic-owned firms in the manufacturing industry. Among 
exporting firms, we expect that foreign-owned firms will have higher product and market diver­
sification than domestic-owned firms do. Foreign-owned firms face lower cost in the introduction 
of new products or presence in new foreign markets due to their advantageous access to new 
products, process techniques and management practices developed by the parent firm. In the 
empirical model, the variable foreign-own firm takes a value equal to one if the firm has more 
than 25 percent of foreign capital, and zero otherwise.
Our third explanatory variable is the import activity of the firm. In our sample 43% of firms 
did some imports in 1988. Although the import activity of a manufacturing firm may be closer 
related to the input requirements of the production function, Castillo (1994) and Merino and 
Salas (1996) observe that firms with high export propensity also have greater import propensity. 
If firms learn through their import activities about opportunities to sell new products or enter 
into new countries, we should expect a positive correlation between firm’s import/sales ratio 
and export diversification. The import ratio is measured as the value of total imports divided 
by total sales.
It is interesting to ask whether firms that are competing abroad are located in such a way 
that localisation economies may help them to explain their export performance. Aitken et 
al. (1997) show that the presence of multinationals in some regions of Mexico induced local 
firms in this region to become exporters over the period 1985-1989. Bechetti et al. (2000) find 
positive effects of industrial districts on export intensity of small and medium sized firms in 
Italy. If localisation externalities generate more availability of specialised inputs and facilitate 
the diffusion of information and know-how about export products and markets, then industry- 
province activity concentration will stimulate export diversification. We measure geographical 
concentration of an industry as the percentage of employment of this industry in the province.
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Industry R&D and marketing as percentage of industry sales are introduced to control for 
product differentiation. Export diversification may occur because firms become so specialised in 
their products than local markets are not large enough. Product diversification and specialised 
market segmentation is more likely among firms whose main activity is in industries intensive 
in R&D and marketing (Teece, 1980; Jovanovic, 1993; Willing, 1993). Concentration in the 
domestic market is measured as the four largest firms’ sales concentration ratio adjusted by 
the import penetration ratio to take into account foreign competition in the domestic market. 
Firms in industries with strong domestic competition will have a less diversified production and 
marketing strategy in order to concentrate effort in a better defence. On the other hand, firms 
operating in oligopolistic industries may enjoy market power in the domestic market so they 
can employ more resources in product and market diversification abroad.
2.5 R esults
We first investigate the relationship between geographical diversification and internationalisa­
tion, putting an special emphasis on how such a relationship is affected by the extent of product 
diversification. Table 6 reports the semi-parametric regression of GDI on export ratio by num­
ber of product-lines. The sample is split-up into three groups of firms: single product firms, 
firms selling less than 5 products, firms selling more than 5 products. The industry effects have 
been netted out through the use of three-digit industry dummies. Interestingly, the results show 
important differences between single-product and multiple-product firms. The size of the firm 
seems not to have a significant impact on the firm export/sales ratio-GDI relationship for single­
product exporters. In opposition to our expectations, the coefficient on firm import activity is 
negative on market diversification in all the product segments, although it is only significant 
for single-product firms. Firms that depend heavily on imports for production tend to be more 
domestic-orientated, especially among single-product firms. As expected, the foreign ownership 
variable is positively related to market diversification in the three estimations, although the 
coefficient in only significant among firms exporting more than 5 different products. Finally,
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province sales concentration is also positively related to geographical export diversification, but 
the coefficient is only significant for multiple-product firms with less than five products.
Figure 1 summarises the non-parametric results of the export/sales ratio-GDI profile by the 
number of product-lines after controlling for firm and industry characteristics. For each group 
of firms, the export/sales ratio is on the x-axis and the geographic diversification index on the 
y-axis. At any given value of firm export/sales ratio, the graph indicates an average of the values 
of the index of diversification for observations within the kernel. As far as different products 
are more likely to be demanded by specific countries, multiple-product firms will export to more 
countries. In addition, the distribution of sales across destinations will be proportional to the 
production of each good, and markets will be more dissimilar due to production heterogeneity. 
The graph confirms this hypothesis. The GDI-export ratio profile shifts upward as firms export 
more products.
The GDI-export/sales ratio profiles are quite steep in the early stages of internationalisa­
tion of the firm. The maximum value of market diversification varies with the export/sales 
ratio: Around 32 percent for single-product firms, 26 percent for firms producing less than five 
products, and 49 percent for firms producing more than 5 products. After reaching the critical 
threshold, market diversification falls slowly but continuously for the three groups of firms.
To deepen our understanding of the relationship between export diversification and the ex­
port/sales ratio we analyse GDI and PDI separately for five groups of industries in order to 
identify possible industry differences masked by aggregation. Table 7 reports the results of 
the semi-parametric regression of GDI on export/sales ratio. The most significant firm char­
acteristic affecting the firm export ratio-GDI relationship in all the industries is the size of 
firm, suggesting that large companies tend to export to more countries than small compa­
nies. The foreign ownership variable is also positively related to market diversification in all 
industries except engineering equipment. The two industry-level variables measuring product 
differentiation, R&D and marketing, are positively related to market diversification in most 
industries, suggesting that the close link between investment in technology, product quality 
and product diversification is also valid for market diversification. However, the coefficients
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of these two variables are only statistically significant in engineering equipment. As expected, 
province-industry concentration of economic activity is also positively related to geographical 
diversification, confirming that expansion of exports towards new markets is stimulated by the 
proximity of other competitors. However, here the relationship was not statistically significant 
in the textile, clothing and footwear industry. The coefficient on firm’s import ratio showed a 
negative sign but was not significantly different from zero in all but one industry. Finally, we 
find no relationship between industry concentration and GDI.
The estimation results of the regression of PDI on export/sales ratio are reported in Table 
8. Firm size has a positive impact on product diversification of exports only among very large 
firms (>200 workers), except in engineering equipment in which no coefficient is significant. 
Foreign ownership still shows a positive impact on PDI but it is only statistically significant 
in the engineering and chemical industries. The industry characteristics of R&D spending 
and marketing expenditure show no correlation with PDI, while the signs of the coefficients 
of industry concentration on PDI are negative although they are only statistically significant 
in textile and chemicals. In contract to the GDI regressions, the import activity of the firm 
has a positive and statistically significant positive correlation with PDI in all industries except 
textiles. As in the GDI regression, the spatial concentration of industry export activity has a 
positive effect on product diversification, although the correlation is only statistically significant 
for the food and chemical industry.
The panels in Figure 2 summarise the non-parametric results of the export intensity-GDI 
profile and export intensity-PDI profile for the five industries, after controlling for firm-specific 
characteristics and market characteristics. By comparing the shape of the graphs in each of the 
five industries, the general impression is that there is not a clear positive relationship between 
export diversification and export/sales ratio. In fact the data shows that product diversification 
falls when firm’s export/sales ratio increases in all industries but food. The GDI-export ratio 
profile is positive and quite steep for all firms with an export ratio up to 20 percent. In the 
food and chemical industry the profile continues up, in the textile industry the GDI-export ratio 
profile becomes flat, and in the metal and engineering industry the GDI-export ratio profile
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falls. The empirical evidence has revealed a number of interesting features in the pattern of 
export diversification of Spanish manufacturing firms. First, the positive relationship between 
export diversification and firm internationalisation is only valid for market diversification but 
not for product diversification. Firms tend to be more specialised in their production as they 
are more internationalised. Therefore, product specialisation arises as a key characteristic of 
heavy export-orientated companies. Second, in the early stages on internationalisation firms 
tend to diversify in destination very quickly, but when these firms achieve certain levels of 
export dependence, the positive relationship between market diversification and exports/sales 
ratio disappears, and it becomes negative in some industries.
2.6 Conclusion
This paper deals with the international marketing strategy of exporters. In particular, we 
investigate the relationship between export diversification and firm internationalisation. Since 
theory and previous empirical evidence are unclear about the intemationalisation-diversification 
profile, we make use of semi-parametric regression techniques to explore such a relationship 
without imposing any a priori functional form in the estimation. We construct two indices 
of export diversification, one for markets and another for exported products. The indices are 
sensitive to the number of markets (products), distribution of the value of sales, and the extent 
of heterogeneity between markets (products). Internationalisation is defined by the export/sales 
ratio.
Our research exploits the information about export values by product and destination of 
Spanish manufacturing exporters in 1988. The results show that there is an inverted U-shaped 
relation between firm export/sales ratio and the geographical diversification of exports. Al­
though multi-product firms have their exports more geographic diversified compared with single­
product firms, the shape of the inverted U-shaped relation is not altered.
In almost all the industries analysed, the results show that firms tend to be more specialised 
in production and marketing as they become heavily export dependent. On the one hand, firms
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with a low export ratio opt for quick market diversification, mainly through an even spread of 
sales across several countries. This strategy is in fine with the portfolio theory of diversification 
that predicts diversification is used to reduce the risk of operating in markets under uncertainty. 
On the other hand, the group of firms with high export ratio tend to concentrate efforts in a 
few product lines and market destinations. Although the number of products and markets 
still increases, the distribution of sales is more concentrated in few homogenous destinations 
and products. This strategy suggests that there are some advantages such as scale economies 
associated to sell most of the exports in few destinations. Summarising, diversification is crucial 
in the first stages of firm internationalisation, but specialisation arises as a key factor of success 
in the marketing strategy of heavily export-orientated firms.
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2.7 A ppendix 2.1. The Gollup-M ohanan Index o f Diversifica­
tion.
A standard measure of dispersion is the Herfindahl-based index, defined as H  =  1 — sf, 
where s* is the share of ith  product in total firm sales. The index of diversification proposed 
by Gollup and Monahan (1991) is a generalisation of the Herfindahl-based index to make it 
sensitive to a continuous measure of product (market) heterogeneity.
° - 5 ■-E*r-EE S iS j  (Tjj) 
* *
(2.7)
where Zy is a corrective term to avoid an upwards bias by any disaggregation of a homogenous 
output bundle into artificially distinct product groups, Zy =  1 if products i and j  are identical, 
and 0 otherwise. cry is an index of dissimilarity between products. Gollup and Mohanan 




where Wik(wjk) is the input cost share k in product i(j). If we assume that within each 
industry group products are identical, Zy=l for product pairs (i,j) within a common industry 
group and zy=  0 for product pairs (i,j) belonging to different industry groups. The results of 
this simplifying restriction is
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The Gollup and Monahan index satisfies the five desired properties of an index of diversification:
1) It varies directly with the number of products produced or (markets supplied).
2) It varies inversely with increasingly unequal distribution of sales across product lines
(destination markets).
3) it varies directly with dissimilarity or heterogeneity of products (markets).
4) It can be scope, applyed equally to firms, plants or industries.
5) It is bounded between zero and one.
2.8 A ppendix 2: Choosing Sm oothing Param eter and Kernel in 
th e Semi-Linear M odel.
The semi-linear model is y = x/3 +  6(z) 4- u. In order to estimate (3 consistently, we use the 
kernel estimators




Although Silverman (1986) shows that the choice of K(.) is not crucial, the selection of a ”high- 
order” Kernel function may reduce the asymptotic bias in the estimation. We use a third-order 
Kernel based on N(0,1) density <j>(z),
3 1 f
K  =  2^(z) — 2 z2^ z  ^ suck I z2K ( z )dz =  0 (2.12)
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The choice of the smoothing parameter h is more important than the choice of K(.). We 
can choose h by minimising the Mean Integrated Square Error (MISE) - for example, the rule 
of thumb N 1^ 5SD(z)-  or by the least squares cross validation. This chapter uses the data- 
driven method. Define the ”leave-one-out” kernel estimator for Ejq{y \zj) (the same applies for 
E n ( x \z 0 ))
EN{y\zj) =  ((zi ~ zj) 1*0 - y i / Yj K  WZi ” W (2'13)
i^j i^j
Then we choose h by minimising the cross-validation criterion
( l /N )J2 (V i  -  E N t v M ) 2 (2.14)
j
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Table 2.2. Frequency of export diversification by firm size and export/sales ratio.






























Firm size (number of workers)
[21,50] (1064) 0.08 0.08 0.03 0.01 0.06 0.07 0.05 0.03
[51,100] (1826) 0.10 0.14 0.07 0.04 0.07 0.11 0.09 0.07
[101,200] (1157) 0.04 0.08 0.06 0.04 0.03 0.07 0.06 0.07
>200 (1182) 0.02 0.05 0.07 0.08 0.02 0.04 0.06 0.11
Export/sales ratio (%)
<10 (2634) 0.15 0.19 0.09 0.06 0.14 0.19 0.12 0.06
[11,25] (961) 0.03 0.06 0.05 0.04 0.01 0.04 0.06 0.07
[26,50] (970) 0.03 0.07 0.05 0.04 0.01 0.04 0.05 0.09
>51 (664) 0.02 0.05 0.04 0.03 0.01 0.03 0.04 0.06
Each cell contains the proportion of firms over the total o f 5229. CN stands for Combined Nomenclature.
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Size (workers) (% firms) (% sales) (% firms) (% sales)
[21,50] (1064) 39.85 34.66 61.94 43.30
[51,100] (1826) 38.72 35.08 65.33 45.61
[101,200] (1157) 53.50 36.65 74.76 48.23
>200 (1182) 60.11 38.59 85.45 51.39
Export ratio (%)
<10 (2634) 46.74 37.75 57.25 42.96
[11,25] (961) 50.05 36.35 82.83 49.86
[26,50] (970) 48.14 34.41 86.80 51.19
>51 (664) 49.25 32.63 87.50 49.60
Columns 1  and 3 indicate the percentage of firms whose main product or export market represents less than 90 
percent of total exports. Columns 2 and 4 indicate the average proportion of export sales in secondary products 
or markets, among diversified exporters.



















Total sample of firms 5229 2604 19.85 0.422 0.243 0.240 0.169
Industry groups
Food & drinks 752 3347 21.52 0.401 0.226 0.186 0.129
Textile, clothing & footwear 903 1095 16.90 0.309 0.214 0.274 0.190
Chemical, plastic, rubber 961 3593 15.11 0.465 0.254 0.321 0.218
Metal, ceramic & glass 1141 2655 22.87 0.438 0.241 0.211 0.152
Engineering products 624 2884 23.86 0.461 0.265 0.250 0.176
Food & drinks (NACE 41, 42); Textile clothing (NACE 43, 44, 45); Metal, ceramic & glass products (NACE 
247, 248, 31); Quemical, plastic and rubber (NACE 25, 48); Engineering products (NACE 32, 33, 34, 37). GDI 
is the geographic diversification index and PDI is the product diversification index. The Herfindahl index is
1 “  E *  s i and the Mohanan and Gollup index is \  J ( l  -  £ )  +  “  s i )  +  £ t  £ # *  8i 8j ffij
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Table 2.5: Descriptive statistics
Variable name Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
GDI 0.240 0.17 0.00 0.56
PDI 0.169 0.17 0.00 0.66
Export/sales ratio 0.198 0.23 0.00 1.00
Size[21-50] 0.203 0.40 0.00 1.00
Size[51-100] 0.349 0.48 0.00 1.00
Size[101-200] 0.221 0.42 0.00 1.00
Size[>200] 0.226 0.42 0.00 1.00
Foreign owner 0.094 0.30 0.00 1.00
Import ratio 0.114 0.20 0.00 0.724
Province concentration 0.175 0.18 0.000 0.745
Industry concentration 0.185 0.14 0.036 0.810
R&D/sales 0.005 0.01 0.001 0.083
Advertising/sales 0.009 0.06 0.001 0.086
Table 2_6: Geographic diversification index of exports by number of exported products. Semi- 
parametric regression.
# products=1 1<# products<5 # products>5
coefficient t-value coefficient t-value coefficient t-value
Size [50-100 workers] 
Size [100-200 workers] 
Size [>200 workers] 
Foreign Ownership 














0.024 ** (2.83) 
0.036 "  (3.75) 





0.078 "  (3.48) 
0.117 ** (5.44) 











Numbers in parenthesis are standard errors. (**) significant at 1%, (*) significant at 5%. Foreign ownership: 
dummy that takes value of one if more than 25% of capital of the firm is foreign and zero otherwise. Firm 
import ratio is the value of imported goods divided by sales of the firm. Province concentration is the share of 
industry-province employment in national industry employment.
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Size [50-100 workers] 0.019 0.010 0.038 ** 0.038 * 0.018
(1.03) (0.72) (3.15) (2.22) (1.17)
Size [100-200 workers] 0.027 0.055 ** 0.082 ** 0.062 ** 0.045 **
(1.73) (3.39) (5.97) (3.28) (2.80)
Size [>200 workers] 0.069 ** 0.143 ** 0.108 ** 0.076 ** 0.096 **
(3.57) (9.32) (8.00) (3.99) (6.33)
Foreign Ownership 0.189 ** 0.045 ** 0.049 ** 0.030 0.056 **
(3.24) (2.94) (3.31) (1.88) (4.85)
Firm import ratio -0.022 -0.037 -0.012 -0.044 * -0.008
(0.82) (1.72) (0.71) (2.31) (0.51)
Market concentration 0.187 -0.235 -0.026 -0.001 -0.062
(0.79) (1.36) (0.47) (0.01) (0.84)
Industry R&D 0.030 0.151 0.261 1.297 ** 0.754
(0.59) (0.09) (0.43) (3.09) (0.99)
Industry Marketing 0.189 ** 0.023 0.046 0.793 ** -0.015
(3.23) (1.01) (0.77) (3.23) (0.66)
Province concentration 0.048 * 0.038 0.161 ** 1.600 ** 0.111 **
(2.24) (0.69) (5.94) (2.68) (3.58)
Number of firms 752 927 1145 624 946
Numbers in parenthesis are standard errors. (**) significant at 1 %, (*) significant at 5%. Foreign ownership: 
dummy that takes value of one if more than 25% of capital of the firm is foreign and zero otherwise. Firm 
import ratio is equal to the value of imported goods divided by sales of the firm. Industry concentration is the 
four-largest firm concentration index, adjusted by import penetration. Industry R&D and industry marketing 
are the ratio of expenditures on R&D and marketing divided by sales, respectively. The variables are available 
at the three-digit CNAE level. Province concentration is the share of industry-province employment in national 
industry employment.
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Size [50-100 workers] 0.009 -0.025 0.015 -0.006 0.013
(0.57) (1.75) (1.22) (0.30) (0.70)
Size [100-200 workers] 0.039 0.053 ** 0.032 -0.019 0.038
(1.31) (3.09) (1.11) (0.96) (1.64)
Size [>200 workers] 0.062 ** 0.108 ** 0.069 ** 0.017 0.052 **
(3.69) (6.22) (4.43) (0.79) (2.69)
Foreign Ownership 0.04 0.023 0.030 0.024 * 0.041 **
(1.57) (1.34) (1.65) (2.19) (2.66)
Firm import ratio 0.105 ** 0.027 0.088 ** 0.074 ** 0.079 **
(3.69) (1.27) (4.44) (3.37) (4.11)
Market concentration -0.165 -0.433 * 0.041 0.028 -0.237 **
(1.23) (2.34) (0.69) (0.35) (2.98)
Industry R&D 0.320 0.517 -0.123 0.633 0.321
(0.18) (1.35) (0.18) (0.67) (0.41)
Industry Marketing 0.036 0.313 -0.070 0.376 0.038
(0.82) (1.29) (1.09) (1.88) (1.40)
Province concentration 0.173 ** 0.014 0.081 0.024 0.091 *
(3.00) (0.63) (1.02) (0.49) (2.55)
Number of firms 752 927 1145 624 946
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Chapter 3
Information spillovers and the choice 
of export destination
3.1 Introduction
Which countries do firms export to? Trade traditional theory predicts that firms will export to 
countries that have a comparative disadvantage with respect to the domestic country. Empirical 
gravitational models find that firms tend to export more to countries that have a similar level 
of development or are geographically close to the domestic market. Finally, anecdotal evidence 
and several case studies show that entrepreneurs start exporting after observing other firms 
exporting similar products or through an idea that came from another domestic firm. With the 
same micro-data used in Chapter 2 to examine the pattern of export diversification in Spain, 
here we investigate the factors behind the firm’s decision concerning the destination choice of 
exports. In particular, we aim to identify the source and quantify the effect of information 
spillovers generated by other local firms in the individual choice of export location.
From the firm perspective, export activity can be viewed as a learning process, wherein 
firms gradually became familiar with overseas markets and operations. Acquisition of sufficient 
information on foreign markets and operations is crucial for a firm’s export decision (Leonidou 
and Katsikeas, 1996). Beside macroeconomic conditions, the high uncertainty surrounding
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international markets compared to the domestic market is due to firm’s limited knowledge 
regarding international business and overseas market characteristics. Case studies show that 
firms start exporting to close destinations and they export to more distant destinations as 
they accumulate more experience (Weidersheim-Paul et al., 1978; Tesar and Tarleton, 1982). 
However, the physical proximity to certain markets can be altered by destination characteristic 
or firm-specific factors. A firm may bypass several geographically close countries because their 
size does not justify the amount of investment required to initiate export operations (Dalli, 
1994). Moreover, light exporters are more likely to choose ’’soft” countries with relatively low 
entry barriers and more stable macroeconomic environment (Bonacorssi, 1992). Finally, inter­
firm communication or personal contacts may change the perception about the profitability and 
risk of some geographically remote destinations (Reid, 1984).
The theoretical literature has only partially analysed the positive effects of information 
spillovers obtained from the geographical concentration of industries. The empirical literature 
has assessed the importance of agglomeration on firms’ decision to export (Chapter 1), the 
degree of internationalisation of the firm and the pattern of export diversification (Chapter
3). However, any measurement of geographical concentration captures more than one possible 
source of externalities. Marshall’s analogy that the cotton permeating the air of Manchester 
was akin to the transfer of ideas is an evocative one, but information spillovers of the forms 
he described are rarely of such a tangible form. While it is intuitively obvious that such 
forms of externalities may affect firm export behaviour, and that they are frequently invoked 
in anecdotal evaluations, the empirical researcher evaluating such spillovers faces considerable 
conceptual difficulties and problems of how to measure them directly. The recent empirical 
literature on exports and information spillovers has dealt with the decision to export and how 
much to export.1 Here we investigate the destination choice of exports, since we believe that 
entrepreneurs not only exchange generic information about the export activity but also share 
specific information about which particular countries are more profitable and less risky. If we 
cannot reject the hypothesis that firms located in a geographically agglomerated area tend to
1See, among others, Aitken et al (1997), Becchetti et al. (2000), Malmberg et al. (2000) and Lautanen (2000).
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export to the same destinations, this can be interpreted as direct evidence of the importance 
of information spillovers in export activity.
We estimate a multinomial logit model for the probability that a profit maximising firm 
chooses to export to a particular destination. We test whether firms tend to export to countries 
where other local exporters have previous experience as information is cheaper and more reliable, 
to more developed countries in order to enhance the scale of production, and to close countries 
to reduce transport costs. In addition, we try to identify the type(s) of firms that generate 
the information externalities in the export activity: domestic exporters producing the same 
good (localisation economies), multinationals, or any other domestic exporters, whatever the 
industry activity that they have (urbanisation economies).
Our study is based on a unique data set including the export sales by country of destination 
for some 5229 Spanish manufacturing firms in 1988. Our regression analysis is done for a 
subsample of 437 small firms (less than 100 workers) selling only one product to one foreign 
country. Besides the econometric issues discussed below, small firms are more likely to benefit 
from information spillovers since research about opportunities in foreign markets can be very 
expensive for firms with limited resources.
To anticipate the findings, there is evidence that geographical agglomeration of exporting 
firms selling to a particular destination significantly increases the probability of small firms 
exporting to the same destination. The source of information spillovers is localisation external­
ities, that is, geographical concentration of domestic exporters of the same industry. There is 
no evidence that the presence of multinationals or urbanisation economies significantly affect 
the choice of destination of small exporters. The results are robust to different measures of 
geographical agglomeration. The significance of localisation economies also persists in spite of 
controls, which show how the probability to export to one particular destination is also (posi­
tively) affected by conventional gravitational factors such as the level of development and the 
physical proximity of the destination country, and firm characteristics in the form of size and 
export intensity.
The paper is organised as follows. Section 3.2 briefly reviews the literature on information
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spillovers and export activity. Section 3.3 characterises the data and provides descriptive evi­
dence from the sample on the destination choice by Spanish exporters. Section 3.4 accesses the 
results of an econometric analysis on the effects of information spillovers on the decision about 
where to export. Section 3.5 concludes.
3.2 Agglom eration econom ies and export activity.
Pioneering work by Marshall (1920) suggests that firms in the same industry may be drawn to 
the same location because proximity generates positive externalities. Firms tend to concentrate 
in specialised areas since this reduces production costs due to the sharing of certain resources 
(notably social and physical infrastructures and skilled labour), access to transportation facili­
ties and proximity to both customers and suppliers. Recent advances in Economic Geography 
have formalised, in general equilibrium models, the different types of source generating pos­
itive spillovers: pool of specialised labour, linkages, diffusion of information and technology 
(Krugman, 1991; Fujita et al., 1999; Henderson et al., 1995; Glaeser et al. 1992).
It has been argued that in industrial areas where there is a high density of one or few 
sectors the degree of co-operation is intensive. There is a high level of communication and of 
interpersonal relationships among entrepreneurs, so that information is diffused by word-of- 
mouth. In such an environment, information spillovers may have direct or indirect effects on 
the decision of a firm about what to produce, where to locate production, and which markets to 
target. Two factors, related to firm neighbourhood, play a major role in reducing the barriers 
to export: information and imitation.
Managerial attitudes toward exporting, risk perception and risk-aversion are key to explain 
export behaviour (Bilkey and Tesar, 1975). Interpersonal communication reduces the perception 
of risk and positively influences expectations about profitability of exports. Entrepreneurs start 
exporting because they learn about experiences from other firms that have adopted exporting as 
a viable growth alternative. Perception of risk is greatly reduced because first-hand information 
is available about opportunities in a particular foreign market, the trends of demand, and
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major problems about exporting. Entrepreneurs strongly prefer personal and direct sources of 
information when they have to decide where to export. For example, Bonaccorsi (1992) observes 
that many new Italian firms are set up by people with previous experience as employees, who 
often receive support from their former employer who are in contact with foreign intermediaries. 
When demand in a particular foreign market is increasing, entrepreneurs feel that they can give 
information on export markets even to their local competitors, with the expectation that it will 
be reciprocated in the future, when needed. Proximity to other exporting firms also reduces the 
need for information gathering and processing, since face-to-face contacts with other colleagues 
are perceived as a reliable and inexpensive information source.
Knowledge about foreign markets can be transmitted through other channels. Even without 
direct interpersonal communication about exporting experience, the high density of firms in a 
concentrated area leads to a high transparency in the behaviour of individual firms. 'When 
an innovative firm makes the decision to export, many imitators will follow within a short 
time period. Imitators will target the same market destinations where the innovative firm has 
already conducted the research on potentially profitable foreign markets (Lautanen, 2000).
The two factors referred to above, information and imitation, lead us to formulate the 
following hypothesis: ceteris paribus, if information spillovers are important, firms located in 
the same region will have similar export experience. We define "similar” export experiences in 
terms of same destination of exports and we aim to identify the source of information spillovers 
that induce firms to share the same export destinations. Our approach follows Head et al. 
(1995) and Aitken et al. (1997) by separating various types of exporters located in the same 
area. The geographic concentration of export activity to one particular destination is split 
into three terms: province concentration of local exporters in the same industry, province 
concentration of multinationals in the same activity, and province concentration of the rest of 
export activities. The first is related to localisation economies (or industry-specific economies); 
the second captures economies generated by the proximity to a multinational company; the 
third reflects urbanisation economies (or agglomeration of firms irrespective of sector origin). 
We discuss each source of information spillovers in more detail.
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Localisation econom ies
Similar firms tend to benefit from being located close to each other. The gains comes from 
reductions in transaction costs between firms and their trading partners, as well as from the 
speed with which communication can take place between firms. The central mechanism is that 
the concentration of many firms in related industries tends to enhance firm competitiveness by 
triggering not only flexibility and dynamics in general, but innovation and learning in particular. 
In regions with many firms in the same industry, there is a greater chance of contact with early 
adopters of a new technology, more rapid circulation of information about specific technologies, 
potential markets, and so on. The literature on industrial-districts is particularly interesting 
in this context (Pyke and Sengenberger, 1992, for an overview) since the specific source of 
externalities is the concentration of very small sized firms of the same activity in well-defined 
geographic areas.
M ultina tiona ls  econom ies 
Multinational (MNEs) may act as a ’’hub firm” in a large-firm dominated hub-and-spoke in­
dustrial area. Aitken et al. (1997) describe two channels used by domestic firms that want 
to export to benefit from the export activity of multinational enterprises. First MNEs have 
multi-market presence so they have better information than domestic exporters about foreign 
markets, foreign consumers and foreign technology. Second, MNEs provide inputs not avail­
able in local markets, and arrange subcontracts or licences with neighbouring local firms that 
directly or indirectly link these firms to foreign buyers.
U rban isa tion  econom ies 
Whereas localisation economies are defined as the effect of an agglomeration of firms active in 
the same industry, urbanisation economies accrue from the agglomeration of firms irrespective of 
sectoral origin. The main difference may be that urbanisation economies are seen as being more 
related to the benefits of sharing basic assets, resources and institutions, which are regarded as 
public goods, while localisation economies have traditionally leaned more toward the increase of 
efficiency of economic transactions when carried out between firms located close to each other. 
In areas where similar firms are not close one to each other, cities may have a central position
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in the system of information circulation facilitating access to specialised information.
Recent empirical literature has found that agglomeration economies play an important role 
in regional and urban growth (Nakamura, 1985; Glaeser et al, 1992; Henderson et al., 1995; 
Hanson, 1996), location decision, particularly by multinationals (Head et al. 1995, Devereux 
and Griffith, 1998) and in the export performance of local firms. While most empirical research 
finds that geographical agglomeration has a positive effect on economic performance at the 
aggregate, regional and firm levels, there is no consensus about the type of agglomeration 
behind such benefits.2 In the trade literature, Lautanen (2000) analyses the reasons that 
generate interest for exporting among managing directors of small exporting firms in Finland. 
He finds that the major stimulus comes from inter-firm transmission of information, but not 
always from firms producing the same goods. Becchetti et al.(2000) find strong evidence of the 
positive impact of industrial districts (or localisation economies) on the probability to export 
and the export intensity of Italian small-medium sized firms in 1995. In contrast, Malmberg et 
al. (2000) observe that localisation economies are not important among Swedish exporters in 
1990, while urbanisation economies have a large positive effect on the firms’ volume of exports. 
Finally, Aitken et al.(1997) show that the export decision of local Mexican firms is positively 
affected by the specific export activities of multinationals, while there is no evidence of spillovers 
from the geographical concentration of local export activity.
This paper uses data on Spanish exporters to analyse the impact of information spillovers 
on export activity. Our approach differs markedly in a number of important respects from 
previous research. First, we examine the destination choice decision, instead of the export 
participation decision or export performance (e.g. export sales or export/sales ratio). Second, 
we concentrate our attention on small firms since the lack of a sophisticated marketing team 
makes it more likely they will be dependent on local information spillovers than their large more
2 While some authors find a positive and significant effect on regional growth from urbanisation economies 
(Nakamura, 1985; Glaeser et al, 1992), other have found evidence emphasising the importance of localisation 
externalities (e.g. Henderson et al., 1995; Hanson, 1996). In Spain the evidence also is mixed. The results in 
Callejdn and Costa (1996) support urbanisation economies as determinant of province output growth rates over 
the eighties. However, Goicolea et al (1996) find weak evidence of urbanisation economies and strong evidence 
of localisation economies using regional data.
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complex counterparts. Third, we aim to identify the source of spillovers: domestic exporters in 
the same industry (localisation economies), multinational enterprises, domestic exporters from 
any other sector (urbanisation spillovers).
3.3 The destination choice of Spanish exporters
We analyse empirically the decision about where to export using a multinomial logit model. 
Consider a firm that produces one good in the local market and sells part of the production 
abroad. There are several alternative markets and the firm has to decide on one market to 
export to. 3 We assume that the expected profits (Ily) of selling to country j by firm i is a 
linear function of factors affecting the destination choice,
n ij =  6j +  a'l-i j  +  (3'jXi +  7'zij +  e»i, i=l,..., I; (3.1)
where Oj is a constant specific to the location, which captures unobservable fixed effects associ­
ated with the location perceived as identical by all the exporters; I - i j  measures the ’’mass” of 
information that other exporters located close to firm i have about destination j, x* is a vector 
of firm-specific characteristics, Z{j is a vector of attributes of the destination-country (that may 
be perceived differently by each firm i), and £{j is a random term denoting the unobservable 
(by the researcher) unique profit advantage to the ith firm from selling in the }th country.
An exporter will choose to export to a particular country if it will earn the highest possible 
profit. Formally, the j t/l country is chosen as the destination of exports if
=  max(IIifc, k =  1,..., K ) (3.2)
If random, firm-specific random terms (e*i, £*2 , -»£iK) are independently distributed, each
3  For the moment let assume firms export only to one destination and model their choice. However, firms 
usually choose more than one export destination. This issue wiil be discussed below and in the next section.
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with an extreme value (Weibull) distribution, McFadden (1974) showed that the probability of 
a firm i to choose a destination k is
T-^  L r 7 1 n  l /T T  ^  TT I ^ l \  6 X p ( 0 f c  +  c l  I - ik +  (3'f.Xi +  Zik)
Pik =  P r o %  = fc] = P ro6 (n it > ni(, M 0 =  E , ex p ( ^ +  * '/_ ,, +  ^  + 7 'zw) (3'3)
where Pik is the population relative frequency of exporting to destination k. The estimates 
are obtained by maximising the likelihood function, L(6j,(3j,7 ) =  HjPij- Two econometric 
issues should be mentioned. The estimation of a single multinomial logit model requires the 
assumption of the ’’independence of irrelevant alternatives (IIA)”, which would imply that the 
probability of choosing between two destinations is independent of the characteristics of a third 
destination. In the next section we test for IIA by selecting different sub-samples to check 
for consistency of the estimates.4 Another problem is that our specification does not permit 
choosing to export to more than one country. However, in practice some firms do so. As it 
is difficult to allow for this possibility, we estimate parameters using firms that export to only 
one destination and assume that these estimates are also valid for firms that export to several 
countries. We conduct an indirect test of this assumption by estimating a binary logit model for 
the choice of whether or not to export in each country, and compare the results of the group of 
firms that export to only one destination with those that export to more than one destination.
The data used in our empirical exercise is the same as in chapter 2: 5229 Spanish manufac­
turing firms with more than 20 workers and exports above one million pesetas (~3000ECU) in 
1988. For each company the value of exports is broken down by product and country. Trade 
data is classified by four digits Combined Nomenclature codes (Eurostat, 1991). The data set 
includes information on total sales, employment by size range, percentage of foreign equity 
participation in the firm, and geographic localisation by province. It is worth stressing that 
more than 55 percent of the firms employ less than 100 staff and that 9 percent of the firms 
have positive (>25%) foreign capital participation.
4 The alternative approach is the use of specification tests for the multinomial logit model (Hausman and 
McFadden, 1984).
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Table 3.1 shows the distribution of total export value by geographic area in 1988. The first 
half of the table demonstrates the preference of Spanish firms for EU countries since 68  percent 
of firms’ exports were marketed to the EU. Of the remaining market areas, North America has 
some significance for exporters (8.3 percent). The remaining geographic areas have less than 6 
percent of Spanish exports each. The last two columns in Table 3.1 show the distribution of 
Spanish exports to those countries whose share in total Spanish exports was above 1 percent. 
The ranking of countries matches expectations: France, Germany, Italy, UK and USA are 
the five largest market destinations (65 percent of total firm’s exports). The concentration 
of exports value by destination is significant since the first 10  countries represent 80 percent 
of total export value. Table 3.2 shows the preferences of 5229 Spanish firms towards several 
export destination markets. The choice of first destination by export value is quite selective. 
France is the first destination chosen by both domestic-owned and foreign-owned firms. The 
next most frequent first destination is Portugal among domestic exporters while Germany seems 
to be preferred by multinationals. In our sample, 50 percent of firms choose France, Germany 
or Portugal as a first destination.
We have selected our analysis to those firms that are domestic-owned, export only one good 
(major product represents above 95% of the exports value), employ less than 100 workers, 
and export to only one destination. The number of firms is 494 out of 5229 firms. On the 
one hand, as we explained above, this is motivated by the econometric specification of the 
model. On the other hand, we reduce the heterogeneity of the sample (only small sized firms) 
and ease the calculations of the geographic concentration indicators (single-product exporters). 
The comparison between column 1 and column 3 in Table 3.2 points out some differences in 
the distribution of number of firms by first destination between all domestic-owned firms and 
the subsample of single-product SMEs. Saudi Arabia was one of the preferred destinations in 
the full sample but it disappears from the list of favourite destinations by SMEs. Portugal, 
Morocco, Tunisia and Algeria gain positions in the ranking, which suggests that the geographic 
proximity of the destination country is important for SMEs. Again the destination choice is 
quite selective: 437 out of 494 SMEs chose among only 12 countries in 1988.
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Next we provide a description of the explanatory variables in the empirical model (I-ij, X{, Zij) 
and the hypotheses related to each of them. The source of information available in one province 
about market opportunies abroad (I-ij) is captured by three types of agglomeration economies. 
Each of them is identified by the kind of firms providing the information about the profitability 
of exporting to one particular market: domestic firms operating in the same industry, multina­
tionals, and firms from different industries.
Ho(l): Localisation economies. The probability that a firm exports to a particu­
lar destination increases with the level of export concentration by other domestic 
exporters of the same product to this destination.
Ho(2): Multinational enterprises (MNEs). The probability to export to a particular 
destination increases with the concentration of export activity by MNEs in the 
province.
Ho(3). Urbanisation economies. The probability to export to a particular desti­
nation increases with the total number of firms in the province exporting to this 
particular destination, independent of the exported product.
A problem in the analysis of agglomeration by province is that the export value is not always 
registered by the plant where the production actually took place, but in the place where the legal 
unit (that is, the firm) is registered. In the case of multilocational firms, this means that certain 
provinces acquire a higher export value and other regions a lower export value than they should. 
When we compare the distribution of export values between our 5229 exporting firms in 1988 
and government’s aggregate figures using ESTACOM (ICEX) in 1993, the correlation indices 
were very high (0.71 across 48 provinces and 0.98 across 81 two-digit Combined Nomenclature 
codes). The main difference between the two data sets was the high concentration of export 
activity in Madrid; 40% of total export value according to CAMERDATA and 12% of total 
export value according to official statistics. Since the gap is mainly caused by a few large 
multiple-plant exporters whose legal unit is located in Madrid, we choose firm counts instead 
of export values in the construction of agglomeration measures.
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We measure LOCALISATION economies as the logarithm of one plus the number of domestic- 
owned firms in the province operating in the same industry and exporting to the same desti­
nation. In the calculations, we exclude the firm on which the observation is taken. MNE 
economies are equal to the logarithm of one plus the number of foreign-owned firms in the 
province operating in the same industry and exporting to the same destination. URBANISA­
TION economies are equal to the logarithm of one plus the number of firms in the province 
exporting to the same destination. However, other local export firms in the same industry have 
been included in the localisation economies. Therefore, in order to avoid double counting, these 
have been excluded from the urbanisation economies.
If the ’’home base” of the firm is the correct locus for the origin of export spillovers, as 
this is normally where the main development work takes place (Porter, 1990), we can still use 
export values to construct a conventional indicator of LOCALISATION economies (Henderson 
et al, 1995) as
induatry-province exports to country K
industry exportB to country K  ( ‘X A \
province exports ' ' >
national exports
Indicators of MNE economies and URBANISATION economies are constructed in a similar 
way using export values of MNEs and export firms outside the industry of the firms in focus, 
respectively.
The other two destination-specific variables included in the regression analysis are level of 
development and distance. Gravity models of trade show that the volume of trade between 
partners is directly proportional to their level of economic development and inversely propor­
tional to the geographic distance between them. The level of economic development of the 
destination country is measured by its income per capita (Source: World Penn Tables) and it 
is expected that domestic exporters will tend to sell more where the demand is higher. As rich 
countries will demand more manufacturing products than poor countries, the choice decision 
should be positively affected by the per capita income of the destination country. However, the
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geographic proximity of some foreign markets may contribute to change the perception towards 
these markets. For example, firms located near the frontier will treat neighbouring countries 
similar to other domestic regions. Indeed, transportation costs may be lower or similarities 
in demand stronger across neighbouring countries than within a country in some industries. 
Given the important role of distance, we undertook a detailed analysis of the transportation 
routes for firms in relation to their provincial location. The calculation of distance with trad­
ing partners is as follows: France, Portugal, Morocco, Tunisia and Algeria, we calculate the 
distance by road between the capital of each province to the corresponding frontier. For other 
European destinations [Germany, UK, Italy, Netherlands, Belgium], we use the road distance 
in kilometres from the capital of the province and the capital of the destination country. For 
USA and Mexico, we use the geographical distance between Madrid and the capital of these 
countries. Measuring distance in that way takes into account borderline effects between some 
countries and some Spanish provinces.5
Ho (4): Geographic proximity. The probability to export to a particular destination 
decreases with the physical distance from the production province to the destination 
country.
Ho(5): Level of Development The probability to export to a particular destination 
increases with the level of development of the destination country.
Unlike other studies on spillovers and localisation, our model allows for firm-specific charac­
teristics to have different impacts on the choice of export destination. The presence of different 
firm characteristics might make some of their choices closer substitutes in the eyes of certain 
exporters than other choices. The inclusion of firm-specific characteristics interacting with the 
destination-specific constant terms also contributes to reducing the risk of violation of the In­
dependence of Irrelevant Alternatives assumption (Train, 1986). For example, some firms must
5 Sources: http://shellintenational.org for distance between Spanish cities and European destinations;
http://Haveman.org for distance between capitals. We consider C£diz the closest port to Morocco. For 
Argelia and Tunisia we add 800km and 1200km, respectively, to the original distance (approximately the dis­
tance C&diz-Algiers and Cridiz-Tunis).
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attain a minimum size in order to export. We can carry this argument further and specify the 
relationship between conditions of foreign entry and the minimum size which must be attained 
by firms to enter a specific foreign market. Some destinations may require a level of previ­
ous investment or knowledge such that only few firms may have enough resources to export 
to them. The requirements needed by a firm to supply a particular market may be directly 
related to its size and the level of internationalisation, measured by its export/sales ratio. If 
we do not include information about firm characteristics, then the choice of destination could 
be dependent on firm heterogeneity.
Ho(6 ): Firm heterogeneity. The probability that a firm will export to a particular 
destination is affected by the interaction between the country-specific characteristics 
and the firm-specific characteristics.
3.4 E stim ation results
Our final sample is reduced to 437 single-product small-medium sized firms (SMEs), producing 
in 1050 (four digits Combined Nomenclature) industries, located in 48 provinces6, and exporting 
to 12 possible choices (France, Portugal, Germany, UK, Italy, USA, Morocco, Netherlands, 
Belgium, Mexico, Argelia and Tunisia) .7 The indices of geographic concentration of exports 
are constructed using data on the rest of domestic firms and foreign-owned firms, and excluding 
in the calculation the firm of reference. As firms export, on average, 6 different product lines 
to 8  different countries, we count each product line-country pair as a separate observation. 
As a result, we use more than 120000 observations for calculating the relevant concentration 
variables. Table 3.3 presents some descriptive statistics of the explanatory variables used in 
our estimation.
The results of the regression analysis using firm counts to measure agglomeration are dis­
6 Firms located outside of the peninsula (Baleares, Canarias, Ceuta and Melilla) were excluded.
7We have constrained the number of countries to 12 since the rest o f the destinations are chosen by three or 
less firms. Given the independence from irrelevant alternatives assumption built into the logit specification, the 
reduction in the choice set should not affect the other parameter estimates.
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played in Table 3.4. In the first three columns, the impact of each measure of spatial con­
centration of exporters is investigated in isolation from each other. If the error term is an 
independently drawn disturbance, the coefficient of each agglomeration measure shows the 
impact of information spillovers on the destination choice. All the columns include 12 country- 
specific constants. The high value of the reported chi-square statistics suggest that there are 
significant unobservable differences across the 12 destination characteristics. In Column 1 the 
coefficient on LOCALISATION is positive and significant. That is, SMEs choose those desti­
nations in which a relatively large number of other local exporters in the same industry are 
exporting. Column 2 shows that the presence of MNEs in the same province exporting to one 
particular destination has a negative impact on the destination choice by domestic SMEs, but 
the coefficient is not statistically significant. In column 3 the coefficient of spatial concentration 
of firms from other industries selling to a particular destination is not statistically significant 
on the choice decision of SMEs. When we put the three measures of export concentration to­
gether in column 4 the coefficient on LOCALISATION remains positive and significant, while 
the coefficients on MNE and URBANISATION economies are not statistically significant. The 
results are reasonably stable across columns 5 and 6  when we add the other explanatory vari­
ables in the model, firm-specific characteristics (size and export/sales ratio) interacting with 
the destination-specific constants and the gravity variables (distance and income per capita). 
The chi-square test rejected the hypothesis that firm-specific variables interacting with the 
destination-specific constants have no explanatory power.8 The coefficient of the distance to 
the destination shows a negative and significant impact on firms’ choice decision as we expected, 
but the coefficient of per capita income has an unexpected negative sign although it is not sta­
tistically significant. The inclusion of additional variables has little effect on the three measures 
of export concentration: the coefficient on LOCALISATION economies remains positive and 
significant, while that on MNE and URBANISATION remains insignificant. There are benefits 
of being near other firms exporting to the same destination. However, the results indicate these
8  The hypothesis of equal coefficients for size and export/sales ratio across destinations was also strongly 
rejected by the data.
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benefits are only generated by other domestic firms operating in the same industry. Neither the 
proximity of MNEs nor the concentration of firms in other industries exporting to one particular 
destination has a significant impact on the decision of SMEs.
The coefficients presented in Tables 3.4 are the marginal impact on odds ratios. A more 
intuitive interpretation of the magnitudes of the effects is given by considering the marginal 
effects or the probability elasticities. Since explanatory variables are expressed in logs, the 
elasticity of the probability of a particular exporter j choosing destination k with respect to any 
explanatory variable can be calculated as
Eik =  =  3(1 -  Pjk) (3.5)
Summing overall the choices and firms we obtain the relationship between average proba­
bility elasticities and the coefficient estimate, j3 :
£  =  £ X >  =  3 ~  (3.6)
3 k
Since K, the number of choices, equals 12 in the estimations, elasticities can be obtained by 
multiplying the estimated coefficient by 0.916. Using the estimates of Column 6  in Table 3.4, 
the average probability elasticity indicates that for the average province, a 10 percent increase in 
the number of firms in some industry exporting to one particular destination would increase the 
likelihood of choosing this destination by other exporters in the same industry by 16 percent. 
Thus, we have shown that the coefficient that we interpret as evidence of export spillovers is 
highly statistically significant and seems to affect the choice decision of small firms by a large 
percentage.
Three final remarks about our findings. First, our results are obtained using a sample of 
small single-product firms. If we assume that small firms have less resources to finance searching 
for new market opportunities, information from other firms could be the only available way to 
learn about profitable opportunites abroad, compared with large firms that *may obtain extra
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resources more easily. If the benefits from information spillovers decrease with firm size, the esti­
mated coefficients should be smaller for a sample including medium-large sized firms. However, 
when we augment the sample with large single-product firms the new estimated coefficients did 
not change significantly. Second, we attribute the positive effect of geographic agglomeration 
on export activity to information spillovers between local firms. However, another source of 
information could be a sector of specialised export services in the local area created by the 
central or regional government or wholesale industry. Unfortunately, it is difficult to control 
for such an alternative source of positive externalities without extra information. Finally, the 
findings could be also interpreted using the traditional trade theories. Due to factor abundance 
or superior technology, Spain will have a comparative cost advantage in the production of some 
goods relative to its importing countries. At the same time some regions may have a com­
parative advantage in the production of those goods in which Spain shows a comparative cost 
advantage abroad. The result will be that most firms producing these goods will be located in 
specific locations and will export to the same destinations in which Spain has a comparative cost 
advantage. The main criticism of this explanation is that technology and factor endowments 
are not so heterogenous across Spanish regions, particularly in the manufacturing industry.
3.5 R obustness issues
In this section we discuss three issues. First, we check the robustness of the results by changing 
the way we measure agglomeration. Second, we test for the violation of the independence of ir­
relevant alternatives (IIA) assumption by changing the number of possible destinations. Third, 
we test whether the results obtained for single-destination firms apply for multi-destination ex­
porters.
Table 3.5 presents the results of estimating the multinomial logit using as explanatory 
variables the quotient index in expression (3.4). The results are very similar to those in Table 
7 using firm counts to measure agglomeration. Again, in all the specifications, the coefficient 
on LOCALISATION economies is positive and significant, while the coefficients on MNE and
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URBANISATION are not significant. We conclude that the hypothesis of information and 
imitation spillovers in the export activity among domestic firms operating in the same industry 
is robust for alternative measures of agglomeration. In Column 6 the coefficient on per capita 
GDP of the destination is now positive and significant, confirming the importance of including 
gravity variables in this type of model of export destination decision.
Multinomial logit estimations rely on the assumption of identical independent error terms. 
If these assumptions are not meet in the data, a violation of the independence of irrelevant 
alternatives (IIA) property will lead to biased estimates. The IIA property implies that the 
relative probability of choosing two alternatives does not depend on the availability or charac­
teristics of other alternatives. Although the inclusion of firm-specific characteristics interacting 
with the alternative-specific constant terms might contribute to reduce the risk of violation 
of IIA, the coefficient estimates still depend critically on the sample of firms and destination 
choices. To investigate whether the results in Table 7 are robust, we re-estimate the model 
with different sub-samples. We have selected three groups of destinations from the sample: 
all destinations but France, European destinations only, and border destinations only. Since 
France concentrates nearly half of the total first destination choices, we check whether France 
itself has certain characteristics that could lead to violations of the IIA assumption. Second, we 
remove non-European destinations since they have in common larger transportation costs. Fi­
nally, we select the three border destinations (France, Portugal and Morocco) to check whether 
our estimates change when we control for borderlines.
The results of estimating the model with the restricted samples are shown in Columns 1 
to 3 in Table 3.6. The baseline specification is column 6 of Tables 3.4. The estimates on 
SPECIALISATION are robust through each sub-sample. The coefficients are always positive 
and statistically significant. While the coefficient on MNE is again not significant in any sub­
sample, the coefficient on URBANISATION is positive and significant in the sub-samples of 
European destinations and destination borders.
An additional problem is the difficulty in dealing with firms that choose more than one 
destination within the context of the econometric framework used here. Consider the possible
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extension that includes firms that export to two destinations. It is difficult to assess which vari­
ables should be used to investigate choices such as France-UK and Germany-Portugal relative 
to the choice of each destination separately. We therefore investigate this issue using a different 
approach. We follow the procedure of Grubert and Mutti (1996) and Devereux and Griffith 
(1998) of estimating a binary choice model (in our case logit) of the choice facing a firm as to 
whether or not to export to a given market, independent of whether the firm exports to other 
countries. 9 Thus, the dependent variable y\
y*c =  1 if firm i exports to country c; yxc =  0, otherwise (3.7)
The observations for the 12 destinations are stacked together, so that the 437 observations 
used above reflect 5244 choices in this framework. The results of estimating this model on the 
sample of single-destination exporters are presented in column 5. The presence of other domestic 
firms in the same industry exporting to one particular destination has a significant impact on 
the destination choice of small exporters, while the presence of MNEs has no impact no the 
destination decision. The coefficient on distance is negative and significant, and the per capita 
GDP of the destination is not significant. Surprisingly, the coefficient on URBANISATION 
is negative and statistically significant. Since it is independent of the choice for any other 
country, this model can be applied to firms which choose more than one location. Column 6 
presents the results of estimating the model on all firms that export to more than one country 
in our selection of 12 destinations. Because we can now include firms choosing more than one 
destination this yields 1201 firms and 14424 possible choices. The results in column 6 are the 
same as those in column 5 suggesting that the hypothesis of spillover effects can be extended 
to firms selling in more than one destination. Of equal interest, the results indicate that small 
firms at best do not benefit from being close to multinational firms, at least in their choice
9 As we saw in chapter 2, the probability of exporting to more markets was positively related to the extent 
of firm internationalisation. Here what we are saying is that the choice of exporting to Germany, for example, is 




This paper investigates the impact of information spillovers on firms’ choice of export destina­
tion. Although case-studies indicate that new exporters take into account the destination chosen 
by other exporters, there is no econometric evidence on this area. If information/imitation is 
important in the firm’s decision about where to export, an interesting issue is to identify the 
source of these externalities. There are three sources of externalities generated by the loca­
tion of firms in the same geographic area: pooled specialised labour, linkages and information 
spillovers. A further classification distinguishes between externalities generated by the con­
centration of firms of the same industry in the same area and externalities generated by the 
location in the same area of firms from several industries. This paper investigates whether 
the geographical concentration of different types of exporters selling to a particular destination 
stimulates other firms to export to this destination. These benefits from the concentration of 
exporters selling to a particular destination are more likely to be be generated by information 
spillovers and less likely to be generated by a skilled labour pool or by demand and supply 
linkages.
We have divided the sources of externalities generated by geographical concentration of ex­
porting firms in three: localisation (firms operating in the same industry), multinationals, and 
urbanisation (heterogeneity of firms). Our research uses data on exports destination of a sam­
ple of 5229 Spanish exporting manufacturers with more than 20 workers in 1988. The results 
confirm the hypothesis that local exporters in the same industry affect positively the destination 
choice of small size exporters. There is no evidence of any influence from from multinationals 
or agglomeration of local firms belonging to other industries. We also quantify the importance 
of ’’information spillovers” on the export decision. Our estimates suggest that for a province in­
creasing the number of firms exporting one product to one particular destination by 10 percent 
would increase the likelihood of choosing this destination by other small exporters in the same
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industry by 16 percent. Localisation economies also emerge as a major mechanism of transmis­
sion of information about export markets after controlling for firm-specific characteristics (size, 
export/sales ratio) and gravity factors (distance, level of economic development).
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Table 3.1: Distribution of Spanish exports sales, by geographic destination, in 1988.
Geographic Area Percentage Major destinations Percentage
Developed countries 82.8 France 23.1
EU-12 67.8 Germany 14.4
Rest West Europe 4.1 UK 11.9
North America 8.3 Italy 9.2
Other 2.5 USA 6.6
Portugal 5.5
Developing countries 17.1 Netherlands 3.8
Eastern Europe 2.1 Belgium 2.0
Africa 4.9 Morocco 1.7
LatinAmerica 3.0 Canada 1.1
Asia 6.2 Sweden 1.0
Own calculations using CAMERDATA. The developed countries include Japan, Australia, New Zealand and 
South Africa.
Table 3.2: The first destination by sales value of Spanish firms. N=5229.Year=1988.
Domestic-owned companies Foreign-owned companies Single-destination SMEs
# exporters Ranking # exporters # exporters
France 1289 (1) France 119 (1) France 163 (1)
Portugal 568 (2) Germany 95 (3) Portugal 75 (2)
Germany 492 (3) UK 68 (4) Germany 47 (3)
UK 403 (4) Netherlands 44 (7) UK 36 (4)
Italy 365 (5) Italy 40 (5) Italy 34 (5)
USA 354 (6) Portugal 33 (2) USA 29 (6)
Netherlands 127 (7) Belgium 24 (8) Morocco 17 (10)
Belgium 99 (8) USA 23 (6) Netherlands 12 (7)
Arabia Saudi 78 (9) Denmark 19 (18) Belgium 9 (8)
Morocco 64 (10) Japon 16 (16) Mexico 6 (11)
Mexico 56 (11) Sweden 11 (15) Algeria 5 (12)
Argelia 42 (12) Canada 8 (24) Tunez 4 (20)
First 12 First 12 First 12
destinations 3937 destinations 465 destinations 437
All firms 4733 All firms 496 All firms 494
Foreign-owned firms are companies with positive foreign equity participation. The sample in the third column 
includes only domestic-owned SMEs (less than 100 workers) selling one major product in a single destination (a 
major product line equals at least 95 percent of total exports).
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Table 3.3: Basic statistics of the explanatory variables
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
firm export/sales ratio 0.075 0.178 0.0001 1
log firm size (sales) 5.502 1.512 0.693 10.542
log (1+distance province-destination) 7.022 1.227 0 9.166
log (per capita GDP in destination) 9.055 0.601 7.577 9.715
Destination export concentration 
[log(1+number of firms)]
Localisation 0.743 1.059 0 4.788
MNE 0.127 0.333 0 2.197
Urbanisation 4.333 1.811 0 7.286
Destination export concentration 
[quotient index]
Localisation 0.059 0.745 0 47.162
MNE 0.021 0.119 0 3.245
Urbanisation 0.013 0.016 0 0.029
Table 3.4: Estimation of multinomial logit model of decision about where to export.











































































Concentration indicators are constructed using number of exporters and formula log(l+ n ). Column (1) 
to (4) include country specific constants. Column (5) and (6) are estimated with firm-specific characteristics 
(size, export/sales ratio) interacted with country specific constants. Standard errors in parenthesis. Bold figures 
indicate ’’significant at 5% critical level” .
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Table 3.5: Estimation of multinomial logit model of decision about where to export.











































































Concentration indicators are constructed using export values and the quotient index. Column (1) and (4) 
include country specific constants. Column (5) and (6) are estimated with firm-specific characteristics (size, 
export/sales ratio) interacted with country specific constants. Standard errors are in parenthesis. Bold figures 
indicate "significant at 5% critical level” .
Table 3.6: Specification tests for the choice of destination.
Excluding European Border Binomial logit model
France Destinations destinations
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Localisation 1.586 2.048 1.371 0.452 0.327
(0.168) (0.199) (0.230) (0.055) (0.032)
MNE 0.154 0.264 0.343 -0.108 0.091
(0.287) (0.275) (0.429) (0.184) (0.115)
Urbanisation 0.313 0.849 -0.617 -0.176 -0.108
(0.253) (0.313) (1.462) (0.039) (0.027)
Distance •0.157 -0.179 -0.336 •0.269 •0.396
to destination (0.075) (0.068) (0.093) (0.047) (0.060)
GDP per capita -0.271 -0.548 1.496 -1.882 -2.244
of destination (0.446) (0.737) (0.634) (1.125) (1.524)
Number firms 275 370 246 437 1202
Number of choices 11 7 3 12 12
Log-Likelihood -482.53 -485.96 -171.41 -1331.1 -3695
Pseudo-Rsq 0.201 0.326 0.388 0.254 0.054
The baseline specification is Table 4, column 6. Column (1) to (3) are estimated with firm-specific characteris­
tics (size, export/sales ratio) interacted with country specific constants. Column (4) and (5) includes firm-specific 
characteristics interacted with country specific constants and a set of 10 two-digit Combined Nomenclature in­
dustry dummies. European destinations are Prance, Germany, UK, Italy, Portugal, Belgium, and Netherlands. 
Border countries are Prance, Portugal, and Morocco.
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C hapter 4
Price discrimination and market 
power in the ceramic tile export 
industry.
4.1 Introduction
The oligopolistic behaviour of exporters in international markets has been examined using three 
main approaches developed from the New Industrial Organisation literature. First, Knetter 
(1989) tested for third degree price-discrimination and pricing-to-market behaviour using a 
single equation of export price-adjustment to exchange rate changes. Second, Goldberg and 
Knetter (1999) successfully applied a residual demand elasticity technique to measure the extent 
of competition of German beer and US kraft paper in the international markets. Third, several 
authors have estimated a system of demand and supply of exports to identify what factors 
explain a positive market power in the industry. 1 This paper combines the three empirical 
approaches in order to characterise the market structure and conduct of the ceramic tile export 
industry.
Over the past decade, ceramic tile production for exports have been concentrated in two
1Among others, Aw (1993), Bernstain (1994), Yerber (1995), Bughin (1996) and Steen and Salvanes (1999).
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regions, Emilia-Romagna in Italy and Castellon de la Plana in Spain. In 1996 these two regions 
constituted above 60 percent of the world export value of glazed ceramic tiles. Moreover, in 
many countries imports represent more than 50 percent of the national consumption. Finally, 
while Italian and Spanish manufacturers exported more than 50 percent of their production, 
other major producers such as China, Brazil, and Indonesia exported less than 10 percent.
Although it is widely accepted that competition is very aggresive in the home markets, it 
is not clear how much competition there is between Italian and Spanish exporter groups in 
the international markets. Market segmentation and lack of information may have prevented 
domestic competition to be the same in the export destinations. In addition, leadership position 
might allow some producers to act as monopolists in some destinations. But the increasing 
presence of both exporter groups in all the destinations may have eroded the market power of 
these exporters.
As far as we aware, this is the first time international markups have been estimated with 
data for two groups of exporters that clearly dominate all the the major import markets. Our 
investigation aims to combine previous empirical techniques to obtain a ’’complete picture” of 
the case with two source-countries/multiple destinations.
We propose a three-step approach to evaluate the extent of competition in the ceramic tile 
export industry. In the first step, we test for price discrimination and pricing-to-market as 
signals of imperfect competition. In the second step, we identify in which markets exporters 
have some market power and how the extent of market power changes with the presence of 
other competitors. In the third step, we examine the effect of demand, costs and conduct on 
market power in a dynamic framework, in order to distinguish long-run from short-run market 
power.
One of the main problems in the identification and measurement of firm markup is the access 
to information about production inputs. Our approach avoids this problem by estimating 
directly the marginal cost of both Italian and Spanish exporter groups. Once we know the 
cost structure of each exporter group, the measurement of market power can be obtained using 
cross-section techniques (estimation of the residual demand elasticity) or time-series techniques
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(estimation of a dynamic system of demand and supply).
Our findings show that the tile export industry had enjoyed substantial market power over 
the period 1988-1998. However, there are indicators suggesting that the export market was 
becoming more competitive over time. Summarising, we found that:
1.- There is strong evidence of market segmentation and pricing-to-market in the tile export 
industry. Producers try to adjust markups to stabilise import prices in the European destina­
tions, while they apply a constant-markup export price policy in non-European markets. We 
attribute this finding to the greater price transparency of the European destinations.
2.- The results using cross-section techniques show a positive price-above-marginal cost in 
half of the largest destination markets. In our attempt to relate the extent of each exporter 
group’s markup to the existence of ’’outside” competition in each destination market, we found 
that only Spanish markups are sensitive to Italians’ market share. Both Spanish and Italian 
markups seems to be insensitive to the market quota of domestic rivals.
3.- We use time-series techniques to analyse whether market power has been sustainable over 
the period 1988-1998. For France, the third largest import market of ceramic tiles, we find that 
only Italian exporters have market power in the short run. Neither Italian or Spanish exporters 
have market power in the long run. The finding that positive markups are not sustainable 
in the long run during the nineties suggests that the export ceramic tile industry has become 
more and more competitive, at least within Europe.
The structure of the paper is as follows. Section 4.2 describes the tile export industry. Sec­
tion 4.3 introduces the theoretical framework and the different empirical applications. Section 
4.4 examines the data, specification issues and the results. Section 4.5 concludes.
4.2 The glazed ceramic tile  export industry
Ceramic tiles are an end product that is produced by burning a mixture of certain non-metal 
minerals (mainly clay, silica sand or kaolin, feldspars and quartz sand) in very high tempera­
tures. Basically, ceramic tiles have standardised sizes and shapes. However, ceramic tiles come
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in different physical qualities, especially in terms of surface hardness (for public building or for 
households). Ceramic tiles as a building material has two principal sources of demand. First, 
the construction sector, and especially the development of non-residential property such as of­
fice buildings, shopping centres, hotels, and apartment blocks. A secondary source of demand 
for ceramic tiles is the retail market composed of households. The types of ceramic products 
that are produced on a large-scale basis are wall tiles, floor tiles, and roof tiles.
Italy, the world leader, produced 572 minion square metres in 1997, compared with only 
200 million square metres in 1973. Over the same period exports rose too, from 30% to 70% 
of total production. Overall Italy’s tile industry accounts for 20% of global output and 50% 
of the world export market. In his book ’’The Competitive Advantage of the Nations”, Porter 
(1992) attributes the success of the Italians’ tile producers in the international markets to 
fierce domestic competition plus the gains generated by the interaction between tile makers 
and machinery engineers. 2
Tile makers elsewhere are catching up with the Italians. 3 In 1987 Italy was clearly the 
largest producer and exporter of ceramic tiles in the world. Spanish production started com­
peting against Italian producers in the late 1970s, although the technological and marketing 
superiority of Italian producers was notorious. Graph 4.1 shows the evolution of Spanish and 
Italian production over the period 1977-1998. In 1977 the Spanish production was equivalent 
to one-third that of Italy. In 1987 Spain’s production was only one half that of Italy, however 
by 1997 the production was about 85% the Italian’s.4 In the same year exports represented 
52% of total production. The success of Spanish producers may be attributed to the use of high 
quality clay and pigments to create a new market niche in large floor tiles, and the control of 
marketing subsidiaries by manufacturing companies.
The abundant supply of basic materials, low labour costs and the sheer size of population
2 Porter analysed the domestic characteristics of the Italian tile industry over the period 1977-1987 in order 
to explain the success of tile producers abroad. Our study starts in 1988, year in which Spain and other large 
producers start gaining market quota to Italy in most export markets.
3”On the Tiles”, an article in ’’The Economist” (99/2) emphasises the challenge that Italian exporters are 
facing due to an increasing competitive world marketplace.
4ASCER Annual Report (1998) estimated that the Spanish production could achieve the Italian production 
level in the year 2004.
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are among the most important factors that led to the expansion of the ceramic tile industry 
in China, Brazil, Turkey and Indonesia. However, these countries are strongly oriented to the 
domestic market. In 1996 China’s production was already as large as Italy’s but its exports 
were only 5% of its production. Brazil, Indonesia and Turkey exported 14%, 12% and 11% of its 
production, respectively. Moreover their destination markets are mainly neighbour countries.
High quality ceramic tiles with the logos ’’Made in Italy” and ’’Made in Spain” add value 
to what is basically nothing more than cooked mud. The best example is the porcelain ceramic 
tile. A porcelain ceramic tile is a ceramic tile that is homogenous, meaning that every part 
of it is made from the same mixture of materials. The surface of a porcelain ceramic tile is 
glazed. Since it has to be homogenous and strong, a porcelain ceramic tile has to be made from 
high-quality materials. Porcelain ceramic tiles look like marble and granite, but are lighter and 
cheaper than the real thing. Among the advantages of marble/granito ceramic tiles over the 
regular products are that the former are more solid and less water-absorbent than the latter. 
This means that marble/granito ceramic tiles are more resistant to impact and scratches than 
a regular product. In addition, the colour of a marble/granito ceramic tile is also more durable 
than that of a regular product. This is the market segment in which Italian and Spanish 
exporters are the absolute world leaders.
The industrial and geographic composition of the tile industry is displayed in Table 4.1. 
Medium-and-small sized firms dominate the production. Over the nineties 75 percent of firms 
had less than 100 workers. There are more producers in Italy than in Spain, mainly due to the 
existence of a large number of family business. Industrial production is strongly concentrated in 
two provinces, Modena in Italy and Castellon de la Plana in Spain. The regional concentration 
ratio in both countries is about 70% if it is measured by number of firms, and it rises to about 
90% in terms of production.
The strong export orientation of the Italian and Spanish tile industry is evident looking at 
Table 4.2. In 1997 Italy and Spain exported 70 and 52 percent of their production, respec­
tively. Together they represent 68 percent of the world export market. Table 4.2 also displays 
the distribution of the ceramic tile exports among the 20 largest destinations (~77% of world
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import market). Three features are relevant for our purposes. First, for most countries im­
ports represent more than 60% of the total domestic consumption and in some countries the 
import/consumption ratio is above 85%. Second, in all but one market (Hong Kong), Italy and 
Spain are the first and second major exporters. In all the destinations, Italian and Spanish 
products are above 50% of total imports and, in some cases the ratio is above 95% (Greece, 
Israel, Portugal). Third, in almost every market Italian and Spanish exporters face competition 
from a neighbour country of the importer. Germany has a notable market share in Netherlands, 
Austria and Switzerland. Turkey has a significant presence in Greece and Saudi Arabia. Some 
of these features have important implications on the empirical sections below, in particular in 
the analysis of the residual demand.
Glazed ceramic tiles are physically homogenous products. It is very unlikely to guess 
the origin (Italian or Spanish) of the product without looking the reverse of the tile. Trade 
restrictions appear not to be important in any country destinations: tariffs have been low and 
stable over the nineties and the ceramic tile industry is not subject to non-tariff barriers.
4.3 The theoretical framework
The demand of ceramic tiles in a market k can be described as
Xk — D(Pk, Zk) +  £k (4.1)
where X  is exported quantity, P  is price and Z  is a vector of exogenous variables (e.g. income) 
affecting demand. The supply of the production by a firm j  is given by the equilibrium output 
condition, that marginal revenue equals marginal cost,
Pijk - ( A ) ekMj (4.2)
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where Pjk is the product price (in source country currency), e* is the price elasticity of demand 
curve facing all firms in market k, M j  is the marginal cost of production, and e* is the ex­
change rate (expressed as source country currency in terms of the destination currency). The 
technology of each ceramic tile exporter j  supplying any destination market is assumed to be 
represented by the marginal cost function,
M j  = m c ( W j )  (4.3)
where W j  represents a set of input factors (labour, capital, energy, and raw materials).
4.3 .1  S tep  1: T h e  pricing-to-m arket eq u ation  (Sullivan , 1985; K n etter , 1993)
Suppose, as it is our case, that we have no information about each single exporter but industry- 
level data is available for each export destination over a period of time. Equation (4.2) for 
cross-section time series data may be written as
^ kt =  ekt ~  P k e k t + 0 *  +  a* +  (4 .4 )
where k refers to each of the destination markets, t refers to time, and Ukt is a random dis­
turbance term. The export price to a specific market becomes a function of: (1) the bilateral 
exchange rate in foreign currency units per domestic currency the exchange rate (e**); (2 ) a 
destination-specific effect (0 k) capturing time-invariant institutional features; and, (3) a time- 
varying effect (A*) reflecting primarily the marginal costs of exporter group. Finally, a random 
disturbance term Ukt• is added to account for unobservable factors (by the researcher) or for 
measurement error in the dependent variable.
The conditions under which the use of industry-level data can be used to made inferences 
about (4.2) are: (a) The industry has no influence over the exchange rate, (b) The variation of 
the perceived elasticity of demand and the variation in marginal costs across firms selling in the
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same destination are small, (c) No arbitrage opportunity exists across destinations. The three 
conditions are satisfied in the tile export industry. First, exchange rate variation is exogenous 
to the export industry. Second, the marginal cost condition is strongly supported by the fact 
that cost of production differences across exporters are likely to be small since ceramic tiles 
are produced in a single region of the country with a standard technology. Unfortunately 
little can said about demand elasticity differences since firm data are not available. Third, 
segmentation of the international markets and product characteristics make arbitrage very 
unlikely. Therefore, monopoly power would give tile manufacturers an incentive to charge 
different prices in countries and years on the basis of exchange rate differences.
Under the assumption of common marginal costs for ceramic tiles across destination markets, 
three different market structure hypotheses can be tested using equation (4.4). Under the null 
of perfect competition, both 6k and (3k equal zero since At captures all marginal cost effects 
over time. Under the alternative hypothesis of imperfect competition with constant elasticity 
of demand, 6k can be non zero since markups can change across markets but (3k still equals 
zero. Lastly, under the null of imperfect competition with non constant elasticity of demand 
both Pk and 6k can be non zero.5
In addition to the statistical significance of the parameters (3k and 0*, the parameter (3k 
can be interpreted economically in terms of the exchange rate pass-through effect. On the one 
hand, a zero value for f3k implies that the markup to a particular destination is unresponsive 
to fluctuations in the value of the exporter’s currency against the buyer’s. On the other hand, 
the response of export prices to exchange rate variations in an imperfect competition setting 
depends on the curvature of the demand schedule faced by firm. As a general rule, when the 
demand becomes more elastic as local currency prices rise, the optimal markup charged by the 
exporter will fall as the importer’s currency depreciates. Negative values of (3k imply that 
exporters capable of price discrimination try to offset relative changes in the local currency 
induced by exchange rate fluctuations. Thus markups adjust to stabilise local currency prices.
5 Knetter (1989) shows that there are no estimation problems even though there is correlation between factors 
that affect exchange rate and demand shocks in the traded goods markets.
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Positive values of (3k suggest that exporters amplify the effect of exchange rate fluctuations on 
the local currency price.
The advantage of the pricing-to market equation as an indicator of imperfect competition 
is its simplicity and clear interpretation of the results. First, if 0* ^  0 we can reject the 
null hypothesis of perfect competition in the export industry; and, if (3k ^  0 firms may adjust 
markup as demand elasticities varies with respect to its local currency price. Second, we 
can look for similarities in the price behaviour between exporter groups in different source- 
countries by comparing (3 coefficients across destinations. A third advantage of using the 
pricing-to market equation is that we can obtain an estimate of the marginal cost At of both 
exporter groups over the entire period. Once we know the cost structure of the competitors, 
the following steps are to measure the intensity of competition in the export industry and to 
identify which factors determine positive markups.
4 .3 .2  S tep  2: T h e  residual dem an d e la stic ity  eq u a tio n  (B aker and  B resna- 
han, 1988; G old berg and  K n etter , 1999)
As we said above, how exchange rate shocks are passed through to  prices in itself reveals little 
about the nature of competition in product markets. Indeed, the interpretation of the pricing-to 
market coefficients depends critically on the market structure of the product market. Our next 
step explains how to measure directly the elasticity of the residual demand curve of exporter 
groups to assess the importance of market power in the export industry.
The ’’residual demand curve” measures the relationship between the exporter group’s price 
and quantity, taking into account the supply response of all other rivals. The residual demand 
curve is derived as the difference between the market demand and the supply curves of all 
other exporter groups outside the export source country. This approach was first developed 
by Baker and Bresnahan (1988) to avoid the complexity in the estimation of multiple cross­
price and own-price demand elasticities in product differentiated markets. Instead, the residual 
demand elasticity approach summarises in a unique statistic the degree of market power of one 
exporter group in a particular destination market.
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Consider two groups of exporters (I) and (S) selling in a particular foreign destination 
market (we will use the letter J  for S or I indistinctively). We rewrite equation (4.1) as the 
inverse demand including the export price of the other competitor
Pi =  D ^ X u P s .Z )  (4.5)
Ps =  Ds (X s ,P i ,Z )  (4.6)
where X j  = Y lx j stands f°r the total quantity exported by the J  exporter group, P  stands 
for price expressed in destination currency, and Z  is a vector of exogenous variables affecting
demand for exports. For each firm j  within an exporter group J, the optimal sales are achieved
when the perceived marginal revenue is equal to the marginal cost,
Pi +  XiDu
Ps +  XaDss
d X i . dDi dDs
' dPs dPtdxi
dX s
dXc ( i +
dDs dDi 
dPi dPs
) = eiM i , i E I
) =  es M a , s € S
(4.7)
(4.8)
where D j j  =  We rewrite the both expressions as follows
Pj =  ejMi — ? * £ I  (4.9)
Ps =  esM a — x aXstps D ss  > s e S  (4.10)
where Xj is the j  firm’s conjecture term relating the output of the exporter group J  to a change 
in its own output > and ipj captures the competitive interaction between both groups of
exporters ^1 +  . In order to obtain an industry-level expression we use firm’s market
share m sj within each export group. Taking the market share-weighted sum over all firms and 
defining industry-level marginal cost as M j  =  m s j M j ,  exporter group exported quantity as 
X j  =  Ylj m sj x j> and industry conduct as X j  =  Y^j(msj)2(^j) > we can transform equations 
(4.9) and (4.10) into industry-level expressions
121
Pi =  ejMj — [DiiXjipj] X j  
Ps = esM s — [D ss^si’sl X s
(4.11)
(4.12)
The estimation of the market power of each exporter group requires the estimation of the 
system of Eqs (4.5),(4.6),(4.11) and (4.12). Here we explain how to estimate a single equation 
for each exporter group to measure the extent of market power, the so-called residual demand 
equation. For exposition purposes let us derive the residual demand curve for the exporter 
group (I). After substituting (4.5),(4.6 ) in (4.12) the first order condition for exporter group
(S) becomes
Ps =  esM s  — D s s ( X s , D j(X i , P s , Z  ) ,Z)  [AsV’s] X s  (4-13)
In expression (4.13) the optimal price of exporter group (S) becomes a function of the quantity 
exported by the rival exporter group (I), cost factors, demand shifters in destination market, 
and conduct parameters,
PS = PS(X ,, es Ms , Z, A s i ’s) (4-14)
Now we write the residual demand for the exporter group (I) as follows
Pi =  D i (X j , PJ, Z  ) =  P /(X /, esM s , Z , As ^ s )  — P i (X i , e sM s , Z)es  (4.15) 
and solving in the same way for exporter group (S) we obtain
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Ps  =  Ds (X s ,P f ,Z  ) =  Rs (X s ,e iM I ,Z,Xii>i) = R s (X s ,e IM ,,Z )e I (4.16)
The residual demand curve has three observable arguments (the quantity produced by the 
exporter group, demand shifters and the rival exporter group cost shifters) and one unobservable 
argument (the rivals’ conduct parameters). The slope of the residual demand is the slope of 
the demand curve facing each export group, taking into account the competitive interaction of 
the other rival exporter group(s). The system of two equations of residual demand is identified 
as cost shifters for each exporter group are excluded arguments in their own residual demand 
function; i.e. ej and M/ from (4.15) and es and M s are excluded from (4.16). In each 
expression the only endogenous variable is the exported quantity X j .  We can use both e j 
and M j  as instruments since both variables affect the exported supply of the exporter group 
in a particular destination independently of the other exporter groups competing in the same 
destination.
We obtain the residual demand elasticity by differentiating (4.15) and (4.16) with respect 
to X j.  For export group I, the (inverse) demand elasticity is
R _  d\n.Rj _  d \n D j d \n D id ln P g  . .
Vl ~  d ln X i ~  d ln X ,  9 InPJ d ln X j   ^ ' ’
Note first that rjf estimates the degree of market power, but not its source. The estimation 
method only reflects the joint impact on market power through the slope of the residual demand 
curve but we cannot separately estimate each of the demand, cost and behavioural parameters 
affecting market power. In addition, the residual demand elasticity is equal to the Lemer index 
an(j OIL[y =  that is, the residual and the actual demand faced
by the exporter group coincides. This may limit the use of the residual demand elasticity 
to specific industries. Baker and Breshanan (1988) numerate the following cases: Stackelberg 
leader, dominant firm model with competitive fringe, perfect competition, and extensive product
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differentiation. These four markets have one characteristic in common: the role of strategic 
interaction is not important.
Although in other oligopoly models the markup measured by the Lemer index and the es­
timated residual demand elasticity are not equal, one would expect that the estimated slope 
of the residual demand is still correlated with the true measure of market power. In other 
words, an steep residual demand curve is likely to be a valid indicator of high market power. 
An alternative interpretation of the estimated residual demand elasticity is that it summarises 
the intensity of ’’outside competition” faced by each exporter group in a particular destination 
country. An elastic schedule would reflect the presence of close substitutes and intense com­
petition from outside the exporter group. In the empirical section, we look for evidence of the 
sensitivity of the estimated markups of one exporter group with respect to the market share of 
other competitors in each destination market. 6
4 .3 .3  S tep  three: T h e dem an d-sup ply  eq u ation  sy stem
As we noted before the residual demand elasticity rjf estimates the degree of market power, but 
it cannot separately estimate each of the demand, cost and behavioural parameters affecting 
market power. This task only can be achieved if we estimate a complete system of demand 
and supply. A brief description of the methodology to estimate both a static and dynamic 
structural model of demand-supply is contained in this section. 7
The static m odel (Bresnahan, 1982; Aw, 1992)
Consider again the system of equations (4.5),(4.6),(4.11) and (4.12) for a particular market 
rewritten in a linear form
6The ’’inside” competition among Spanish and Italian producers within each source country is fierce, but it 
is difficult to evaluate whether the ’’inside” competition by each exporter group is severe in the international 
markets. The residual demand elasticity measures the extent of ’’outside competition” faced by each source- 
country exporter group in each destination market.
7See Bresnahan (1989) for a complete discussion of the NIO empirical methods.
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X j  =  otj0 4- olj\P i  +  cx-nPs +  a i3 ^  +  a i4PiPs +  a ibPiZ  +  ei  (4*18)
X s  = ots0 4- ctsiPs +  ols2Pi  +  olszZ  4- as4PiPs +  CK55P /Z  4- 65 (4-19)
Pi =  Pio +  P1 M 1  — OiDjj X j  4- 77/  (4.20)
Ps — Pso 4" P s ^ s  — QsDSgX s  4- f]s (4-21)
where D j)  =  and thus Pj 4- O jD jjX j  is the marginal revenue perceived by each
exporter group J  in each export market. The parameter 6j  =  Xjtpj can be interpreted as a 
summary statistic of the degree of market power measuring directly the percentage of monopoly 
marginal revenue perceived.
The parameter 6 is identified, i.e. we can distinguish between P  =  M C  and M R  =  MC, 
provided that at least one of the elements of the vector of exogenous variables affecting demand 
causes both a rotation and a shift in the demand curve. The identification problem arises from 
the simultaneity relationship price-quantity in the supply-demand product market: O j D j j  =  
Starting from an equilibrium situation rotations of the demand curve caused by a change in 
own quantity will not affect the exporter group equilibrium price. Only a joint rotation and shift 
of the demand curve caused by a change in price (quantity) will affect both price and quantity, 
allowing us to identify the extent of the behavioural impact on exporters’ group market power. 
A sufficient condition for identification of 0 is that at least one demand shifter interacts with the 
exporter group’s price (quantity). If changes in the rivals price and/or income conditions affect 
both the position and the slope of the export group demand curve, the identification problem
is solved as D j]  =  a jl+a j3pA+ajBz so 0jD ~) ^  -X-. Now the supply relation is given by
Pi == Pio 4- P1 M 1 — 0j X j  4- rjj (4.22)
Ps =  Pso +  PsM s — @sXg 4- T)s  (4.23)
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where X j  = aji+aJ3PA+aj5Z ' By treating the parameters of demand as known, the parameters 
measuring market power Qj and 9j  are identified. The model needs to be estimated as a system 
of simultaneous equations. As far as the vector of demand shifters Z  in the demand equations 
and the vector of cost shifters M  in the supply equations contain at least one exogenous variable 
the system is identified.
It remains a question: what are the gains from estimating a multiequational system com­
pared to the easy-implemented residual demand elasticity equation to measure market power. 
First, solving the simultaneous equation model we obtain complete information about own 
price and cross price elasticities of demand. Second, as we will show, the linear demand-supply 
model can be extented to a dynamic framework to examine whether market power is sustainable 
in the long run. As markets are intrinsically dynamic, the market structure of an industry 
changes over time. This is particularly applicable to the case of the tile export industry. Until 
1987 Italy was the world leader. From 1988 new large producers appear on the world (China, 
Brazil, Indonesia, Spain). In particular, Spain has continuously gaining market share in all the 
international markets. The recent, quick changes in the export ceramic industry has opened 
the question whether the market power of a dominant exporter group is affected by the dy­
namic interaction between the dominant exporter group and the new competitors. Our third 
step thus offers another way of studying the relationship between market power and ’’outside” 
competition in the export industry.
The dynamic model (Steen and Salvanes, 1999)
Here we extend the monopoly version of Steen and Salvanes (1999) to a duopoly setting. A 
structural demand-supply system can be re-formulated in an Error Correction Model frame­
work. The starting point is that any linear demand-supply system can be re-formulated as 
an autoregressive distributed lagged model (ADL). Next the ADL model can be formulated as 
an error-correction model (ECM) such that the stationary solution of the ADL coincides with 
long run solution of the ECM (see Steen and Salvanes (1999) for the proof).
The demand functions in (4.18) and (4.19) have the following dynamic formulation
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fc-1 fc-1 fc-1 V
A X jt =  a jo + aJliAXjt-i + a-/2t AP/t_t + ^ 2  a'jviARvt-i +
7 j R
t= 0  t = l  t= 0  v=3
n
x j t - k —v > j 2 P j t - k —y  <pfjyRyt-k
v=2
J  = I ,S  (4.24)
where A is the lag operator and Rvt is a vector of demand variables including the price of the 
rival and at least one additional variable interacting with the variable own price Pjt-k  in the 
stationary long-run relationship. If a RR is the vector of long-run demand parameters, it can be
a LR
shown that <pJv = d % ,v  = 2,..., V.
> j
In the same way, the linear supply can be written in a dynamic formulation,
fc - i fc - i  fc - l
A Pjt =  P jo  +
i = l  1=0 i= 0
[PJt- k -  -  4>jiMjt- k} , J  — I , S  (4.25)
where M jt is a vector of contemporaneous and lagged marginal costs (expressed in destination 
currency) and XX = ~ ~\?J p v. As in the demand system, if we define 9j R and <f>jR as the 
long-run supply parameters, then 9j R =  and (f)jR =  The ECM provides then a
short-run measure of market power, Yli=o anci a long-run measure of market power, 9j R. If 
intertemporal changes in competition matter, we should expect some difference in the estimates 
of the short-run and long-run market power parameters.
4.4 D ata, estim ation and results
4 .4 .1  T h e  D a ta
We use quarterly observations from 1988:1 to 1998:1 (41 observations) on the values and quan­
tities of ceramic tiles exports (CN Code 690899) from Spain and Italy to the largest market 
destinations. The price of exports are measured using fob unit values. As far as we are aware,
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no country produces bilateral export price series, which is probably the main justification for 
the use of unit value to measure bilateral export prices. The drawbacks of using unit values as 
an approximation for actual transaction prices are well known. The most serious problems are 
the excessive volatility of the series and the effect on prices of changes in product quality over 
time (Aw and Roberts, 1988). However, any purely random measurement error introduced by 
the use of unit values as a dependent variable will only serve to reduce the statistical significance 
of the estimates.
The analysis includes sixteen export destinations (>60 percent of world import market): 
Germany, USA, Prance, United Kingdom, Greece, Hong-Kong, Belgium, Netherlands, Singa­
pore, Australia, Israel, Austria, Portugal, Canada, South Africa and Switzerland. Spanish and 
Italian exports represented between 48 and 99 percent of total imports in each of these markets 
in 1996.
The destination-specific exchange rate data refer to the end-of-quarter and is expressed as 
units of the buyer’s currency per unit of the seller’s (unit of destination market currency per 
home currency). Adjusted nominal exchange rate is nominal exchange rate divided by the 
destination market wholesale price level.
As we explained above, the exporter’s marginal cost function for ceramic tiles is obtained 
directly from the estimation of the pricing-to-market equation. Demand for ceramic tiles in 
each destination market is captured by two variables: building construction and real private 
consumption expenditure. 8 All the series in the empirical analysis are seasonally adjusted. 
The Appendix contains more details about the construction and source of the variables.
4 .4 .2  E v id en ce  o f  P ricing-to-M ark et B ehaviour
In order to assess the potential for price discriminating behaviour on the part of Italian and 
Spanish exporters, we start by comparing the response of export prices to exchange rate vari­
ations in each of the major destination markets. For a comparable export product, differences 
in prices across export markets should be attributable to segmented markets. If the null of
8When consumption data was not available we used real GDP.
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perfect competition is rejected, price discrimination is possible so exporters may enjoy market 
power in some destinations. The general empirical model of export price adjustment estimated 
for the tile export industry in Spain and Italy as source countries can be written as follows:
Vkt =  +  Pkekt + 6l  + u)L J=Italy, Spain (4.26)
where k =  1 , 1 5  and t = 1, ...,41, pjit is the log of price in national currency of k’s exports 
to country J at time t, ej.t is the log of bilateral exchange rate, At is a time effect reflecting 
common marginal costs across destination markets , Ok is a destination market effect, and the 
error term, u£v  is assumed to be jointly normally distributed with mean zero and constant 
variance-covariance matrix.
The model is estimated with two different exchange rate measures, the nominal exchange 
rate in foreign currency units per home currency and the nominal exchange rate adjusted by 
the wholesale/producer price index in the destination market. The exchange rate adjustment is 
made, because the optimal export price should be neutral to changes in the nominal exchange 
rate that correspond to inflation in the destination markets. Estimates of Ok reveal the average 
percentage difference in prices across markets during the sample period, conditional on other 
controls for destination-specific variation in those prices. In practice, only (N-l) separate values 
of Ok can be estimated in the presence of a full set of time effects. Consequently, we will normalise 
our model around West Germany, the world largest import market, and test whether the fixed 
effects for the other countries are significantly different from zero.
Equation (4.26) is estimated by Zellner’s Seemingly Unrelated Regression technique to im­
prove on efficiency by taking explicit account of the expected correlation between disturbance 
terms associated with separate cross-section equations. Results for the two source-countries, 
Italy and Spain, are reported in Table 4.3. For each destination the table reports the estimates 
of the country effects (Ok), and the coefficient on the exchange rate (/?*).
Using either exchange rate measures, the country effects are significantly different from zero
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in almost all the cases. 9 This is evidence against the hypothesis of perfect competition. 
Looking at the estimated (3k, the regression with nominal exchange rates indicates that 7 
export markets for Italy and 8 export markets for Spain violate the invariance of export prices 
to exchange rates implied by constant-elasticity model. The regression with adjusted exchange 
rates increases the number of exports markets to 12 for both source-countries. There is evidence 
of imperfect competition with constant elasticity of demand (6k ^  0 and j3k =  0) for most 
non-European markets (USA, Canada, Hong-Kong, Singapore, Australia) in one or another 
source-country . In most European destinations, tile exporters perceive demand schedules to 
be more concave than a constant elasticity of demand (9k ^  0 and (3k < 0) revealing that 
exporters capable of price discriminate try to offset the relative price changes in the local 
currency price induced by exchange rate fluctuations. A plausible explanation is that tile 
exporters have some incentives for price stabilization in the local currency in the European 
markets while there is a lack of significant stabilisation across non-European markets. In other 
words, European destinations are more competitive than non-European ones in the export tile 
industry. Theories explaining PTM behaviour such as large fixed adjustment costs differences 
across destinations or concerns for market share that varies with the size of the market seem 
unlikely explain this dichotomy in price behaviour. An alternative explanation could be the 
greater price transparency in the European markets over the period 1988-1998, together with 
the fact that the number of firms selling in the European markets is larger than in the non- 
European markets (this interpretation coincides with the predictions of the Cournot oligopoly 
model; see Dombush (1987).
A surprising feature of our results is that destination-specific markup adjustment is very 
similar across source country for each destination country. In order to examine in more detail 
the pattern of price discrimination across destinations we reestimate equation (4.26) under the 
assumption that the j3k is the same across destination markets (Knetter, 1993). Table 4.4 
displays the estimated value of (3k for each source-country when it is assumed to be the same
9F-tests for the exclusion of the country effects are overwhelmingly significant: 3486 for Italy and 4970 for 
Spain.
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across destination markets. The t-statistics (reported in parentheses) indicate that pricing-to- 
market coefficients are significantly different from zero for both exporter groups. The second 
row in Table 4.4 offers a test of whether the identical PTM behaviour is supported across only 
the European destinations. In this regression each non-European market coefficient is uncon­
strained and a common j3 is estimated for all the European markets. The reported F-statistic 
reveals that the null hypothesis of identical PTM behaviour across destination markets is re­
jected at the 5 percent level. The last column of Table 4 offers pooled regression results. In it, 
the constrained coefficients across destination markets for each source country are additionally 
constrained to be the same for both source countries. The reported F-statistic reveals that the 
null hypothesis of identical PTM behaviour across source countries cannot be rejected at the 5 
percent level for the tile export industry. We conclude that export price-adjustment behaviour 
is different across destination for each source country but on aggregate both source countries 
have similar export price-adjustment behaviour.
Finally, Figures 4.2 and 4.3 plot the index of the estimated time effects from the regression 
with price-level adjusted exchange rates for Italy and Spain. For comparison we also plot the 
wholesale price indices in both countries (dotted fine). As argued by Knetter (1989) ’’...there 
is no reason to think that they are biased measures of marginal cost, only noise ones” .
As a conclusion the export price-adjustment in response to exchange rate variations is on 
average 30 percent. This means that more than a half of the exporter’s currency appreciation 
or depreciation are passed through to the import prices (after controlling for country-specific 
effects and time effects). The low sensitivity of domestic currency prices to changes in exchange 
rates provides indirect evidence of the existence of positive markups in the export tile industry. 
The next two questions are how much market power each tile producers have and what is the 
extent of competition in the industry. These questions are accessed in the following section.
4 .4 .3  E stim a tin g  th e  R esid ual D em an d  E lastic ities
In this section we estimate the slopes of the residual demand curves facing Italian and Spanish 
exporters in each destination market. Our data includes two source-countries, Italy and Spain,
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and 16 destination markets. For destination k a system of two equations can be written
In Pikt — Aik +  rjj In Xjkt +  7 ^  %kt +  P ln eskt +  7  In Mst +  e/fct (4.27)
1nPskt =  + 775 ln Xsfct+  7  InZfct+  /? In e/fct+ 7 ln M /t+  €5 ^  (4.28)
The demand shifters Zkt consists of a combination of construction index, real private con­
sumption, the nominal exchange rate of a third competitor and a time trend. The cost shifter 
M jt is the estimated marginal cost of each exporter group derived from the pricing-to-market 
equations in the previous section. Each equation is in double log form so that the coefficients 
are elasticities. It is easy to check that the system is identified due to exclusion of the cost 
shifter and exchange rate of the source-country in its own equation.
If the exported quantity X jkt is endogenously determined with its price through the residual 
demand function, then OLS will be biased and inconsistent. Three-stage least squares (3SLS) 
is employed to estimate separately each of the 16 systems of two equations. The exogeneity 
assumption of the exported quantity is testable by comparing the 3SLS and seemingly unrelated 
regression (SUR) estimates using the Hausman-Wu test statistic (Hausman, 1978). The choice 
of an appropriate instrument in the 3SLS is a crucial step. We need a set of instrumental vari­
ables that are correlated with the exported quantity but not with the error term of the residual 
demand function in each equation. The ideal candidates are the cost shifters and exchange 
rate of the source-country, as they have been excluded from each equation as regressors.
Results of our preferred specifications by 3SLS appear in Table 4.5. The last column 
reports the p-value of the Hausman-Wu test for the null hypothesis of exogeneity of log quantity 
after estimating the model with (3SLS) and without instrumental variables (SUR). The null 
hypothesis is rejected in about half of the specifications at 10 percent significant level, suggesting 
that IV techniques are necessary to control for endogeneity in the equation system. The R- 
square and Durbin-Watson statistics vary substantially across destinations and source countries.
The coefficient on log quantity directly estimates the residual demand elasticity. If we 
interpret the r)i parameters as estimates of exporter’s group markup of price over marginal
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cost, Italy had a significant market power over the sample period in 9 destinations while Spain 
had significant market power in 6  destinations. For example, the residual demand elasticity 
for Italy in the three largest markets is 0.362 (Germany), 0.460 (US) and 0.363 (France) which 
corresponds to a markup over marginal cost between 36 and 46 percent. Although Spain shows 
no market power in Germany, its residual demand elasticity for US and France are 0.372 and 
0.135, respectively. Looking at the rest of the destinations, Italy’s markup over marginal cost 
was on average 40 percent while in Spain was about 10 percent.
The interpretation of the rest of the coefficients in each equation is unclear since they may 
reflect both direct effects on demand and indirect effects through the adjustments of a rival 
exporter’s group. Columns 3 and 4 in Table 4.5 display the estimated coefficients of the 
rival’s adjusted exchange rate and marginal costs. A positive sign of the coefficients reflects 
the significant role of ’’outside” competition in constraining the market power of a particular 
exporter group. In general, the coefficients of the other exporter group’s exchange rate and 
marginal costs are positive (and for some destinations significant), indicating that the market 
power of one or another exporter group in most destination markets is constrained by the 
presence of the other exporter group.
The conclusions drawn from estimating the equation system (4.27)-(4.28) are summarised 
in Table 4.6. Destination countries are ranked from the highest to the lowest residual demand 
elasticities for each source country. If the market demand elasticities are not very different 
across destinations, the residual demand elasticities measure the degree o f’’outside” competition 
in each destination: the lower (in absolute value) the elasticity, the stronger the competition that 
each exporter group faces from each . In the previous section the PTM analysis showed that 
demand elasticities were constant for non-European destinations and convex across European 
destinations. The rank correlations between the market power of one exporter group and the 
market share of the other exporter group are clearly negative with values of -0.34 for Italy and 
-0.51 for Spain, suggesting that the presence of competitors reduces the market power of the 
other export group. A weaker correlation was also found between the market power of one 
exporter group and the domestic market share. In our regression analysis, the coefficient of
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Italian market share in the Spanish market power regression is negative and significant, while 
the coefficient of Spanish market share in the Italian market power regression is negative but 
not significant. The coefficient of domestic market share is negative but not significant in both 
samples. Hence, Italian exports are strong substitutes of Spanish tiles while the evidence is 
weaker in the opposite direction. Finally, domestic tiles seem to be poor substitutes for both 
Italian and Spanish tiles.
4 .4 .4  E stim a tin g  o f  th e  stru ctu ra l m odel
So far we have ignored the dynamic interactions between exporter groups and their impact on 
the market power. If market structure changes with competition, then market power in the 
short run and market power in the long run may be different. To investigate whether there 
have been changes in competition in the tile export industry, we estimate a structural system 
of demand and supply. We start by specifying a linear static model,
X j  =  ajo  +  atjiP j +  o lj'iP r  +  otj$Y +  o cj^ P jP r  +  o lj^ P jY  +  edemand (4.29) 
P j =  /3j0 +  f3J1M j  +  XjX'J +  e,Jufv‘'1 (4.30)
where the subscripts J and R represent the source-country and the rival exporter group, re­
spectively. Apart from the quantity exported and its destination-currency per unit price, the 
rest of variables are: Y is the construction index, M is the estimated marginal cost and X* is
a function of X j ,  P r  and Y  such that X*T =  . =  - —j——T3Xj . ^ — .n  J  D j j (P j , R j ) < x j i + a j 4 P R t - k + a t j 5 Y t - k
Using equations (4.29) and (4.30) the specification of the dynamic empirical model as an
error correction model is given by
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fc-1 fc-1 fc-1
A X /t =  a I0 +  ^ 2  a J li& X jt- i  +  ^ 2  a J2i& P jt-i +  ^ 2  a J2i&Pm -i
i= 0  i = l  t = l
fc-1 fc-1 fc-1
4-  Y ,  otj4iAYt-i + y^ja j5iA(Pjt-iPRt-i) + y^JQtj6iA(Pjt-jYt-i)
i= 0  t = l  t=0
+ l j H[Xjt-k -  V n P jt -k  -  f j iP R t-k  — 9 j 3Yt-k
- V j i P j t - k P n t - k  -  <PjiPjt-kYt-k] +  4 r and (4.31)
fc-1 fc-1 fc-1
A PJt =  /J/0 +  E + E xJ‘A X 'jt-i + E PjiAMjt-i
t = l  i= 0  1=0
+ *!iR[Pjt-k -  4>jMJt-k -  K]X'jt-k\ + 4 ? ply (4.32)
where the subscripts J and R represent the source-country and the other exporter group. An im­
portant fact is that X* is still a function of X j,  Pr  and Y  such that X j  =  (pJ1Y<pj4PRtJ k '
To calculate X j  we use the estimated parameters in the error correction term of the demand 
functions.
The steps for solving the simultaneous equation system are: (a) Selection of the destination 
market, (b) Cointegration test for long-run relationship between the variables of interest in 
each equation of the system, (c) Test of identification conditions in the demand functions, (d) 
Estimation of the model, (e) Significance test for long-run market power. We examine steps 
(a)-(e) in turn.
(a) Selection o f the destination country: Integration test.
Due to the complexity in estimating a structural model of demand and supply, we choose one 
destination. Our choice is France. This is motivated by two reasons. First, France is the 
closest destination market for both exporter groups. In fact Spain and Italy share borders with 
France. It is the third largest import market of tiles in the world, with a ratio of imports 
to consumption above 60 percent. Italy has ~38 percent of the total market and Spain has
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~10 percent. Second, when we analyse the integration order of the price, quantity, and other 
demand variables using the Augmented Dickey-Fuller unit root test (Dickey and Fuller, 1979), 
the series for France were non-stationary in levels but stationary in first differences at reasonable 
significance levels. The integration tests are presented in Table 4.7. As the data is quarterly, 
it was natural to perform the ADF test up to four lags. All the variables in first differences 
capturing the short run dynamics in the demand equations are stationary. On the supply side 
the variables in first differences for Italy are stationary, but not for Spain.
(b) Long run equilibrium: Co-integration test.
We need to ensure the existence of a long-run solution in the demand functions and in the 
supply functions. Johansen and Juselius (1990) propose two different tests, the ’’trace” test 
and the ’’maximal eigenvalue” test.10 The vector of variables in the demand functions are 
y /={X /,P j, P s , Y , P /P s , P/Y}, y5 ={Xs , Ps , P j, Y, P5 P j, P SY }  for Italy and Spain, re­
spectively. The vector of variables in the supply functions are y/  =  {Pj,XJ, Mj} and ys  =  
{Ps,XJ, Ms} where X j  = aji+aj4 PRtJ k+ajsYt * are estimates of the demand function of 
J  =  J, S. To account for the possible simultaneity problem between quantity and prices, the 
VAR system includes in the demand functions the marginal cost estimates for both exporter
10 We can write the VAR system in error correction form
p - i
A yt = ^ 2  T iA yt-i +  IIPyt- P +  B x t +  et
i= 1
where I \ =  —I +  III + ...Ili , i =  1, ...,p  — 1, and lip is the long-run ’’level solution” . If yt is a vector of 1(1) 
variables, the left hand side and the first (p-1) elements of the VAR system are 1(0), and the second elements, as 
linear combination of 1(1) variables, is 1(0). If Ppyt-p~l{0) either yt contains a number of cointegration vectors, 
or lip must be a matrix of zeros. Johansen’s method estimates the lip matrix in an unrestricted form and tests 
whether we can reject the restrictions implied by the reduced rank of lip. The rank of lip , r, determines how 
many linear combinations of yt are stationary. If r  =  N , the variables in levels are stationary; if r =  0, lip =  0 
and none of the linear combinations are stationary; hence the variables are non-cointegrated; finally, if  0 < r  <  N  
, there are r  cointegration vectors or r stationary linear combinations of yt.. In the last case one can factorize 
lip : —lip =  a/3' where /3 contains the cointegrating vectors and a  the speed adjustment parameters.
The ’’trace” test is a likelihood test for at m ost r  cointegrating vectors: T]r — — T ^ £ L r+1 In | l  — A»| where 
T is the number of observations and A * is the eigenvalues that solve the iegenvalue problem. The ” maximal 
eigenvalue” test is a test of the relevence of column r+1  in /?: £r =  —T in  j l  — Ar+i j  =  rjr — rjr+1. The critical 
values for both statistic tests are tabulated in Osterwald and Lenum (1992).
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groups and the exchange rate France-Germany as predetermined variables. For the supply 
functions, the selection of predetermined variables comes from the construction indices and real 
private consumption in the destination country and the source countries.
Table 4.8 displays the cointegration tests for each source country. There is clear evidence 
of cointegration in all the demand and supply functions. Both the trace test and the maximal 
eigenvalue test indicate one cointegration vector for the demand functions and two cointegration 
vectors in the supply functions. Therefore, the expressions in brackets in equations (4.31) and 
(4.32) can be interpreted as stationary long-run solutions.
(c) The identification condition: Separability test.
We can use the exclusion tests of Johansen and Juselius (1990) to test the identification con­
dition in the demand functions. According to our empirical specification, the parameter X* in 
the supply function is only identifiable if the demand function is not separable in P r  and/or 
y , that is, the price set by the each exporter group (P j) interacts with the other exporter group 
P r  and/or with the income variable Y. Exclusion tests are imposed as null-restrictions on the 
long-term parameters of P j P r  and P jY  in the <p long-run coefficients found in the demand 
functions (Table 4.12). Hence, if the interaction term can be excluded from the long-run rela­
tion the demand function is separable in P r  and Y . Table 4.8 indicates that there is only one 
cointegration vector in the demand equation of Italy and Spain. Thus the null-hypothesis of 
separability is Hjq : £>J4 =  <pJ5 =  0, J  =  7, S. 11 Table 4.9 shows that the null hypotheses of 
separability in each demand function are rejected at 5 percent significance level. The demand 
functions are not separable in P r  and Y, so we can use P j P r  and P jY  to identify A* in the 
supply relations of both source-countries.
11 The null restrictions on the parameters in <p are tested using a likelihood ratio test. First we estimate 
the unrestricted model and solve the eigenvalue problem. Then the model with the restriction(s) imposed 
are estimated and the restricted eigenvalues Ai >  ... >  are calculated. The test statistic are calculated as: 
LR* [r(N  — s)] =  TY% =i l n | l  — A */l — A<|. The test statistic has an asymptotic chi-square distribution with 
r (N  — s) degrees of freedom, where s  is the number of independent cointegration parameters in the restricted 
model.
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(d) E stim ation  o f  th e  sta tic  m odel
The parameter estimates of the static model (4.29) and (4.30) are presented in Table 4.10 and 
Table 4.11. First, the demand function is not separable in P s  in the Italian regression and is 
not separable in Y  in the Spanish regression. The model satisfies the condition of identification 
of the parameters reflecting the degree of competitiveness, and confirms the significance of the 
separability test implemented in the previous section using the ECM model. The average 
price elasticity of demand is calculated using the formula ==^  (a j 2 +  oijsPr +  ctjeY) where 
the upper bar stands for average values over the whole sample. In the same way, the average
cross-price elasticity is calculated as
X.
X j \
( a j 3  +  a j $ P j )  and the average income elasticity is 
( a j4 +  ajeF J) . The elasticities are quite similar between source-countries. The own- 
price elasticity varies between -0.61 and -0.79, revealing that the demand for tiles in France 
is moderate inelastic. The values for the cross-price elasticities, -0.05 for Italy and -1.10 for 
Spain, are quite surprising since they suggest that Spanish tiles are poor substitutes for like 
tile produced in Italy and Italian tiles are very poor substitutes for like tiles produced in Spain. 
The complementarity of the tile price by source country is an unexpected result. The income 
elasticities are 0.61 for Italy and 0.58 for Spain, suggesting that tiles in both source-countries 
are perceived as normal goods.
Table 4.11 displays the estimates of the static specification of the supply equation. The 
index of competitiveness is measured by the parameter of A(X*). The parameter value should 
be negative, and between -1 and 0. This is the case for Spain (Ao =-0.012) but not for Italy 
(Ao =0.003). Since the variables are not stationary it is difficult to make any inference about the 
accuracy of Ao- As in the demand equation, the supply equation has problems of specification. 
The R2 is quite low and the Q-statistics detect autocorrelation.
Overall, the results of the static model are very poor. First, although there are not pre­
vious studies on the ceramic tile export industry, the economic interpretation of the estimated 
parameters does not coincide with what was expected a priori (positive cross price elasticity 
and high income elasticities). Second, there is a statistical problem of autocorrelation due 
possible to the non-stationarity of the variables. In the demand functions the Q-statistics are
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Q(4)=4.00 for Italy and Q(4)=17.85 for Spain. In the supply functions the Q-statistics are 
Q(4)=11.73 for Italy and Q (4) =7.61 for Spain. The significance of the Q-statistics indicate 
that the model is mis-specified. For these reasons we estimate a dynamic model of demand and
supply.
(e) Estim ation o f the dynamic model 
Demand equations
Examining the equations (4.31) and (4.32), it is noteworthing that the ECM is non-linear. 
The model can still be estimated by OLS after factoring in the ECM term, and recovering 
the long run parameteres using the so-called Bardsen (1989) transformation.12 The model is 
estimated by two-stage least squares (2SLS). In the demand equations, export prices, export 
quantities and the export price of the other exporter group are treated as endogenous variables. 
The construction index in France and the estimated marginal costs of Italy and Spain are treated 
as exogenous. The variables used as instruments in the demand equation are all the exogenous 
variables in the system as well as the construction indices in Italy and Spain, real consumption 
in Italy and Spain, and the exchange rates of Germany/France. To test the validity of the 
instruments, we used the Sargan test.13
The results for the demand functions are displayed in Table 4.12. The lag length of the 
ECM was determined using the Ljung-Box Q-statistics to avoid higher-order autocorrelation 
(Ljung and Box, 1979). For Italy the number of lags was k = l and for Spain the number of 
lags was k=2. In both equations the Q-statistics for no-autocorrelation are not significant 
(Q(4)=0.9 for Italy and Q(4)=3.08 for Spain.). Although most parameters are insignificant, 
the model fits well with R2 =  0.72 for Italy and R 2 =  0.86 for Spain. Since the correlations
12 The variance of dj =  — is computed from the matrix of variance-covariance of the OLS estimates using 
the delta method.
See Kmenta (1986, pag. 486)
Xdf with Z =set of instrumentsThe Sargan validity of instruments test is
and 7T =  (Z 'Z ) 1Z 'Y  and degrees of freedom equal to the number of instruments minus the number of endoge- 
neous variables plus one.
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between the right side variable are very high and the model has a high explanatory power, we 
have a standard problem of nmlticollinearity.14 After calculating the long-run coefficients we 
obtain the long run elasticity predictions. Comparing with the results of the static model, the 
three elasticities do not change sign but are greater (in absolute value), suggesting that the 
dynamic model has the same difficulties of interpretation of the elasticities as the static model.
The long-run own-price elasticity is -0.83 for Italy and -1.11 for Spain, so tiles are found 
to be weakly own-price elastic. This result is consistent with those in Table 4.5, where the 
(inverse) residual demand elasticity for Prance was -0.35 for Italy and -0.14 for Spain. Ceteris 
paribus, the greater the perceived sensitivity of demand to changes in own price, the lower the 
capacity to set prices in the long-run.
The cross-price elasticity lies between [-4.38, -5.58], and suggests, surprisingly, that Italian 
and Spanish tiles are strong complementary products in the international markets. We do 
not find a economic rationale for such a result in general. Finally, the income elasticities are 
2.70 for Italy and 0.90 for Spain. In contrast to the results in the static demand equation, 
the difference between coefficients in the dynamic specification suggests that French consumers 
perceive Italian tiles as a luxury product.
Summarising, tiles exports are found to be weakly own-price elastic and strong demand 
complements. The income elasticity is high in Italy (luxury product) and low in Spain (normal 
product).
The next parameter is the adjustment parameter 7 j R. If 7 j fl =  0 no error correction takes 
place, if 7 j R =  — 1 the deviation from the long run equilibrium is adjusted instantly. The 
estimate of the adjustment parameter 7 j R has the expected negative sign. The value -0.855 
for Italy and -0.175 for Spain reveals that only Italian exporters adjust to deviations from the 
stationary long-run equilibrium quite instantly.
Supply equations
The results for the supply function using the dynamic specification are displayed in Table
14 In the correlation matrix of the five variables included in the demand function of Italy and Spain the 
coefficients are never lower than 0.48.
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4.13. Again we use the Ljung-Box Q-statistics to determine the lag length of the ECM to 
avoid high order auto-correlation. The optimal lag for Italy was k = l and for Spain was k=3. 
In both equations the Q-statistic for no-autocorrelation are not significant (Q(4)=1.73 for Italy 
and Q(4)=1.52 for Spain.). The supply side of the model fits well with R 2 =  0.57 for Italy 
and R 2 =  0.64 for Spain. Again, due to multicollinearity problems, several parameters are 
insignificant. In both countries, the adjustment parameters ^ j R lies in the interval [-1,0] and 
is statistically significant; _  _o.448 for Italy and ^fgR =  —0.584 for Spain, indicating that 
both countries adjust quite fast to deviation from the stationary long-run equilibrium.
Looking directly at the parameter Xj in the supply functions we can test for differences in 
market power in the short run, The short rim market power parameter should be negative, 
and between -1 and 0. If A is -1 the exporter group uses all its potential market power with 
respect to its residual demand curve. The parameter that measures the extent of competition 
in the short run is Ao =  —0.147 for Italy and Ao =  0.007 for Spain. The estimates suggest that 
only Italy exercises a moderate level of market power in the short run. The null hypothesis of 
market power in the short run (Hq : Ao =  0) is rejected for Italy at 5 percent significance level, 
but it cannot be rejected for Spain at any reasonable significance level.
The next question is whether the result also holds in the long-run. The measure of long 
run market power is 9* =  - ^ r . The long run measure of market power is 9* — —0.24 for Italy 
and 9* =  0.04 for Spain (last row in Table 4.13). The null hypothesis of no market power in 
the long run (Ho : 9* =  0) cannot be rejected for both Italy and Spain at 5 percent significance
t
level.
Our finding of a positive market power by Italian exporters only in the short run is similar 
to the one found by Steen and Salvanes (1999) for the Norwegian salmon exporting industry in 
the EU. They argue that some market power in the short run is justified by the scarcity of fresh 
wild-caught salmon in some periods of the year, which allows for seasonal price discrimination in 
the short run, but it is not enough to prevent competition in the long-run. They also suggested 
an alternative explanation, which is more plausible in the case of the export tile industry. The 
short-run-long-run result can be due to the historical change that has happened in the industry
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during the eighties. It is very likely that Italy had some market power at the beginning of the 
eighties, given its worldwide leadership position. As Spain entered the international market, 
Italian’s market power disminished, and finally dissapeared. According to this explanation 
the long-run estimate of market power in the ECM model captures the present situation in the 
industry, and the short-run estimate of market power is capturing the historical role of Italians 
and Spaniards at the beginning of the period analysed.
4.5 Conclusions
Before 1987 Italian exporters were the absolute world leaders. After 1988 the international mar­
ket structure of the export industry has changed. China and Brazil becames large producers. 
Moreover Spanish producers have been gaining gradually market quota in the international 
export market.
In order to characterise the market structure of the tile export industry, we use three different 
techniques borrowed from New Industrial Organisation. First, we measure the sensitivity 
of local currency prices of exported tiles to different countries with respect to exchange rate 
changes. The so-called pricing-to-market equation permits one to identify the existence of price 
discrimination and the similarity in the price behaviour of Italian and Spanish across destination 
markets. Second, we measure the response of one exporter group’s price to changes in the 
quantity supplied, taking into account the supply response of the other rival exporter group. 
The so-called residual demand elasticity equation allows us to identify the extent of competition 
in the international tile market by quantifying the sensitivity of the positive markups of an 
exporter group across destinations with respect to the market share of its rivals. Third, we 
investigate whether increasing competition in the industry has affected the market power of 
competitors during the eighties. An Error Correction Model of demand-supply is estimated 
for France, the third largest import market, in order to account for dynamic factors such 
as changes in demand preferences and adjustment costs for the producers. The estimates 
distinguish between short-run market power and long-run market power.
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Using the pricing-to-market equation we found that the export price-adjustment in response 
to  exchange rate variations is on average 30 percent. We also observe that both Spanish and 
Italian exporters set different prices in domestic currency to different destination markets. 
The evidence of market segmentation is weaker for European destinations compared to non- 
European destinations, which could be explained by the price transparency effects of economic 
integration within Europe.
In order to measure the degree of competition in the export tile industry. The estimation 
of the residual demand elasticity for each exporters’ group revealed that, across destinations, 
both Italian and Spanish exporters have enjoyed positive market power during the eighties. 
On average Italian markups are 30 percent and Spanish markups are 10 percent. The results 
also reveal that Italian markups are less sensitive to Spanish competition, while the historical 
leadership of Italian exporters has a depressive effect on Spanish markups in many destinations.
Finally, a time-series analysis of the changes in competition for France revealed that neither 
Italian or Spanish exporters enjoy positive markups in the long run. The findings of positive 
markups by Italian exporters in some periods is attributed to its historical leadership in the 
tile market over the eighties, but in the long run this positive markup tends to dissapear.
While the above findings are most relevant to researchers studying ceramic tile industry, 
the methodology developed contributes more generally to the literature testing market power 
in export markets. A major problem in estimating market power in an industry is to collect 
information on the determinants of marginal costs such as input quantities or prices. We pro­
pose a simple solution to this problem by estimating the marginal cost for each exporter group 
directly from the pricing-to-market equation. We also show that techniques developed in one- 
source-country/multiple-destination can be implemented to multiple-source-countries/multiple- 
destinations. Finally we compare the results obtained by two different approaches, the residual 
demand elasticity estimated using cross-section data and a structural model of demand and sup­
ply estimated using an ECM framework. Our future research is to explicitly model the strategic 
behaviour between exporter groups for a better understanding of the export pricing policies in 
different periods of time, in a similar way as Kadayali (1997) did for the US photographic film
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industry or Gross and Schmitt (2000) did for the Swiss automobile industry.
4.6 A ppendix 1. Description of data.
Export quantity and price.
Price and quantity of ceramic tiles exported to the largest market destinations from 1988 
to 1998 is from national customs, who collect data on the total number of squared metres 
and the total national currency value of exports of ceramic tiles to each destination country. 
Data was kindly provided by ASSOPIASTRELLE and ASCER, the two national entrepreneur 
associations. To ensure homogeneity in the product we selected the product registered as ”CN 
Code 690899” from the EUROSTAT-COMEXT Customs Cooperation Council Nomenclature: 
’’Glazed flags and paving, hearth or wall tiles of stone ware, earthenware or fine pottery,..., 
with a surface of >7cm2” (Eurostat, 1988). The price of exports is measured using unit values. 
Data does not include the cost of shipping and the other transportation charges. Tariff levies 
are not included in the value. The study covers the period 1988:1-1998:1 (41 observations).
Unit values are quarterly average prices constructed dividing the value by the quantity of 
trade flows. Monthly data was available for all European destinations, but Italian series for non- 
European destinations are quarterly. For the monthly series unit values for each quarter were 
calculated as the mean average of the corresponding three months. We reduce the volatility 
of the unit values series by eliminating potential outliers. We exclude in our calculations the 
monthly prices five times larger or smaller the standard deviation of the annual average in the 
corresponding year.
Export markets.
The eligible destination markets are those that satisfy the following conditions. First, the 
destination countries are the largest import markets over the entire period since large des­
tinations improve the accuracy of the unit values as a measure of prices. Second, country 
destination currencies fluctuate in value against the exporter’s currency since exchange rates 
are the critical variable which rotate the industry supply schedule in the source country. Three
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large destination markets, Poland, Saudi Arabia and Russia, were excluded from our analy­
sis due to data limitations. The analysis includes sixteen export destinations (>60 percent 
of world import market): Germany, USA, Prance, United Kingdom, Greece, Belgium, Hong- 
Kong, Netherlands, Singapore, Australia, Israel, Austria, Portugal, Canada, South Africa and 
Switzerland.
Exchange rates and demand variables.
The data on exchange rate and wholesale price was collected from IFS publication of the 
International Monetary Fund. The destination-specific exchange rate data refer to the end- 
of-quarter and are expressed as units of the buyer’s currency per unit of the seller’s (unit of 
destination market currency per home currency). Adjusted nominal exchange rate is nominal 
exchange rate divided by the destination market wholesale price level.
We use quarterly data on ’’new building construction permits” as an indicator of building 
construction demand. Data was obtained from DATASTREAM and the original sources are 
OECD and National Statistics. When the series were not available we look for alternatives. We 
use for Italy and South Africa ’’Construction in GDP”, for Hong Kong and Austria ’’Work put 
in construction”, and for Israel ’’Construction production index”. Real private consumption 
expenditures were used for the household demand of ceramic tiles. When the data was not 
available it was replaced by gross domestic production. The data was obtained from IMF, 
International Financial Statistics. All the series in the paper are seasonally adjusted.
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Table 4.1. Industrial structure of ceramic tile industry in Italy and Spain. Distribution of firms 
by size.
1987 1991 1996
Number of employees Italy Spain Italy Spain Italy Spain
<25 92 58 115 49 93 41
>25-<100 185 144 157 123 145 132
>100-<200 50 16 50 20 40 30
>200 28 15 29 14 42 20
Total 355 212 351 206 320 223
Regional concentration 69% 75% 68% 76% 69% 81%
Source: Assopiastrelle and ASCER. The regional concentration ratio is constructed as the percentage of firms 
located in the provinces of Modena and Reggia-Emilia for Italy and Castellon de la Plana for Spain.








(%) 1st exporter (%) 2on exporter (%) 3rd exporter (%) 4th exporter (%)
Germany 145.159 186.825 77,7 Italy 67,7 Spain 8,5 France 7,2 Turkey 7
USA 87.743 145.883 60,1 Italy 31,8 Mexico 23,5 Spain 17,6 Brazil 10,3
France 75.674 119.711 63,2 Italy 61,2 Spain 15,3 Germany 5,5 Netherland 5.4
Poland 32.262 50.474 63,9 Italy 55,2 Spain 27,7 Chech Rep. 9,4 Germany 3.5
UK 29.382 37.439 78,5 Spain 38,3 Italy 20,5 Turkey 12,4 Brazil 7,2
Greece 27.577 30.453 90,6 Italy 62,1 Spain 32,8 Turkey 2,3 Others 2,7
Hong Kong 27.008 29.168 92,6 China 33,0 Spain 29,3 Italy 20,0 Japan 10
Belgium 22.518 23.000 97,9 Italy 52,8 Spain 14.1 Netherland 10,2 France 8,3
Netherlands 20.453 26.358 77,6 Italy 38,8 Spain 18,1 Germany 15,6 Portugal 4,3
Singapure 19.422 19.474 99,7 Italy 34,4 Spain 30,5 Malaysia 17,0 Indonesia 7.3
Saudi Arabia 19.276 24.671 78,1 Spain 61.1 Turkey 11,1 Italy 10,0 Libanon 6,2
Australia 17.703 21.118 83,8 Italy 54,4 Spain 10,9 Brazil 6,6 Indonesia 5,4
Israel 17.009 23.013 73,9 Spain 54,8 Italy 34,2 Turkey 4,3 Others 6,7
Austria 16.963 17.215 98,5 Italy 79,3 Germany 8,7 Spain 3,8 Chech Rep. 2,8
Portugal 15.083 54.557 27,6 Spain 97,3 Italy 1,9 Others 0,8
Russia 14.044 66.931 21,0 Spain 26,6 Italy 24,0 Turkey 13,6 Germany 4.5
Canada 13.450 15.318 87,8 Italy 43,1 Turkey 13,6 Brazil 12,3 Spain 10,7
South Africa 12.418 21.600 57,5 Italy 43,1 Spain 17,4 Taiwan 12,6 Brazil 9,8
Switzerland 10.485 12.050 87,0 Italy 69,2 Germany 10,2 Spain 6.2 France 5,1
Source: Own elaboration using data from ASCER and Assopiastrelle
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Table 4.3. Estimation of price discrimination across export markets. SUR estimation. N=41.
Foreign Price Adjusted
Source country: Italy. Nominal Exchange Rate Nominal Exchange Rate
Source destination b. * b.
Germany -0,590 (0,127) * -0,530 (0,117) *
United States -0,338 (0,037) * 0,155 (0,150) -0,320 (0,031) * 0,119 (0,127)
Prance -0,092 (0,032) * -0,896 (0,132) * -0,143 (0,028) * -0,710 (0,104) *
United Kingdom -0,036 (0,032) * -0,252 (0,230) -0,050 (0,029) * -0,263 (0,123) *
Greece -0,409 (0,030) * -0,536(0,161)* -0,348 (0,048) * 0,082 (0,110) *
Hong-Kong -0,448 (0,037) * -0,074(0,148) -0,447 (0,030) * -0,032 (0,132)
Belgium -0,117 (0,032) * -0,226 (0,125) -0,107 (0,030) * -0,230 (0,124) *
Netherland -0,080 (0,032) * -0,568 (0,126) * -0,091 (0,030) * -0,578 (0,131) *
Singapore -0,331 (0,037) * -0,068 (0,180) -0,336 (0,046) * 0,028 (0,163)
Australia -0,161 (0,033) * -0,001 (0,168) -0,145 (0,029) * -0,100 (0,131)
Israel -0,513 (0,030) * -0,402 (0,121) * -0,623 (0,044) * -0,374 (0,095) *
Austria -0,046 (0,032) -0,569 (0,127) * -0,093 (0,050) •0,555 (0,127) *
Portugal -0,369 (0,030) * -0,351 (0,246) -0,394 (0,032) * -0,176 (0,081) *
Canada -0,293 (0,040) * 1,029 (0,261) * -0,206 (0,028) * 0,693 (0,161) *
South Africa -0,340 (0,033) * -0,028(0,137) -0,286 (0,036) * -0,346 (0,134) *
Switzerland -0,017 (0,032) -0,217 (0,114) * -0,031 (0,030) -0,238 (0,122) *
Source country: Spain. 
Source destination
Nominal Exchange Rate 
■i b,
Foreign Price Adjusted 
Nominal Exchange Rate
A
Germany -0,688 (0,130) * -0,681 (0,111) *
United States -0,291 (0,034) * 0,206 (0,137) -0,275 (0,027) * 0,076 (0,112)
Prance -0,043 (0,030) * -0,839(0,134)* ■0,099 (0,024) * -0,801 (0,095) *
United Kingdom -0,011 (0,029) -0,702 (0,183) * -0,069 (0,025) * -0,597 (0,107) *
Greece -0,453 (0,028) * -0,118(0,117) -0,445 (0,043) * 0,031 (0,101)
Hong-Kong -0,415 (0,034) * 0,044 (0,136) -0,411 (0,026) * -0,034 (0,116)
Belgium 0,027 (0,030) -0,238 (0,128) * 0,043 (0,026) -0,431 (0,118) *
Netherland 0,105 (0,030) * -0,560 (0,128) * 0,116 (0,026) * ■0,720 (0,124) *
Singapore -0,246 (0,033) * 0,198 (0,158) -0,294 (0,039) * 0,304 (0,136) *
Australia -0,140 (0,030) * 0,339 (0,148) * -0,115(0,025) * 0,028 (0,116)
Israel -0,135 (0,027) * 0,605 (0,091) * -0,269 (0,038) * 0,725 (0,083) *
Austria 0,194 (0,030) * -0,565 (0,129) * 0,203 (0,026) * -0,724 (0,121) *
Portugal -0,113 (0,028) * -0,105 (0,293) -0,165 (0,028) * -0,295 (0,073) *
Canada -0,139 (0,036) * -0,391 (0,222) -0,171 (0,025) * -0,368 (0,141) *
South Africa -0,242 (0,029) * 0,919 (0,109) * -0,221 (0,032) * 0,813 (0,127) *
Switzerland 0,026 (0,029) 0,063 (0,112) 0,038 (0,027) 0,091 (0,115)
* Indicates significance at the 5% level. Heteroskedasticity robust standard errors in parenthesis. Exchange rate 
series are expressed as destination market currency per source country currency and normalised to 1.0 in 1994:1. 
Wholesale price are used to adjust exchange rates.
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Table 4.4: Testing for identical Pricing-to-Market behaviour across destination
ITALY SPAIN Pooled
b| Std error b| Std error t>! Std error
Constrained-b| -0 ,256 (0.063) * -0,304 (0.067)* -0 ,292 (0.045)*
(all destinations) F(15,584)= 21.52 * F(15,584)= 11 .57* F(1,599)= 0.46
Constrained-b, -0,281 (0.072) * -0,401 (0.064)* -0 ,337 (0.038)*
(Europe only) F(8,584) = 8.41 * F(8,584)= 11 .94* F(1,592)= 2.14
F-statistic tests the null hypothesis that PTM coefficient is the same across export destinations. For the 
pooled regression F-statistics test the null that PTM coefficient is the same for both source countries. * 
indicates significance at the 5% level. Heteroskedasticity robust standard errors in parenthesis.
Table 4.5: Measuring the residual elasticity of demand in ceramic tile export industry.
SOURCE COUNTRY: ITALY Hausman-Wu
iti nation Iqjtaly le_spaln lcost_spain R* D-W P-valur
Germany -0.362 (0.105) 0.518 (0.319) -6496 (2.177) 0.37 1.75 0.12
United State* -0460 (0.196) 0.533 (0.280) 5.686 (4.194) 0.49 2.31 0.00
France •0.363 (0.132) 0.582 (0.251) 9408 (3.027) 0.63 1.71 0.40
United Kingdom -0.885 (1.833) 1.632 (1.011) 26.706 (19.763) 0.05 1.63 0.01
Greece -0417 (0.077) 0.655 (0.402) 4.342 (3.736) 0.91 1.93 0.08
Hong-Kong -0.718 (0.379) -0.309 (0.271) 7.960 (7.921) 0.73 1.90 0.00
Belgium -0.428 (0.423) 1.792 (0.999) 0.895 (2.600) 0.12 2.05 0.20
Netherland -0.317 (0.130) 0.981 (0.285) 11.235 (3.980) 0.45 2.22 0.01
Singapore -0.472 (0.355) 0.830 (0.318) 1.154 (6.955) 0.21 2.03 0.12
Australia -0.042 (0.111) 1.190 (0.235) 4.995 (1.822) 0.71 2.30 0.06
Israel -0.231 (0.179) 0.455 (0.620) 11.391 (7.923) 0.68 1.44 0.18
Austria •0409 (0.237) -0.014 (0.221) -1.602 (4.948) 0.12 1.67 0.38
Portugal -0.099 (0.073) 0.753 (0.395) -0.839 (2.167) 0.45 1.87 0.54
Canada -0.782 (0.338) -1.352 0.354 3.017 (2.321) 0.45 1.87 0.05
South Africa -0.662 (1.835) 0.120 (1.923) -14.298 (18.207) 0.02 1.71 0.17
Switzerland -1.139 (0.615) 2.510 (0.861) 11404 (5.365) 0.49 1.72 0.16
SOURCE COUNTRY: SPAIN Hausman-Wu
Destination lq_spaln lejtaly IcostJtaly R1 D-W P-value
Germany 0.412 (0.723) 0.854 (0.972) 8.848 (11.480) 0.04 1.25 0.12
United States -0.372 (0.134) 0483 (0.250) 8.180 (2.927) 0.69 1.73 0.00
France -0.135 (0.066) 0.718 (0.161) 11432 (2.799) 0.73 2.26 0.40
United Kingdom 0.019 (0.081) 0.720 (0.282) 1244 (2.771) 0.67 1.24 0.01
Greece -0.060 (0.278) 0.518 (0.884) -1.615 (4.179) 0.58 1.64 0.08
Hong-Kong •0.259 (0.124) -0.704 (0.175) 3.914 (3.143) 0.74 2.18 0.00
Belgium 0.111 (0.377) 0.883 (0.677) 11.172 (5.929) 0.29 1.40 0.20
Netherland -0.466 (0.430) 0.478 (0.682) 4.410 (4.087) 0.25 1.61 0.01
Singapore •0.713 (0447) 0.597 (0.338) 3.044 (9.333) 0.61 2.15 0.12
Australia 0.068 (0.056) 1.530 (0.139) 7.262 (2.539) 0.84 1.41 0.06
Israel -0.136 (0.078) 0.399 (0.533) 6.890 (10.93) 0.74 2.10 0.18
Austria 0.106 (0.286) 0.369 (0.328) 2.124 (2.053) 0.00 2.28 0.38
Portugal •0.192 (0.073) -0.079 (0.156) -1.353(2.511) 0.75 2.20 0.55
Canada -0.063 (0.063) -0.341 (0.419) 2.259 (7.084) 0.05 1.57 0.05
South Africa -0.145 (0.092) 0.678 (0.251) 3.032 (5.763) 0.60 1.57 0.17
Switzerland -0.009 (0.132) 1.174 (0.243) 14.265 (5.144) 0.65 1.52 0.16
Each destination is estimated jointly for Italy and Spain using 3SLS estimator. Standard errors are reported 
in parenteses. Dependent variable: log-price of exports expressed in local currency. (Reported) Independent 
variables are log-quantity of exports, log-exchange rate between destination country and the direct rival country, 
and marginal cost of direct rival country. Additional exogenous variables are a construction index, log-real 
private consumption, time trend, and log-neighbour rival exchange rate.
152

















Switzerland -1.139 6.2 13.0 Singapore -0.713 34.4 0.3
United Kingdom -0.885 38.3 21.5 Netherland -0.466 38.8 22.4
Canada -0.782 10.7 12.2 United States -0.372 31.8 39.9
Hong-Kong -0.718 29.3 7.4 Hong-Kong -0.259 20.0 7.4
South Africa -0.662 17.4 42.5 Portugal -0.192 1.9 72.4
Singapore -0.472 30.5 0.3 South Africa -0.145 43.1 42.5
United States -0.460 17.6 39.9 Israel -0.136 34.2 26.1
Belgium -0.428 14.1 2.1 France -0.135 61.2 36.8
Greece -0.417 32.8 9.4 Canada -0.063 43.1 12.2
Austria -0.409 3.8 1.5 Greece -0.060 62.1 9.4
France -0.363 15.3 36.8 Switzerland -0.009 69.2 13.0
Germany -0.362 8.5 22.3 United Kingdom 0.019 20.5 21.5
Netherland -0.317 18.1 22.4 Australia 0.068 54.4 16.2
Israel -0.231 54.8 26.1 Austria 0.106 79.3 1.5
Portugal -0.099 97.3 72.4 Belgium 0.111 52.8 2.1
Australia -0.042 10.9 16.2 Germany 0.412 67.7 22.3
Spearman correlation -0.15 -0.33 Spearman correlation -0.64 0.26
Pearson correlation -0.34 -0.30 Pearson correlation -0.51 0.09
Regression analysis bjSpain b_home Rsq=0.30 bjtaly b_home
Rsq=0.13 -0.003 -0.002 -0.007 -0.003
(0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003)
Figures are obtained form Table 2 and Table 5. Market shares are for the year 1996. In the regression analysis, 
standard errors are in parenthesis.
Table 4.7: Integration test. Destination country: France.
Source Country/ variable 1(0) lag 1(1) lag
xit Italy quantity -2.19 0 -5.92 ** 2
pit Italy price -3.53 1 -5.81 ** 2
xsp Spain quantity -0.92 2 -6.56 ** 3
psp Spain price -1.79 3 -10.25 ** 1
Y1 France construction -1.84 0 -6.46 ** 1
Z1 France consumption -2.40 1 -9.04 ** 0
22 DM/Fr Exch. Rate -2.18 0 -5.86 ** 1
Z3 Italy construction -2.41 1 -2.91 0
Z4 Spain construction -1.53 0 -7.61 ** 0
MJtaly Italy marginal cost -2.50 0 -6.53 ** 1
M_Spain Spain marginal cost -1.82 1 -2.81 1
Zs are the additional instruments used in the estimation, M _Italy and M _Spain are the estimated coefficients 
in the pass-through exchange rate equation.
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Table 4.8: Cointegration Analysis. Destination country: France
ITALY Trace [95%1 Maximal f95%l
DEMAND r = 0 47.17** 39.4 121.8** 94.2
r = 1 30.24 33.5 74.61* 68.5
r = 2 20.49 27.1 44.37 47.2
r = 3 12.64 21 23.88 29.7
r = 4 9.163 14.1 11.24 15.4
SUPPLY r = 0 54.38** 39.4 141.9** 94.2
r = 1 34.62* 33:5 87.51** 68.5
r = 2 24.59 27.1 52.89* 47.2
r = 3 16.93 21 28.3 29.7
r = 4 9.805 14.1 11.37 15.4
SPAIN Trace T95%1 Maximal T95%1
DEMAND r = 0 46.59* 42.5 109.1* 104.9
r = 1 26.76 36.4 62.51 77.7
r = 2 15.44 30.3 35.75 54.6
r = 3 14.54 23.8 20.31 34.6
r = 4 3.809 16.9 5.769 18.2
SUPPLY r = 0 52.59** 39.4 143.5** 94.2
r = 1 45.17** 33.5 90.89** 68.5
r = 2 16.69 27.1 45.72 47.2
r = 3 14.43 21 29.03 29.7
r = 4 13.8 14.1 14.6 15.4
* Significant at 1% le v e l, ** significant at a 5% level. Critical values are from Osterwald-Lenum (1992). The lag 
length in each equation is k = l  (demand, Italy), k = l  (supply, Italy), k=2 (demand, Spain), k=3 (supply, Spain).
Table 4.9: Test for Separability in demand
SEPARABILITY Ho: (p*4=cp*5=0
TEST
ITALY LR-test (2)= 10.98 *
SPAIN LR-test (2) =7.26*
* significant at a 5% level. In parenthesis the degrees of freedom.
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Table 4.10: Estimated parameters of linear demand equation. Method: TSLS. Destination






do (CONST) -75485 88494 45663 20854**
(Xi (P) 1731.6 1801.6 -1031.7 864.3
02 <Z) 1177.1 1087.5 -357.6 261.6
cc3 (Y) 410.0 501.3 -257.0 208.9
a4 (PZ) -52.5 22.519** 7.079 4.99







Own price -0.61 -0.79
Cross-price -0.05 -1.10
Income 0.61 0.58
Dependent variable: q (Exported quantity to France). Instrument variables: estimated marginal costs, exchange 
rate France-Germany. The variable Z stands for price of the rival and Y  for construction index in France.
Table 4.11: : Estimated parameters of linear supply equation. Method: TSLS. Destination 






Po (CONST) -0.877 12.833 17.85 8.895**
Pi (M) 1.418 0.564** 0.393 0.387
X(x* ) 0.003 0.013 -0.012 0.014





Dependent variable: p (Export price to France). Instrument variables: Construction index in France, construction 
index in source country and a linear trend.
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Table 4.12: Estimated parameters of dynamic demand equation. Method: TSLS. Period 1988:1-
1998:1. Destination country: France. Number of lags: k= l.(Italy); k=2 (Spain).
I T A L Y S P A I N
V a r i a b l e P a r a m e te r S td .  E r r o r . V a r ia b l e s P a r a m e te r S td .  E r r o r
C O N S T A N T 24842.00 85321.00 C O N S T A N T 46595 1910
ao o  (A x . , ) -0.59 0.21** <*oo (A x_ i) -0.39344 0.213*
<*io (A P ) -786.46 1381.5 <*oi (A x . , ) -0.68746 0.234**
<*n ( A P . , ) 322.59 1552.30 <*io (A P ) -694.85 282.39**
<*20 (A Z ) 86.40 1022.00 <*n ( A P .i ) -768.57 501.41
<*2i (A Z _ i) 195.18 103.30* <*12 ( A P * ) -1079.4 564.35
<*30 (A Y ) -311.64 373.41 <*20 (A Z ) -245.72 273.56
<*31 (A Y _ i) -103.79 473.92 <*2i ( A Z . , ) -447.18 352.89
040 (A P Z ) -2.18 21.99 <*22 ( A Z * ) -502.64 383.15
041 ( A P Z .i ) -7.89 24.94 <*30 (A Y ) -211.6 111.0**
a 50 (A P Y ) 17.26 7.90** <*3i ( A Y .,) -114.26 120.37
a 51 ( A P Y .,) 1.322 9.737 <*32 ( A Y * ) -235.64 143.39
Y* ( x . , ) -0.855 0.204** 040 (A P Z ) 4.9016 6.126
9 * i  (P - i ) 184.69 1175.90 <*41 ( A P Z . , ) 9.9708 8.1203
< P 5 * 2 (Z .!) -257.67 1125.90 (*42 ( A P Z * ) 10.777 8.735
<P*3 ( Y . , ) 110.47 472.58 <*50 (A P Y ) 4.4639 2.3992**
9 * 4  ( P Z - i ) -15.17 27.31 <*5i ( A P Y .,) 2.7582 2.5501
9 * 5  ( P Y . , ) 2.84 9.4192 <*52 ( A P Y * ) 5.0575 2.9036
Y * ( x - i ) -0.17511 0.14458
9 * i  (P - i ) -1052.2 661.71
9 * 2  (Z.,) -409.91 366.73
9 * 3  (Y-i) -245.6 172.08
9 * 4  ( P Z - i ) 8.4286 8.1528
9 * 5  ( P Y . , ) 6.155 2.7205**
R 2 0.72 0.86
S a r g a n  T e s t
[ p - v a lu e ] [0.07] [0.30]
0(4) 0.90 3.08
0(8) 6.33 11.27
L R  p a r a m e te r s
9i 215.96 1361.7 -6008.79 6347.97
02 -301.30 1336.0 -2340.87 2925.34
03 129.18 551.2 -1402.55 1531.64
04 -17.73 31.2 48.13 62.83
05 3.32 11.1 35.15 33.06
L R  E l a s t i c i t i e s
O w n  p r ic e -0.83 -1.11
C r o s s - p r i c e -4.38 -5.58
I n c o m e 2.70 0.90
Dependent variable: q(exported quantity). Instrumental variables are: Estimated marginal costs in Italy and 
Spain, German/France nominal exchange rate and a linear trend. Standard errors are calculated using the 
Taylor series expansion (Kmenta, 1971, pag. 444)
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Table 4.13: Estimated parameters of dynamic supply equation. Destination country: France. 
Method: TSLS. Period 1988:1-1998:1. Number of lags: k=l.(Italy); k=3 (Spain)
ITALY SPAIN
Variable Parameter Std. Error. Variables Parameter Std. Error
CONSTANT 24.389 29.632 , CONSTANT -23.111 37.325
Pn (Ap-i) -0.148 0.219 Pn(AP-i) -0.738 0.240
P20(AM) -0.687 2.035 Pl2 (Ap-2) -0.696 0.322**
PnCAM.!) •0.969 1.505 Pu (Ap.j) •0.353 0.356*
Xq(Ax*) -0.147 0.075** P40 (AM) 0.039 0.642
X,(Ax*.,) -0.004 0.077 P41 (AM.,) 0.714 0.669
V* -0.448 0.221** P42 (AM.j) -0.386 0.720
-0.836 0.593 P43 (AM.3) -0.661 0.702
V  (x*-,) -0.109 0.068 A<,(Ax*) 0.007 0.025
h  (Ax*4) -0.017 0.032
Xj (Ax*.2) -0.006 0.039
X3(Ax*.j) 0.029 0.047








Market power -0.24 0.20 -0.043 0.118
Dependent variable: p(export price in source-countiy currency). Standard errors are calculated using the Taylor 
series expansion (Kmenta, 1971, pag. 444)
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Chapter 5
Export A ctivity and Efficiency: An 
Empirical Analysis of the UK  
Manufacturing Industry, 1992-1998
5.1 Introduction
In the previous chapters we have examined the decision to export, the export marketing strategy 
and the competition in export markets. In the final chapter we want to examine how the 
export activities affect firms’ performance. In Appendix 1.2 of Chapter 1, we showed that 
firm performance experienced a substantial change during the year that a firm decided to start 
exporting or stop exporting. While performance indicators such as size, labour productivity 
or directors’ wage improve for new exporters, firms that exit the export market experienced a 
deterioration of the same indicators.
This chapter focuses on the performance differences between regular exporters and regular 
non-exporters. For that purpose, we investigate whether UK exporting firms are more efficient 
than their domestically-orientated counterparts operating within the same industry using a 
sample of 2,279 UK manufacturing firms in 45 selected industries over the period 1992-1998. In 
particularly, we focus on two inter-related issues and literatures: (1) is the exports-efficiency re­
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lationship affected by industry-specific characteristics? (2) is the exports-efficiency relationship 
affected by the share ownership structure of the firm?
A considerable literature has been developed arguing that if market competition reduces 
firm’s inefficiency, then the more competitive is an industry the stronger will be the relationship 
between efficiency and firm performance and hence the greater the incentives for managers to 
pursue efficiency (Hart, 1983; Scharfstein, 1988; Hermalin, 1992; Horn et al, 1995; Schmidt, 
1997). It is generally accepted that, although export markets are not necessarily perfectly 
competitive, they are more competitive than the domestic markets. Therefore, we should 
expect that exporters will have fewer opportunities for inefficient operations compared to their 
domestic rivals. Export activity forces firms to behave more efficiently in those products in 
which competition abroad is fiercer than in the local market. There is a number of competing 
and complementary mechanisms in the literature underlying this view.
The first mechanism, which was previously discussed in Chapter 1, is associated with the 
separate but complementary analyses of Dixit (1988) and Baldwin (1989) concerning the entry 
and exit decision of exporters. Both models emphasize that entry into international markets is 
determined by the entrant’s response to above normal profitability, but that potential entrants 
are deterred by barriers to entry. In the context of firm efficiency that literature implies that 
since export markets have higher demand uncertainty and entry sunk costs than domestic 
markets, exporters will need to maintain higher efficiency levels relative to firms selling in the 
domestic market before entering the export market. The minimum entry cost in export markets 
therefore acts as selection mechanism for weeding out the most inefficient firms.
A second mechanism associated with the managerial literature focuses on firm’s interna­
tionalisation. That literature has emphasised the argument that exporting is in itself a learning 
process (see Leonidou and Katsikeas, 1996 for a typical example from this literature). The 
relative efficiency of firms at the time of entry is not considered to be the key efficiency induc­
ing mechanism for firms but rather their ability to make progress in reducing the gap between 
incumbents and themselves after entry. While managerial and labour skills may not be equally 
distributed before entry, there is an opportunity to learn and to improve performance. Export
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activity can be viewed as an innovation, which modifies management practices and attitudes in 
a step-by-step process. The evolutionary learning approach implies that efficiency improves as 
export activity promotes contact with superior managerial and production techniques employed 
abroad. As firms gradually become more familiar with overseas markets and operations, they 
also become more efficient.
The two mechanisms described above to explain the better performance of exporters have 
been formalised in the Industrial Organisation literature using selection and evolutionary adap­
tation mechanisms. The participation in export markets can be viewed as a entry decision. 
Entry involves at least two different types of learning -  one comes from selection, the other is 
more evolutionary in nature. In the first case, entrants may physically have to be present to 
learn about their abilities to manage, to master technologies, to engender labour skills and to 
solve the myriad of other problems that are a pre-requisite for success. Entrepreneurs differ 
in capabilities and are unsure of their own capabilities before committing resources to the new 
activity, that is, they do not have precise information on what their costs will be relative to their 
potential competitors. Industry dynamics models by Jovanovic (1982) or Hopenhyan (1992) 
explain the selection of firms in the market as a function of factors of production and a random 
variable, which can be interpreted as a persistent productivity shock that is uncorrelated across 
firms. Firms have an initial distribution of efficiency levels and potential entrants have to incur 
sunk entry costs. Selection models show that more efficient firms stay in business and less 
efficient firms, after learning about their relative inefficiency level, choose to exit.
A third mechanism is found in a well developed literature examining the pro-efficiency ef­
fects of competition in product markets that place a pivotal role on ownership structure. Leech 
(1987) argues managerial discretion may be reduced by product market competition, but it 
can also be reduced by having a major shareholder who can exercise control. If ownership is 
widely dispersed there is no individual (or group) with either the voting power or the incentive 
to exercise control and enforce profit maximisation. Moreover, the effect of product market 
competition on efficiency may be different for firms with differing types of ownership struc­
ture. For example, Aghion and Howitt (1996) show that the positive effect of product market
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competition on firm growth is stronger among firms with the major shareholders not having 
direct control over managerial decisions (manager controlled firms). The impact of ownership 
structure on the relationship between exports and efficiency has not as yet been integrated into 
the export-efficiency literature, a deficit this paper seeks to amend.
At the empirical level, studies employing micro-data find that imports enhance perfor­
mance (Levinsohn,1991; McDonald,1994), and macro-studies support the link between exports 
and economic growth (Edwards, 1998). Direct evidence from studies utilising micro-data on 
the relationship between exports and performance is mixed. Several studies have compared 
firm performance before and after trade liberalisations to evaluate the effects of foreign compe­
tition.1 Although there is some evidence that increased export activity enhances efficiency at 
the firm level, the more substantive sources of efficiency gains were found to be at the industry 
level resulting from the reduction in the market power of large domestic incumbents and the 
shake-out of small high-cost domestic firms. Unfortunately, such natural experiments occur 
very occasionally and tend to be concentrated in Less Developed Countries. An alternative 
way to test whether export activity stimulates productivity and efficiency is to compare the 
performance of exporters with non-exporters. To date, the evidence suggesting that exporting 
firms exhibit superior productivity or efficiency is mainly based on cross-sectional firm-level 
data (Aw and Hwang, 1995; Chen and Tang, 1987), while studies providing more rigorous 
firm-level panel techniques have obtained mixed results (Kraay, 2000; Tybout and Westbrook, 
1995).
A recent strand of the empirical studies has analysed the direction of causality between 
exports and productivity: the self-selection hypothesis (good companies become exporters) vs 
leaming-by-exporting hypothesis (exporting improves firm performance). Bernard and Jensen 
(1999) and Bernard and Wagner (1997) examine this issue using manufacturing firm data for 
the U.S. and Germany, respectively. They find that successful companies become exporters and 
the benefits of exporting are less clear since productivity performance grows slowly after firms 
become exporters. For Colombia, Mexico, and Morocco Clerides et al. (1998) find that the
ISee, among others, Handoussa et al. (1986), Tybout et al. (1991), Harrison (1994) and Pavcnik (2000).
161
causality between success and exports runs from good performance to exports rather than the 
other way. For Taiwan, Aw et al. (2000) and Liu et al (1999) reinforce the evidence in favour 
of the self-selection hypothesis by finding that Taiwanese firms with higher productivity tend 
to enter the export market and exporters with low productivity tend to exit over the eighties 
and nineties. Aw et al. (2000) find that stable exporters experience relative productivity 
improvement in several industries compared to non-exporters. In contrast, Liu et al. (1999) 
do not find that exporting itself provides performance gains among stable exporters in the 
electronic industry.
There has also been a small body of empirical work focused on the UK. Green and Mayes 
(1991,1992) used the census of manufacturing firms in 1977 to study the determinants of the UK 
industry technical efficiency. The results suggested that technical efficiency across industries was 
positively related to greater competition in the domestic market but, surprisingly, negatively 
related to greater exposure to competition in the international markets. 2
Finally as was noted there are, as far as we are aware, no papers that provide a direct a link 
between ownership and export activity. There are however numerous empirical studies that find 
a significant majority of owner controlled firms outperformed manager controlled firms.3 In the 
literature that specifically examines the UK, Leech and Leahy (1987, 1991) found that owner 
controlled firms perform better than manager controlled firms among large-sized companies 
in the eighties. Nickell et al (1997) investigated the interaction between ownership structure 
and product market competition in the evolution of productivity growth in UK manufacturing 
industry over the period 1985-1994. They found that dominant external shareholders have a 
positive impact on productivity growth, but dominant internal shareholders have no effect.
In contrast to the significant body of empirical literature concerning the long run relationship 
examined above there has been no empirical work examining the short run export-efficiency 
relation.4 Consistent with our desire to understand the impact of product competition on
2 Since the seventies manufactures account for about 80 percent of exports of goods in the UK. Exports as 
percentage of total manufacturing sales has increased continuously from 1970 to 1998.
3 Short (1994) provides a comprehensive summary of the literature.examining ownership and competition.
4 A paper that does examine short efficiency is Hay and Lai (1997) who, using a large panel o f UK firms, found 
that short run declines in domestic market share induced firms to improve efficiency over the period 1975-1991.
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efficiency improvements by groups of firms with different type of ownership structure we provide 
a similar analysis over the short run. Of the mechanisms provided by the theoretical literature 
above, with the exception of evolutionary selection models that are clearly only applicable 
over the long-run, all make a consistent claim that exporters are more efficient than their 
domestically-orientated counterparts in the short-run operating within the same industry.
To anticipate the results, we show that exporting firms are more technically efficient than 
no-exporters, based on their long-run relative position to the industry frontier. We find that, 
on average, exporters are 4 percent closer to the frontier than non-exporters. However, the 
efficiency differences seems to be substantially reduced between heavy exporters and light ex­
porters.5 We thus conclude that the source of efficiency gains comes directly from the decision 
to export rather than the intensity of the export activity. When we examine if the strength 
of the export-efficiency relationship is affected by the trade-orientation of the industry, the re­
sults show a stronger impact of export activity on long-run efficiency among those industries in 
which UK reveals comparative disadvantage. This finding suggests that firm competitiveness 
factors play an important role in overcoming industry comparative disadvantage factors. In 
the analysis of the determinants of short run efficiency changes among exporting firms, the 
results indicate that competition in the domestic market is more important as a ’’disciplinary 
device” in reducing technical inefficiency than competition in the export market. This finding 
is robust to different samples of firms with different ownership characteristics.
We adopt a three stage methodology which determines the format of remainder of this paper 
that is structured as follows. Section 4.2 defines how the data is constructed. In the first stage 
(Section 4.3) we use panel data techniques to examine a stochastic frontier production function 
that allows for the decomposition of total factor productivity (TFP) constructing a firm-specific 
time-variant technical efficiency index. In Section 4.4 we analyse the efficiency index derived 
in the previous step using kernel density estimations to compare the efficiency index between
However, Hay and Lai do not examine the link between efficiency and export status that is the focus of this 
paper. The fact that they do not control for firms’ export activity is somewhat surprising since exports today 
represent 40 percent of total sales in the UK manufacturing industry.
6Heavy exporters being those firms whose average export/sales ratio above 25%, while fight exporters are 
classified as exporters whose average export/sales ratio below 25%.
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domesticly orientated and exporting firms, and between firms with different export intensity 
derived in the first step. Section 4.4 examines the third stage where we undertake regression 
analysis to deepen our understanding of the determinants of efficiency over both the long and 
short runs. Section 4.6 provides conclusions.
5.2 Construction o f the D ata
The trade classification of UK manufacturing industries over the period 1993-1998 uses two 
recent publications from ONS, UK Markets Reports (1993-1994) and Product Sales and Trade 
(1995-1998). Each publication contains information about value and volume of imports and 
exports by destination (EU and NON-EU) for 4,500 products within 200 four-digit SIC92 in­
dustries. We combine two different methods to classify the trade data: positive/negative net 
exports and horizontal/vertical intra-industry trade (IIT). The intuition behind introducing an 
IIT measure is that the division of industries using only the revealed comparative advantage 
classification (positive/negative net exports) may be distorted by firms specific effects. In par­
ticular it is widely recognised that product differentiation may change the relative importance 
of industry comparative advantage forces against firm competitive advantage forces (Porter, 
1990, and Ab-el-Raham, 1991). For example, firm-specific characteristics become very impor­
tant in industries whose trade is based in the exchange of varieties of similar price (horizontal 
intra-industry trade) since cost difference between trading partners is not the major driven-force 
of trade. On the other hand, firm-specific characteristics may be less important in industries 
whose trade is based on exchange of varieties of different price (vertical intra-industry trade) 
since quality differences are based on cost differences, so that traditional comparative advantage 
forces become important again.
For each industry we calculate the average net export flow and the extent of intra-industry 
trade. Following Greenaway, Hine and Milner (1994), we decompose the proportion of intra­
industry trade that corresponds to horizontal and vertical differentiated products. The key 
assumption is that quality is reflected in price and price can be proxied by unit vales. The
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intra-industry trade (IIT) index for an industry j ,  defined as the share of overlapping trade in 
total trade, can be disentangle into horizontal (HIIT) and vertical (YIIT),
IIT j =  H IIT j +  V IIT j  (5.1)
Each term in the right-hand side is obtained according to the formula,
Ei (4+ mij) (5.2)
where i refers to a product in a given j  industry, and k refers to horizontally or vertically 
differentiated products. Each product i is allocated in group k according to the formula
k € H IIT j  if l - a < ^ - < l  +  a
w* ~ " w*. (5-3)k e  V IIT j  if <  1 - a  or > 1 +  aij ij
where UVm and UVX stands for unit values of imports and exports and a  is a the dispersion 
factor. The price gap is justified on possible distortions in the unitary values of imports 
and exports because of transport cost, tariffs and other duties. In our calculations we use a 
dispersion factor of 20 per cent.6
Table 5.1 displays the list of sectors, the value of net exports, the intra-industry trade ratio 
(IIT), and the decomposition of IIT into horizontal (HIIT) and vertical (VHT). Net exports are 
for the year 1993 and IIT, HIIT and VIIT are averages over the period 1993-1998. The results 
indicate the percentage of UK trade classified as intra-industry trade is quite large. Although 
the figures for some industries may be upwardly bias due to aggregation, our main interest here 
is not the extent of intra-industry trade but its composition. The intraindustry trade seems 
to be dominated by exchange of varieties of products of different quality, reflected in the price
6 The literature that has followed Greenaway, Hine and Milner (1994) uses a value of a  between [0.15,0.25] and 
have found that the index is highly robust within these parameter values. Our calculations use an intermediate 
value of a  =  0.2.
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dispersion of the imported and exported varieties. In that sense, our results are in line with 
Greenaway et al. (1994). The analysis of industries in which UK reveals a comparative ad­
vantage or disadvantage also confirms with expectations. Traditional industries (food, textiles, 
footwear, glass and wood-made products) are dominant among the manufacturing sectors in 
which UK reveals comparative disadvantage (negative net exports). UK reveals comparative 
advantage in more advanced technological industries (pharmacy, vehicles, aircrafts, electronic 
apparatus, precision instruments). The high level of disaggregation of our data allows us to 
determine other industries in which UK has comparative advantage or disadvantage: in in­
dustries dominated by horizontal differentiated trade UK reveals comparative disadvantage in 
the plastic and rubber industry (plastic in primary form, rubber tyres and plastic tubes); in 
industries dominated by vertical differentiated trade UK reveals comparative disadvantage in 
the production of specialised machinery for agriculture and manufacturing industry.
The first column of Table 5.1 highlights the 45 industries that we have selected for the 
calculation of the firm technical efficiency.7 The fact that most industries have high vertical 
IIT is in line with the fact that most trade flows across UK industries are of this type.
In order to examine firm and industry characteristics we match two sets of data, one at firm- 
level and one at industry-level. Our first data set is based on firm-level panel data constructed 
from balance sheets provided by Financial Analysis Made Easy (FAME). The firm level data 
comes from a sample contains 2,279 firms distributed in the previously selected 45 manufac­
turing industries. The firm-level data were taken from FAME and were based on published 
Profits and Loss account and balance sheets of UK manufacturing companies.8 The industry
7 The rules for selection of the industry selection rules are (i) industries with export as percent of industry 
sales and imports as percent of home sales both above 10 percent; (ii) industries with a Grubel Lloyd index of 
intra-industry trade above 50% (with the exceptions of [1513] Meat and Poultry products (IIT=0.23) and [1533] 
Fruit and vegetables nec (IIT=0.35) that are included to provide a representation of the Food industry so that 
all SIC92 are included in the analysis) (iii) industries with more than two product categories; (iv) there is a 
sufficient large number of firms in the firm data set (see next section). 29 out of 45 industries have negative net 
exports in 1993 and 30 have high vertical IIT.
8 Firms were selected according to the following criteria: (i) complete information to estimate the production 
function over the period 1992-1998; (ii) the number of employees is above 6 (every year); total assets and turnover 
are above £100.000 every year over the period 1992-1998; (iii) the value of tangible assets does not suffer any 
revaluation or substantial adjustment (doubles or halves) over the entire period; (iv) the number of firms in each 
industry is above 20 prior to eliminating outliers.
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level data on output growth and price indices is from Sector Review, Manufacturing (ONS). 
The data covers the period 1992-1998.
In order to examine the effects of ownership on the relationship between exporters and effi- 
cency we classify firms by ownership into two groups: independent privately owned companies, 
and subsidiary companies. Independent private-owned companies are firms whose major share­
holder is a single individual or family. Within this group of firms we can distinguish between 
firms with a dominant major shareholder who has direct control over managerial decisions 
(owner controlled), and firms with several major shareholders with or without participation in 
the managerial decisions (manager controlled). Subsidiary companies are those firms whose 
major shareholder is another company. To divide independent private companies into owner- 
controlled firms and manager-controlled firms we follow Cubbin and Leech (1983) who measured 
’’ownership control” as function of both the importance of the largest shareholders and the de­
gree of dispersion of all the shares of the firm. Suppose that N  shareholders are ordered in 
decreasing size with percentage holding defined as Pq,P \ , . . . ,P n  such that =  1 0 0 . If 
we define the Herfindahl index as H  =  it can be shown that the degree of control of
the shareholder with the largest percentage of shares, Po, is defined as qo =  $  ( 7— I
\ { H~po) J
where $(•) is the standard normal distribution. This index accounts for the fact that a large 
dispersion of other shareholders helps the largest shareholder to win control over the firm in 
case of a hypothetical contest in which each shareholder votes independently.
Among subsidiary companies, we distinguish between domestic and foreign-owned sub­
sidiaries. Here the major shareholder is an outsider, whose main concern is with the perfor­
mance of the company. However, the degree of managerial discretion may vary with nationality 
(domestic vs foreign).
In our sample, details of managers (name and position) and shareholders (names and sizes 
of holding) are obtained from FAME. Table 5.3 summarises the distribution of companies 
by ownership-type in our sample. In the sample of 2,279 firms, we identified 807 firms as 
independent private companies. On the basis of the probability of control by the leading 
shareholder higher than 90% (i.e. qq > 0.9), more than a half of the companies (458) are
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classified as owner-controlled. Of the 1,472 subsidiary companies, 792 companies have as a 
major shareholder a domestic-owned company and 680 companies are subsidiaries of foreign 
firms.9
5.3 M easuring firm technical efficiency
This section describes the calculation of the index of firm technical efficiency by econometric 
estimation of production functions. Productivity varies across firms within the same industry, 
for example due to differences in technology, scale of production or product diversity. It is 
possible that after controlling for these three factors, productivity differences still persist due 
to firms obtaining different levels of output from the same levels of inputs. This last idea, 
formalised first by Farrell (1957), is termed technical efficiency. Technical efficiency refers 
to the firms’ ability to produce the maximum possible output from their input bundles and 
technology, regardless input prices and output market conditions.10
The index of technical efficiency is measured as the ratio of the observed output of a firm 
to the maximal potential output possible or frontier output by that firm given its production 
capacity. The reliability of this index, therefore depends on accurately estimating the maximal 
potential output of a firm. The most general of the alternative methods for the derivation of 
an efficiency frontier and the computation of a technical efficiency measure is the econometric 
estimation of a stochastic frontier production function (SFPF).11 The main drawback of using 
SFPFs is that they assume a parametric technology to estimate the maximum potential output 
from a given combination of inputs for each company in the same industry. If real output is a 
function of the real capital stock and employment, measured in efficiency units, the stochastic
9 The largest percentage of foreign subsidiaries is from USA (41%). Germany, Japan, France and Switzerland 
are the other major countries with subsidiaries in UK.
10 Efficiency is conventionally divided into two conceptual distinct forms: technical and allocative efficiency. 
Allocative efficiency results in utilisation of inputs in the correct proportions in order to m inim ise the production 
costs, given input prices is not the subject of analysis in this paper.
11 The alternative approach, a non-parametric technique called Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA), uses linear 
programming techniques to restrict all observations to he on or below the frontier. Conceptually this deterministic 
technique is the closest representation of what a frontier is. It, however, is more sensitive to errors in observations 
compared to the stochastic techniques. For a survey of the literature, see Aigner and Schmidt (1980).
168
frontier production for a firm i over the period t = 1, ...,T  is given by
Yit = exp(Au)f(K it, Lu) exp (Zit) exp(vit) (5.4)
where K& = Ku exp(-u'kit) and Lu = Lit exp(—u'lit). The error term u'jit, j  = k, I measures 
technical inefficiency associated directly with each input (i.e. capital-vintage, labour work 
stoppages, material bottlenecks). Technical progress is assumed to be Hicks-neutral. Since 
output changes may occur through firms eliminating (increasing) excess capacity due to demand 
booms (slowdowns), the term exp (Zit) includes industry-level and firm-specific factors to control 
for cyclical movement in demand or capacity utilisation affecting firm’s production. The error 
term vu captures random variations in the economic environment that are not directly controlled 
by the firm reflecting factors such as luck, weather, machine breakdown, random variation in 
workers’ productivity, or measurement and reporting errors in the firm data.
The term exp(j4*t) is an index of total factor productivity (TFP), which varies across firms 
and over time,
exp(j4tf) =  ait = <n + bt -  (5.5)
The first term, a*, measures long run efficiency of the firm relative to the frontier. It reflects 
firm-specific characteristics that affect internal efficiency (managerial organisation) and com­
petitive ability of firms in the product market (experience, expertise, quality factors, location, 
fast adoption of the latest technologies). The second term, represents time-specific efficiency 
effects or shift of the frontier. The change in bt is a measure of the rate of technical change.
The last term, —u"t, is a random term which reflect ’’unobserved” technical inefficiency or short
run deviations with respect to the ’’best practice” of the firm. Substituting (5.5) in (5.4), we 
write the standard SFPF equation in logarithm form
Vit = di + bt + f ( k iu lu) + 2^ €hzhit +  vit ~  uit (5.6)
h
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The last term uu = —u"t — u'kit — u'lit is a firm-specific, time-varying inefficiency effect. It 
reflects the shortfall of the firms relative to their ’’own best practice” in each period, where the 
best practice for the firm is determined by the time invariant efficiency coefficient, a*.
Since the selection of the production function is made apriori, the translog form is the clear 
choice due to its inherent flexibility, 12
lit)  — Oil la  +  OL2kn +  cx l^ft +  ot^kft 4- OL^litkit (5.7)
and substituting equation (5.7) into equation (5.6) and expressing the resulting equation in 
per-capita terms gives
( j —) =  a* +  +  7lit +  P ( j~ ^ j  +  ^ +  ^ ^ € h zhit +  vit — uit (5.8)
The specification of equation (5.8) is made for convenience in order to reduce both multi- 
collinearity and heteroscedasticity problems. The parameters (7 , /3,6) are 7 =  a\ +  02 — 1 
, (3 =  a 2 and 6 is obtained after imposing the restrictions <24 =  —03; <*5 =  0. 7 is a con­
venient measure of the extent to which the industry production differs from constant return 
to scale, while the joint significance of the parameters (/3, 6) test for the translog versus the 
Cobb-Douglas specification. We assume the error term vu is normally distributed with mean 
zero and variance <r2.13
12 The Translog function is a second order approximation to the CES function which does not impose any a 
priori assumption about the Allen partial elasticity of substitution or separability, or else homotheticity (Bernt 
and Christensen, 1973).
13 Three alternative distribution forms of Uu have been assumed traditionally in the literature. Two pioneering 
papers in SFPF, Aigner, Lowell and Schmidt (1977) and Meeusen and van den Broeck (1977) assume half­
normal and exponential residuals distribution, respectively. The main objection to these distributions to depict 
inefficiency is that the modal level of inefficiency is zero. Stevenson (1980) proposes a more general form in 
which the elements of Uu are distributed as a truncated-normal, with the mode determined by the data. The 
three distributions are one-side normal. Eq. (5.8) is estimated by maximum likelihood. Since the measure of 
firm-specific efficiency depends on the estimates of the variance of Uu and Va, the left skew of the distribution of 
residuals is necessary to calculate the standard deviation of ua  and Va. A positive skew of the residuals means 
that the longer tail of the distribution lies outside rather than inside the frontier; as a consequence, a u <  0. 
Three potential reasons could explain the wrong skew of the residuals distribution: (1) the presence o f ’’outliers”, 
(2) our initial distribution assumption (i.e. truncated normal) of Uu is incorrect , (3) the specification of the 
model is inappropriate. Estimation had to proceed by eliminating ’’extreme” outliers in the data, by switching 
the distribution of uu, and by using a more parsimonious functional specification of the production function.
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To estimate the production function for each industry, we first utilise a Least Square Dummy 
Variable (LSDV) estimation of equation (5.8) omitting the error term Uj*. This is followed by 
a battery of specification tests: Cobb-Douglas vs CES model, fixed effect error model (Haus- 
man test), heteroscedasticity (Breush-Pagan test ) and first-order correlation (Durbin-Watson 
test). We then use maximum likelihood estimation of our ’’preferred” specification of equation 
excluding outliers (5.8).14 We test for the correct form of the SFPF using Ho : A =  ^  =  0; 
fi =  0 for the truncated normal distribution,i/o : A =  |^- =  0 for the half-normal distribution 
and Hq : A =  — =  0 for the exponential distribution. We then obtain the residual uu from 
the ’’preferred” distribution of uu.
As we explained above, the efficiency index is measured as the ratio of the observed output 
of a firm to its frontier output. For n  firms in the industry, the estimation of the stochastic 
production function provides (n — 1) negative values of a* which reflect deviations with respect 
to the most efficient firm (the constant term, max(aj)).15 In addition, where we obtained 
n  positive estimates of these reflect deviations with respect to firm’s best practice every 
period. Since the firm’s efficiency level was calculated across firms within the same sector, we 
define the estimated relative technical efficiency index (RTE) as
R TE u =  =  exp (  )  (5.9)
Yit \ max(ai ) /
This index has the advantage of being comparable not only across fims within the same sector, 
but also across different sectors. By construction the index is equal to or less than 1. As RTEu
14 When the skewness of the residuals is wrong (failure in the estimation), we delete those extreme points whose 
DFITS is above (fc=number of regressors, 71= number of observations), and repeat the estimation. In case of
new failure, we use and so on. DFITS can be interpreted as the scaled difference between predicted values
for the ith case when the regression is estimated with and without the ith observation. DFITS combines both the 
size of the residuals - studentised residuals (r,) - and the size of the leverage (hi), D F IT S i  =  , r» , so large/ hi
V U-hi)
values of r* and hi increase the value of DFITS. Belsley et al. (1980) identify ”potential”outliers as observations 
with DFITS greater than 2 ,where k is the number of regressors and n is the number of observations.
15 We identified the most efficient firm using LSDV estimation. In each regression an arbitrary firm was omitted 
until the rest of estimated firm- effect coefficients were negative.
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approaches to 1, the firm is closer to the frontier.
We estimate equation (5.8) using Aigner, Lovell and Schmidt Maximum Likelihood esti­
mation with time and firm dummies (ALS-DV ML).16 The value of total turnover is used as 
the measure of output. Capital stock is approximated by the book value of tangible assets (i.e. 
the sum of land, building, machinery and equipment).17 Total number of full-time workers 
measures employment. Output and capital are expressed in real terms using the corresponding 
output price index and capital price index at the corresponding four-digit and two-digit SIC 
level, respectively. Two additional variables were included in the regression. The first variable, 
real growth rate of industry output, is included to reflect changes in product demand conditions. 
The second variable is the ratio between finished-good inventories (stock) divided by total sales 
at the end of the previous period. This variable is transformed into deviations from trend 
to reflect unexpected changes in demand/capacity that may affect production decisions in the 
next period. We use instrumental variables to correct for possible simultaneity between output 
and inputs (capital and labour) in the production function using one-period lagged variables as 
instruments. The estimation thus covers the period 1993-1998 with six observations per firm.
Table 5.2 displays the estimation of the production functions. The following features 
summarise the results:
(i) The firm-specific time-invariant effect, a*, picks up the relative efficiency of firms, iden­
tifying their positions relative to the frontier. This parameter varies across firms in the same 
industry, capturing differences in quality of management, in ability to adopt new technologies
16 Hay and Liu (1997) use the same estimation technique. ALS-DV ML estimation allows us to examine time- 
variant firm-specific inefficiency as compared to LSDV technique which assumes that ua — (Schmidt and 
Sickles, 1984). See Cornwall et al. (1993) and Kumbhakar (1990) for alternative ways to measure technical 
inefficiency over time. ALS-DV MLE estimation is not exempt of criticism. We impose one-sided normal 
distribution assumptions on uu to estimate deviations with respect to the firm’s ’’best practice” over time and 
assume that the elements of the variance-covariance matrix of the error term are independence over time.
17An alternative to total turnover is value-added. The value added can be measured as the sum of total 
wages, profits before tax, depreciation and interest payments. When we experimented with value-added as 
endogenous variable, the results were quite similar to those using turnover. However, we prefer to use turnover 
in the estimation as it is well known the limitations of using accounting profits as component of value-added 
(Nickell, 1996). Regarding the capital stock, FAME does not provide information on new investment in capital 
so we cannot calculate any measure of capital stock as the sum of investment flows minus depreciation following 
the perpetual inventory formula.
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or in inherited capital stock or technologies. In all the sectors the estimated coefficients of a* 
are significant as a group, reflecting the persistence of efficiency differences between firms.
(ii) The time dummies bt reflect the movements of the sectoral production frontier over 
time. The sign and statistical significance of the coefficients changes from industry to industry, 
although in most cases the frontier seems to shift upward every year. Behind that result may 
stand the favourable years for the UK economy after the recession period 1991-1993.
(iii) The time-variant firm-specific efficient term uu measures the shortfall of the firms 
relative to their own "best practice” in each period. In 30 out of 45 industries, the specification 
tests on one of the distributions of the residuals confirm the presence of significant time-variant 
firm inefficiency.
(iv) The translog specification (that included a quadratic term in the log of the capital-labour 
ratio) was statistically rejected in only nine industries. The coefficient on the labour variable is 
a convenient measure of the extent to which the industry differs from constant returns to scale. 
The null hypothesis of constant returns of scale is not rejected in 15 out of forty-five industries, 
while the rest of industries but one shows decreasing returns to scale. Only the ’’paperboard” 
industry shows strongly increasing returns. The effect of the capital-labour ratio on output is 
mixed. In 5 industries the effect is linear and positive. In 13 of the industries the relationship 
is an strong inverted-U shape while in other 12 the relationships take a U-shape form. In the 
rest of industries there is not significant effect.
(v) Finally, the two control variables for cyclical conditions affecting production are the 
annual growth rate of industry sales (DEMAND) and the ratio inventories/total sales (STOCK). 
The annual change in industry sales was dropped in some industries due to multicollinearity 
problems with the time dummies which complicates the interpretation. For the other variable, 
in 33 industries the coefficient of deviation of stocks/sales to the trend has a negative coefficient 
(only 12 of them are significant) reflecting that in several industries firms adjust their current 
production in response to an excess of finished goods stock.
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5.4 Export activity and Efficiency: Non-param etric Analysis
In this section we compare the RTE indices calculated in the previous section between exporters 
and non-exporters, and between regular exporters with different export intensity. Unfortu­
nately not all firms in our sample of 2,279 report information about exports every year over 
the period 1993-1998 (see Table 5.4). Some 1,997 out of 2,279 firms report at least one year 
information about exports and 1,712 firms report exports value during six consecutive years. 
With this type of data, we could define an exporting firm as a firm that exports at least once 
over the period 1993-1998. However, this definition includes firms that export a very small 
proportion of total production or export irregularly. To avoid including these firms as ’’regu­
lar” exporters, we prefer to define an exporting firm as a firm that exports every year and sells 
abroad more than 2.5 percent of total sales. The selection of exporting and domestic-orientated 
firms is made for the subsample of 1,924 firms with at least three consecutive years of infor­
mation about exports. There are 1,402 regular exporters and 522 domestic-orientated firms. 
Among ’’regular” exporters, we split the sample into 741 heavy exporters (average export/sales 
ratio above 25%) and 861 fight exporters (average export/sales ratio below 25%).
We compare the cumulative distribution functions of efficiency levels that correspond to 
groups of firms with experience in the export market to those with no experience. We denote a 
dummy variable, D, that categorise firms into groups and then calculate the density function of 
the RTE index of firm i at time £, z, that is obtained from a gaussian kernel density estimators 
f ( z  |t, .D).18 Formally,
F {z\t,D ) = f  f(x \t ,D )d x
J —oo
D = 1 for exporting firms
D  =  0 for domestic orientated firms (5.10)
18The smoothing parameter for the kernel estimate is h =  0.9n  A, where A  =  m in(SD , riqr/1.34), SD  
denotes the standard deviation and riq the interquartile range (according to the recommendation in Silverman, 
1986).
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Figure 5.1 reports the kernel estimators of the density functions of the RTE index for 
exporting and domestically-orientated firms. Since the RTE index takes value of one in the 
frontier, the left skewness of the density function of exporting firms (straight fine) suggests a 
higher level of efficiency.
Table 5.5 summarises efficiency differences between exporting firms and domestic-orientated 
firms for the quartiles of both cumulative distributions. The efficiency cumulative distributions 
are higher for exporting firms for all the quartiles. In particular, the median efficiency level of 
exporting firms is 5 percent higher than the efficient level of domestic-orientated firms. The 
efficiency differences at the lower part of the distribution are 5% in favour of exporting firms at 
the lower quartile, and 4% in favour of exporting firms at the upper quartile. The dispersion 
of the distribution of exporting firms, measured by the interquartile range, is similar to the one 
of domestic-orientated firms.
Next we test whether the cumulative distributions are equal,
Hq : sup F(*|t,I> =  0 ) - .F (* |t ,D  =  l ) |  =  0 (5.11)
and whether the sign of the differences between compared distributions is as expected (i.e. a 
superior performance for exporting firms),
H0 : sup F(*|l,.D =  0)-.F(*|i,Z> =  l) l  < 0 (5.12)
which can be tested using the Kolmogorov-Smirnov statistics of equal distribution and stochastic 
dominance for two independent samples. 19 Note that the tests are implemented for each time 
period.
19 Smirnov (1939) shows that the corresponding statistic to test for equality of cumulative distributions and 
differences in cumulative distribution is, respectively,
^  = ( ^ ) ' (5.13)
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The lower part of Table 5.5 shows the test statistics for both hypotheses. First, the null 
hypothesis of equality of both distributions can be rejected at the 0.01 level for all years. 
Second, the null hypothesis of stochastic dominance of exporting firms cannot be rejected at 
any conventional significance level.
Our previous findings indicated higher levels of technical efficiency for exporting firms rela­
tive to domestically-orientated firms. Now, we want to investigate whether the RTE index for 
exporting firms increases with the export intensity. For this purpose, we have classified firms 
into two groups according to their export intensity distribution, i.e. light exporters and heavy 
exporters. The threshold of 25 percent is quite close to the actual median of the distribution 
(21%).
Figure 5.2 displays the density kernel functions of efficiency performance according to firms 
export intensity. Descriptive statistics are displayed in the right hand side of Table 5.5. 
The statistics of stochastic dominance cannot be rejected at any significant level. However, 
the magnitude of the efficiency differentials is smaller than for the aggregate distribution of 
exporters and domestically-orientated firms. The findings suggest that export status matters 
more than export intensity in order to distinguish groups of firms by their efficiency differences.
5.5 Exports and Efficiency: Regression Analysis.
This section is divided into two parts: (1) is the exports-efficiency relationship affected by 
industry-specific characteristics? (2) is the exports-efficiency relationship affected by the share 
ownership structure of the firm?
(1) Long-run analysis o f the efficiency-export relationship.
To probe whether the relationship between export activity and efficiency is sensitive to the
*'»+"•=O t p s )  / sup (# w  -  e<2))  (514)
where n  and m  are the number of firms and domestic-orientated exporters, and F (.)  and G(.) are their estimated 
cumulative distribution functions.
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industry trade orientation, we analyse the determinants of long-run efficiency. Standard with 
the literature on technical efficiency, firm size, age, and ownership may affect long run efficient 
position of a firm (Pitt and Lee, 1981; Haddad and Harrison, 1991). We add to this our key 
variable of interest: the export status of the firm at the beginning of the period (i.e. 1993). Our 
dependent variable is RTE index in 1998. Since the dependent variable lies between zero and 
one we apply the logistic transformation to the dependent variable and estimate the following 
model
>°g , =  f  { E X P O R T ^ , S IZ E i:93,AG Eif9it O W N E R S H IP ^ )  (5.15)
1 — K 1  .C/i98
where the sub-index 98 and 93 refer to years 1998 and 1993. The variable size is measured by the 
sales value (£m), age is equal to the number of years since registration in Company House, and 
foreign is a dummy that takes value of one if the firm is foreign-owned subsidiary, zero otherwise. 
The expected relation between the explanatory variables and technical efficiency are as follows. 
Larger firms are usually to be more efficient than smaller firms because they are thought to 
have superior organisation or technical knowledge. Older firms both because they have gained 
experience from past operations, and the fact o9f their survival may reflect their efficiency should 
exhibit a positive relation with efficiency. Finally, if there are differences in efficiency between 
foreign-owned and domestically-owned firms, this may indicate differences in the organisation of 
production, input usage, or technology access suggesting a positive relationship between foreign 
ownership and efficiency.
Row 1 in Table 5.6 shows the results of equation (5.15) for a sample of 1,902 firms with 
complete information in the year 1993. The positive and statistically significant coefficient 
on the export status supports the earlier results that export activity exhibit less deviation 
from the best-practice efficiency levels relative to domestic-orientated firms. The positive and 
significant coefficient on size also suggests that larger firms are more likely to achieve higher 
levels of efficiency. The positive and significant coefficient on foreign-owned subsidiary suggests
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a smaller deviation from maximum efficiency levels in firms with foreign ownership. This 
result is similar to that obtained by Griffith and Simpson (2000), who observe higher labour 
productivity between foreign-owned and domestic-owned establishments in Britain over the 
period 1980-1996. Finally the coefficient on age is not statistically significant.
Rows (2) and (3) test the sensitivity of the results by splitting the sample into industries 
that are net importers and industries that are net exporters. The sign and significance of 
the coefficients on size, age and ownership does not change. The coefficient on export status 
is positive and statistically significant in net importing industries, but it is not significant 
in exporting industries. This result is in line with our hypothesis that exporters are more 
efficient than domestically-orientated firms in industries with comparative disadvantage since 
exporters have to overcome unfavourable country-wide conditions. Rows (4) and (5) repeat the 
regression for the subsample of industries with high horizontal intra-industry trade. Again the 
coefficient on export status is positive and statistically significant in net importing industries, 
but it is not statistically significant in exporting industries. These findings confirm that 
the relationship between firm-specific factors and export supply is stronger in industries with 
comparative disadvantage, while it is not so strong in industries with comparative advantage. 
Therefore, the positive impact of export status on firm efficiency is greater in industries where 
firms have to overcome national comparative disadvantages to compete successfully abroad. 
Rows (6) and (7) include industries with high vertical intra-industry trade. The coefficient on 
export status is positive but not significant in both net importing industries and net exporting 
industries. A possible explanation for this result is that comparative advantage forces are still 
important in industries with high vertical intra-industry trade so firm-specific attributes are 
less important than they are in industries with high horizontal intra-industry trade.
Our results support the hypothesis that long-run industry comparative advantage forces 
affect the relationship export activity-technical efficiency. In industries with comparative dis­
advantage the presence of firm-specific competitive advantage factors appears to be necessary 
to compete successfully in the international markets. The relationship between export activity 
and unobservable firm-specific factors having a positive impact on efficiency becomes stronger in
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industries with comparative disadvantage, while it is not strong in industries with comparative 
advantage.
(2) Short-run analysis o f the efficiency-export relationship.
We now turn to the determinants of shifts in the efficiency of firms over the short run 
analysing a subsample of 832 ’’regular” exporters with complete information over the period 
1993-1998. The selection of only exporting firms allows us to separate the impact of com­
petition in the domestic product market and competition in the export markets on efficiency 
performance. We use the same empirical approach as Hay and Liu (1997) for comparison pur­
poses but we introduce the novelty that each equation is run for subsamples of firms classified 
according to different types of ownership and control.
A R T E it =  g ( A R r E i t - i , A R T E - i t - i , A 7 n t - i , A M S i t - u A X S i t - i )  (5.16)
In the relative efficiency index (RTEit) the term ua provides an indicator of the failure of 
the firm i to achieve its own best efficiency in period t. As the long-run efficiency component 
(a,i — max(ui)) is constant over time, deviations within firms efficiency frontier between periods 
Aun = —(uit — u a -1) capture short run efficiency changes. A positive value indicates that 
the firm is becoming more efficient. A negative value that the firm is allowing its short run 
efficiency to slip.
What factors are more likely to stimulate firm performance improvements each period? 
Firms performing badly, in particular losing domestic market share, export sales or facing falling 
profits, will have an incentive to improve its short run efficiency. The explanatory variables we 
examine are of two kinds reflecting the differing sorts of competition that the firm may face. 
The first type is competition by comparison, which assumes that the ’’product market rivalry” 
acts as an information mechanism (Bertoletti and Polletti, 1997). Yardstick competition will 
put more pressure on a firm to improve its own efficiency if rival firms are more efficient. The 
comparative efficiency aspect is addressed by introducing the change in efficiency of all other
179
firms in the sector (AUjt). The coefficient is expected to be positive since if rival firms in 
the sector are becoming more efficient there is increased pressure on the firm to improve its 
efficiency. The second type of competition is in the product market where changes in domestic 
market share or export sales will have incentive effects if the firm interprets falling domestic 
sales or exports as a signal of loss of competitiveness and reacts to improve its performance 
(Nickell, 1996). Therefore, the expected sign of the coefficient on lagged change in domestic 
market share and lagged change in export/sales ratio is negative. A fall in cash flow might 
spur the firm to improve efficiency so we also introduce the change in gross profits lagged one 
period in the model. The empirical equation is completed by introducing (up to 20) two-digit 
SIC industry dummies and three year dummies. The inclusion of year dummies should pick up 
any cyclical effects, though it should be noted that the estimating equations for the ua from 
the stochastic frontier production functions have already controlled for these effects with year 
dummies, via sectoral demand changes and unexpected firm stock/sales deviations that were 
designed to proxy the effects of capacity utilisation.
Two further points merit comment. First, Aua  is a first differences in logs so the explanatory 
variables are also expressed as such. Second, the dependent variable Auu is itself an estimate 
derived from the stochastic frontier production function, so may be affected by a problem of 
correlation. In addition we include the contemporaneous rival change in efficiency as a regressor. 
To control for endogeneity of the regressors we instrument the variables A u a -i  and A Ujt for 
A u u - 2 , A u jt- i  and A ujt- 2 -
In order to examine the effects of differing ownership between companies whose major share­
holder is a single individual or family {Independent private-owned firms), and companies whose 
major shareholder is another company {Subsidiary firms) we utilise the separated sample for 
ownerships type, which is further disaggregated into owner-controlled and manager-controlled 
firms, and, for the subsample of subsidiaries into domestic-owned and foreign-owned firms (the 
construction of these variables was previously detailed in Section 5.2). The regression results are 
given in Table 5.7. The sign and statistical significance of the estimates varies across the dif­
ferent types of firms classified by ownership, underlining the importance of delineating between
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ownership structures. The only variable that behaves predictably across all the firm groups is 
lagged profits whose negative coefficient is interpreted as reflecting the effect of falling profits 
motivating improvements in current efficiency. Contemporaneous efficiency improvements by 
rivals have a strong positive effect on efficiency in all firms except owner-controlled private 
firms. Loss of market share in the previous period has a strong positive effect on efficiency 
among independent private companies, but the coefficients are not significant among subsidiary 
companies. Past changes in the export/sales ratio have a positive impact on short ran efficiency 
changes, but the coefficients are not statistically significant. Finally, neither industry nor year 
fixed effects are significant. The absence of year fixed effects in the regression confirms that 
the frontier production function estimates have successfully distinguished the Aua  from cyclical 
effects.
To sum up, there is a strong link between past financial losses and efficiency improvements. 
There is also some support for the hypothesis that short run efficiency of the firm is affected by 
competition. On the one hand, competition with rivals improves efficiency among the group of 
subsidiary firms. On the other hand, competition in the product market, captured by losses 
in domestic market share, seems to have a strong disciplinary effect on independent private 
companies. Finally, the effect of a large exposure to competition in foreign markets, captured 
by an increase in the previous year export intensity, has a positive impact on efficiency, although 
none of the coefficients are significant for any type of firm.
5.6 Conclusions
This chapter has examined the relationship between technical efficiency and export activity 
using a large sample UK manufacturing firms over the period 1992-1998 drawn from FAME 
databank. The paper has aimed to address two questions: (1) is the exports-efficiency rela­
tionship affected by industry-specific characteristics? (2) is the exports-efficiency relationship 
affected by the share ownership structure of the firm?
Our results can be summarised as follows. First, the data provide robust evidence that
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exporters enjoy higher levels of efficiency relative to domestically-orientated firms. Second, 
firms that export a small fraction of their sales only have marginally lower efficiency levels 
that firms with high propensity to export. This indicates that the superior efficiency perfor­
mance of exporters is mainly driven by export status, not by export intensity of sales. Third, 
the econometric analysis confirms that export activity has a positive impact on the long run 
efficiency performance, after controlling for firm size, age and foreign participation in capital 
assets. Moreover, we show that the link between export activity and long-run efficiency is 
stronger among firms operating in import competing industries. This finding suggests firm- 
specific attributes such as managerial quality or internal organisation play an important role in 
the exporting firms’ performance in sectors with comparative disadvantage compared to sectors 
in which exporting firms benefit from the comparative advantage forces in the country to com­
pete abroad. Fourth, competition abroad has a weak impact on short run efficiency, compared 
to other sources of competition such as yardstick competition or competition in the domestic 
market. In general, controlling for ownership does not change the results concerning the lack 
of impact of competition in export markets on short run efficiency improvements.
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Table 5.1: Trade orientation of UK manufacturing industries.
sic92_4 Sector Name Net exports ITT HIIT VIIT
1993 avg 93-98 avg 93-98 avg 93-98
1511 Production and preserving of meat 22 0.44 0.32 0.11
1512 Production and preserving of poultry meat -160 0.53 0.05 0.48
1513~ Meat and poultry products -237 0.23 0.17 0.06
1520 Processing and preserving of fish -26 0.40 0.19 0.21
1531 Processing and preserving potatoes -96 0.32 0.02 0.30
1532 Fruit and vegetable juice -190 0.24 0.13 0.11
1533- Fruit and vegetables not elsewhere classified -678 0.35 0.20 0.16
1541 Crude oils and fats -532 0.13 0.06 0.07
1542 Refined oils and fats -82 0.56 0.29 0.27
1543 Margarine and similar edible fats -15 0.59 0.59 0.00
1551- Milk, butter, cheese and other milk products 90 0.57 0.44 0.13
1552 Ice-cream -41 0.86 0.86 0.00
1561 Grain milling and cereals 311 0.38 0.14 0.24
1562 Starches and starch products -181 0.30 0.06 0.24
1571 Manufacture of prepared feeds for farm animals 33 0.87 0.00 0.87
1572 Pet foods 4 0.89 0.00 0.89
1581 Bread, fresh pastry and cakes 35 0.88 0.51 0.37
1582- Biscuits, preserved pastry and cakes 109 0.67 0.02 0.65
1583 Sugar -480 0.22 0.00 0.22
1584- Cocoa, chocolate and confectionary 92 0.60 0.29 0.31
1585 Macaroni, noodles and similar -67 0.26 0.06 0.20
1586 Tea, coffee and substitutes 131 0.48 0.06 0.42
1587 Condiments -60 0.81 0.74 0.07
1588 Homogenesed and dietetic food -50 0.42 0.39 0.03
1589 Soups & other products nec -247 0.67 0.04 0.63
1591 Destilled potable alcoholic beverages 2122 0.13 0.06 0.07
1592 Ethyl alcohol from fermented materials 33 0.27 0.00 0.27
1593 Wine -946 0.10 0.03 0.07
1594 Cider and perry -17 0.97 0.97 0.00
1595 Other non-destilled fermented beverages -131 0.51 0.00 0.51
1596- Beer 64 0.78 0.78 0.00
1597 Malt -21 0.35 0.02 0.33
1598 Mineral water and soft drinks 470 0.46 0.38 0.08
1600 Tobacco -129 0.28 0.00 0.28
1710- Textile fibres, silk -776 0.56 0.42 0.14
1720- Textile weaving -21 0.64 0.24 0.40
1740- Soft furnishings, household textiles -9 0.55 0.07 0.48
1751 Carpets and rugs -201 0.63 0.02 0.60
1752 Cordage, rope,twine, netting 2 0.72 0.07 0.65
1753 Nonwovens articles, except apparel -53 0.63 0.33 0.30
1754- Lace and other textiles n.e.c 27 0.82 0.67 0.15
1760 Knitted and crocheted fabrics 6 0.50 0.02 0.48
1771 Knitted and crocheted hosiery -63 0.69 0.00 0.69
1772 Knitted and crocheted pullovers and cardigans -327 0.60 0.00 0.60
1810 Leather clothes -69 0.48 0.48 0.00
1821 Workwear -4 0.63 0.09 0.55
1822- Other outwear -748 0.65 0.05 0.59
1823 Underwear -948 0.57 0.20 0.38
1824- Other wearing apparel & accessories nec -217 0.58 0.07 0.51
1830 Fur; articles of fur 25 0.95 0.95 0.00
1910 Tanning and dressing leather 68 0.67 0.18 0.49
1920 Luggage, handbags, harness -253 0.44 0.00 0.44
1930- Footwear -814 0.47 0.02 0.44
2010 Sawmilling and planning wood -1030 0.05 0.01 0.04
2020 Panels, boards and similars -522 0.26 0.05 0.21
2030 Builder's carpentry -118 0.40 0.25 0.15
2040 Wooden containers -2 0.65 0.00 0.65
2051- Other wood products -94 0.53 0.21 0.32
2052 Articles of cork and straw -37 0.12 0.00 0.12
2112- Pulp, paper & paperboard -1809 0.54 0.22 0.32
2121 Corrugated paper and paperboard -40 0.75 0.75 0.00
Source: Own calculations using UK Markets Reports (1993-1994) and Product Sales and Trade (1995-1998)
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2122 Households and sanitary goods -84 0.47 0.32 0.14
Paper stationary -102 0.77 0.57 0.20
2124 Wallpaper 141 0.25 0.00 0.25
2125 Other articles of paper 2 0.83 0.00 0.83
2211 Publishing books, newspapers 672 0.70 0.00 0.70
2214 Publishing of sound recordings 102 0.86 0.74 0.13
2411 Industrial Gases -38 0.53 0.00 0.53
2412 Dyes and pigments 330 0.73 0.16 0.56
I** Other inorganic basic chemicals 145 0.62 0.20 0.41
2414 Other organic basic chemicals 974 0.55 0.08 0.27
2415 Fertilizers and nitrogen componends -179 0.43 0.41 0.02
r Plastic in primary form -623 0.41 0.20 0.20
2417 Synthetic rubber in primary form 60 0.65 0.13 0.53
2420 Pesticides and agro-chemistry 397 0.56 0.23 0.32
r Paints, ink and mastics 250 0.72 0.38 0.33
I** Basic pharmaceutical products 300 0.71 0.00 0.71
2442 Prepared pharmaceutical products 1399 0.61 0.35 0.26
2451 Soaps and detergents 192 0.72 0.64 0.09
2452 Perfumes and toilet preparations 346 0.64 0.06 0.58
2462 Glues adn gelatine -30 0.85 0.00 0.85
2463 Essential oils 58 0.65 0.50 0.15
2464 Photographic chemistry 155 0.89 0.00 0.89
2465 Prepared unrecorded media -272 0.78 0.00 0.78
;** Other chemical products n.e.c. 718 0.68 0.11 0.57
2470 Man-made fibres 25 0.66 0.35 0.31
2511 Rubber tyres and tubes -35 0.77 0.69 0.09
2512 Retreating, rebuilding of rubber tyres 16 0.12 0.01 0.11
r Other rubber products -4 0.76 0.24 0.52
2521 Plastic plates, sheets, tubes , profiles -64 0.69 0.49 0.20
2522 Plastic packing goods -136 0.76 0.27 0.49
2523 Plastic floor and builder1 ware of plastic 2 0.61 0.10 0.50
r Other plastic products -341 0.80 0.18 0.61
r Flat glass -133 0.67 0.02 0.65
2613 Hollow glass •60 0.61 0.30 0.31
2614 Glass fibres 16 0.71 0.30 0.41
2615 Other glass techniques -31 0.71 0.32 0.39
2621 Ceramic household 161 0.40 0.00 0.40
2622 Ceramic sanitary fixtures 14 0.62 0.00 0.62
2623 Ceramic insulators 27 0.51 0.00 0.51
2626 Refractory ceramic products 170 0.40 0.00 0.40
2630 Ceramic flags and tiles -84 0.22 0.14 0.06
2640 Bricks, tiles and construction products 24 0.43 0.00 0.43
2650 Cement, lime, plaster -16 0.95 0.88 0.08
2661 Concrete products for construction 4 0.53 0.00 0.53
2666 Other articles of concrete, plaster, cement 21 0.34 0.14 0.20
I** Abrasive products 5 0.69 0.00 0.69
2682 Asbestos and other non metallic products n.e.c. 13 0.66 0.41 0.24
2721 Cast iron tubes,Steel tubes 66 0.45 0.19 0.27
2731 Cold drawing 14 0.55 0.40 0.15
2732 Cold rolling of narrow strip -10 0.73 0.08 0.65
2733 Cold forging 5 0.59 0.00 0.59
2734 Wire drawing 65 0.70 0.48 0.22
2741 Precious metal production -10 0.51 0.23 0.28
!** Aluminium -552 0.58 0.54 0.03
2743 Lead, zinc and tin -144 0.54 0.08 0.46
2744 Copper -392 0.75 0.56 0.19
2745 Other non-ferreous metal production -164 0.59 0.23 0.36
2811 Metal structures and parts of structures 221 0.64 0.17 0.47
2812 Builers' carpentry and joinery -11 0.85 0.85 0.00
2821 Tanks and metal containers -1 0.82 0.61 0.22
2822 Central hetaing radiators and boilers -95 0.44 0.00 0.44
2830 Steam generators 58 0.38 0.05 0.33
2861 Cutlery -7 0.42 0.06 0.36
!** Tools -40 0.70 0.37 0.33
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2863- Locks and hinges -200 0.62 0.39 0.23
2871 Steel drums and similar containers 6 0.87 0.00 0.87
2872 Light metal packaging 56 0.73 0.00 0.73
2873 Wire products -36 0.80 0.67 0.13
2874- Fasteners, screw, chain and springs -108 0.71 0.07 0.64
2875- Other fabricated metal products n.e.c. -99 0.80 0.38 0.41
2911 Engines and turbines, except aircraft and vehicles 356 0.93 0.93 0.01
2912- Pumps and compresors 108 0.67 0.02 0.65
2913 Taps and valves 55 0.88 0.20 0.68
2914 Bearings, gears, driving elements -54 0.82 0.28 0.54
2921 Furnaces and furnace burners 97 0.61 0.23 0.38
2922- Lifting and handling equipment 127 0.74 0.52 0.23
2923 Non-domestic cooling and ventilation equipment -11 0.70 0.46 0.23
2924- Other general purpose machinery 163 0.77 0.34 0.44
2931 Agricultural tractors 414 0.43 0.05 0.37
2932“ Other agricultural and forestry machinery -150 0.61 0.24 0.37
2940- Machine tools -11 0.69 0.12 0.57
2951 Machinery for metallurgy 50 0.37 0.17 0.20
2952“ Machinery of mining, quarrel, construction 645 0.64 0.22 0.42
2953 Machinery for foof, beveradge and tobacco -16 0.65 0.24 0.41
2954 Machinery for textile, apparel and leather 88 0.65 0.07 0.57
2955 Machinery for paper and paperboard -15 0.70 0.26 0.44
2956 Machienery for other special purposes -157 0.85 0.28 0.57
2971- Electric domestic appliances -434 0.55 0.14 0.41
2972 Non-electric domestic appliances -35 0.72 0.18 0.53
3001 Office machinery 19 0.73 0.29 0.44
3002“ Computers & information processing equipment -1439 0.75 0.14 0.61
3110- Electric motors,generators and transformers 130 0.59 0.05 0.54
3120 Electrical distribution and control apparatus -202 0.79 0.44 0.34
3130 Insulated wire and cable -35 0.69 0.34 0.36
3140 Accumulators, primary cells and batteries -169 0.53 0.14 0.39
3150 Lighting equipment and electric lamps -75 0.81 0.27 0.53
3161 Electrical equipment for engines and vehicles -36 0.60 0.32 0.27
3162“ Other electrical equipment 106 0.79 0.09 0.70
3210“ Electronic valves and tubes -163 0.76 0.26 0.50
3220“ TV and radio Transmiters etc -256 0.86 0.00 0.86
3230 Television and radio receiver, sound and video -322 0.69 0.15 0.54
3310 Medical, surgical, orthopaedic appliances 171 0.73 0.28 0.45
3320“ Non-industrial instruments for measuring, testing 417 0.77 0.28 0.49
3340 Optical instruments;Photographic equipment -222 0.50 0.08 0.42
3350 Watches and clocks -286 0.59 0.09 0.50
3410“ Motor vehicles -3155 0.80 0.74 0.07
3420- Bodies for motor vehicles; trailers 84 0.67 0.14 0.52
3430 Parts and accesories for motor vehicles -2160 0.66 0.15 0.51
3512 Leisure craft 133 0.50 0.34 0.16
3530“ Aircraft and spacecraft 1904 0.76 0.44 0.33
3541 Motorcycles -114 0.27 0.19 0.07
3542 Bicycles -108 0.45 0.00 0.45
3543 Invalid Carriages 10 0.75 0.16 0.59
3550 Other transport equipment 157 0.98 0.00 0.98
3611“ Chairs and seats -148 0.56 0.06 0.50
3612 Other office and shop furniture -21 0.55 0.17 0.38
3613 Other kitchen furniture -25 0.78 0.00 0.78
3614- Other furniture •199 0.68 0.40 0.28
3615 Mattresses 2 0.37 0.00 0.37
3620 Striking coins & medals; Jewellery •285 0.50 0.00 0.50
3630 Musical instruments -56 0.34 0.00 0.34
3640 Sports goods -131 0.72 0.13 0.60
3650 Games and toys -814 0.56 0.14 0.42
3661 Imitation jewellery -27 0.75 0.16 0.59
3662 Brooms and brushes -29 0.79 0.37 0.41
3663 Other miscellaneous goods -133 0.66 0.21 0.45
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Table 5.2: Estimation of Stochastic Frontier Production Functions
Industries 
[SIC92 classification] PARAMETERS
Constant L K/L K/LA2 Demand Stock y1995 y1996 y1997 y1998
[1513] Pork industry LSDV 6.620* -0.042 (0.8) -0.105 (0.6) 0.047 (1.9) -0.002 (0.2) 0.119 (1.1) 0.041 0.086* 0.139* 0.083*
(H) ALSDV 6.741* -0.048 (1.3) -0.105 (0.7) 0.048 (2.1) 0.003 (0.1) 0.122 (0.8) 0.026 0.082* 0.143* 0.092*
[1533] Preserved fruit & vegetables LSDV 7.749* -0.222 (5.6) 0.194 (5.2) 0.002 (1.3) 0.096 (2.4) 0.078* 0.109* 0.001 0.106*
(H) ALSDV 7.785* -0.223 (5.8) 0.194 (6.1) -- 0.009 (1.2) 0.095 (2.5) 0.078* 0.109* -0.001 0.106*
[1551] Milk& derivates LSDV 8.355* 0.006 (0.1) -1.500 (2.6) 0.244 (2.7) 0.003 (1.2) -0.002 (1.4) -0.004 -0.091 0.086* 0.081
(H) ALSDV 8.476* 0.002 (0.0) -1.517 (3.1) 0.249 (3.3) 0.002 (0.8) -0.010 (1.2) -0.009 0.095 0.074 0.058
[1582][1584] Confectionary LSDV 6.643* -0.050 (0.8) -0.251 (1.0) 0.072 (2.3) 0.003 (0.3) 0.151 (2.5) 0.008 0.002 -0.015 0.021
(V) ALSDV 6.671* -0.050 (1.1) -0.241 (1.3) 0.072 (2.4) 0.003 (0.3) 0.151 (2.5) 0.008 0.002 -0.015 0.022
[1596] Beer LSDV 10.885* -0.649 (1.7) -0.476 (0.9) .. 0.593 (1.8) -0.114 (1.6) 0.001 0.132 0.376* 0.406*
(H) ALSDV 10.079* -0.596 (1.6) -0.321 (0.7) ~ 0.499 (1.8) -0.078 (1.4) 0.025 0.154* 0.359* 0.385*
[1710] Preparing textile fibre LSDV 4.556* -0.207 (1-6) 0.090 (0.8) 0.019 (2.0) 0.003 (0.1) 0.005 (0.2) 0.131* 0.175* 0.162* 0.227*
(H) ALSDV 4.420* -0.179 (1.8) 0.065 (0.7) 0.031 (1.9) 0.004 (0.1) 0.046 (0.2) 0.092* 0.151* 0.129* 0.224*
[1720] Weaving Industry LSDV 2.312* 0.069 (0.5) 0.283 (1.4) 0.001 (0.1) 0.025 (0.2) -0.078 (1.7) 0.123* 0.140* 0.177* 0.143*
(H) ALSDV 3.210* -0.104 (0.7) 0.340 (1.6) -0.020 (0.5) -0.055 (0.4) •0.049 (1.6) 0.119* 0.124* 0.194* 0.151*
[1740] Housing textiles LSDV 4.562* -0.184 (1.3) 0.256 (2.6) .. .. -0.047 (1.6) 0.054 0.062 0.145* 0.201*
(H) ALSDV 4.462* -0.120 (0.8) 0.208 (2.1) -- -- -0.053 (1.8) 0.052 0.056 0.137* 0.216*
[1754] Lace, narrow, LSDV 0.440 0.087 (1.3) 1.935 (1.5) -0.379 (1.4) .. -0.131 (1.3) 0.094 0.136* 0.220* 0.269*
(H) embroidery, wadding ALSDV 0.498 0.087 (1.3) 1.935 (1.2) -0.379 (1.2) - -0.131 (1.2) 0.094 0.136* 0.220* 0.269*
[1822] Outwear excl. workwear LSDV 6.656* -0.142 (3.1) 0.108 (3.0) 0.032 (3.0) -0.004 (1.3) 0.437 (2.9) 0.110* 0.096* 0.051 0.005
(V) ALSDV 6.690* -0.143 (3.2) 0.108 (2.3) 0.033 (2.2) -0.005 (1.3) 0.437 (2.3) 0.110* 0.096* 0.053 0.005
[1824] Hats and other LSDV 6.921* 0.017 (0.2) 0.267 (4.4) .. -0.007 (1.6) 0.425 (2.4) 0.152* 0.089* 0.076 0.087*
(H) apparel accessories ALSDV 8.096* 0.017 (0.1) 0.267 (4.3) -- -0.007 (1.5) 0.425 (2.3) 0.152* 0.089* 0.076 0.087*
[1930] Footwear LSDV 7.720* -0.387 (3.8) -0.366 (2.1) 0.153 (2.8) -0.002 (0.4) 0.199 (1.2) 0.074 0.010 0.127* 0.149*
(V) ALSDV 7.798* -0.387 (3.4) -0.364 (1.9) 0.152 (2.7) -0.003 (0.4) 0.196 (1.3) 0.071 0.004 0.130 0.149*
[2051] Other wood products, nec LSDV 6.630* -0.188 (3.2) 0.079 (2.2) .. -0.001 (0.1) 0.191 (0.3) 0.060* 0.086 -0.021* -0.204*
[H) ALSDV 6.709* -0.190 (3.6) 0.818 (2.0) -- -0.001 (0.3) 0.191 (0.5) 0.059* 0.065 -0.021* -0.188*
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[2112] Paper & Paparboard LSDV 6.515* -0.106 (2.0)
(V) ALSDV 6.599* -0.107 (2.2)
[2123] Othar paper products LSDV 5.903* -0.161 (2.2)
(H) ALSDV 5.977* -0.162 (2.5)
[2413] Inorganic quemlcal LSDV 8.706* -0.189 (4.1)
(V) ALSDV 8.820* -0.191 (4.7)
[2416] Plastic In primary form LSDV 5.504* -0.170 (1-3)
(H) ALSDV 5.636* -0.181 (1.4)
[2430] Paints & Inks LSDV 9.206* -0.726 (3.7)
(H) ALSDV 7.007* -0.512 (2.4)
[2441] Basic Pharmaceutical LSDV 6.503* -0.188 (2.9)
(H) Products ALSDV 7.949* -0.188 (3.1)
[2466] Quemlcals tor LSDV 6.964* -0.327 (3.4)
(V) final consumption n.e.c. ALSDV 7.108* -0.329 (3.7)
[2513] Rubber products LSDV 5.268* -0.316 (2.8)
(V) excl. tyres ALSDV 5.422* -0.319 (3.2)
[2524] Plastic products n.e.c. LSDV 3.856* -0.167 (1.7)
(V) ALSDV 3.856* -0.237 (2.5)
[2611] Flat glass LSDV 9.091* -1.094 (2.4)
(V) ALSDV 9.170* -1.089 (2.0)
[2681] Abrasive products LSDV 8.692* •0.205 (1.4)
(V) ALSDV 8.764* -0.215 (1.6)
[2742] Aluminium LSDV 7.439* -0.153 (2.8)
(H) ALSDV 7.526* -0.138 (2.6)
[2860] Cutlery and tools LSDV 7.229* -0.371 (5.9)
(H) ALSDV 7.325* -0.377 (8.6)
[2874] Fasteners, screw, LSDV 4.881* -0.241 (2.4)
(V) chain and springs ALSDV 5.285* -0.275 (3.1)
[2875] Metal products n.e.c. LSDV 3.494* -0.103 (1.8)
(H) ALSDV 4.056 -0.124 (2.5)
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0.051 (0.4) -0.004 (0.3) 0.003 (2.0) 0.027 (0.8) -0.101* 0.006 -0.281* -0.242*
0.051 (0.3) -0.003 (0.2) 0.003 (1.8) 0.028 (0.9) -0.094 -0.004 -0.273* -0.239*
-0.157 (0.8) 0.048 (1.3) 0.005 (0.3) 0.078 (1.3) -0.044 -0.010* -0.191* -0.147*
-0.16 (0.9) 0.048 (1.4) 0.004 (0.3) 0.077 (1.0) -0.044 -0.010* -0.198* -0.151
0.146 (1.3) -0.017 (1.1) 0.030 (3.8) 0.092 (0.5) -0.174* 0.542* 0.475* -0.101
0.151 (1.6) -0.016 (1.2) 0.025 (3.3) 0.095 (0.4) -0.136* 0.465* 0.419* -0.055
0.632 (1.8) -0.130 (1.8) -0.002 (2.7) -0.064 (1.5) 0.015 -0.092* -0.049 0.151*
0.637 (2.1) -0.129 (2.3) -0.001 (2.6) -0.064 (1.4) 0.014 -0.092* •0.051 0.151*
0.155 (0.3) -0.016 (0.2) - 0.111 (1.5) 0.095* 0.129* 0.057 0.139*
0.388 (0.7) •0.052 (0.4) -- 0.076 (1.0) 0.124* 0.161* 0.099* 0.175*
-0.479 (2.4) 0.107 (3.5) 0.009 (2.3) 0.150 (1.1) -0.054 0.479* 0.105 0.496*
-0.479 (2.8) 0.107 (4.2) 0.009 (2.4) 0.149 (1.3) -0.057 0.477* 0.102 0.498*
-0.698 (2.7) 0.127 (2.6) .. -0.007 (0.2) 0.032 0.006 0.056* 0.02
-0.680 (2.1) 0.122 (2.1) - -0.100 (0.4) 0.017 -0.058 0.035 0.01
-0.102 (0.9) 0.070 (2.5) .. •0.082 (1.6) 0.091* 0.112* 0.120* 0.194*
-0.143 (1.3) 0.079 (3.1) - -0.078 (1.8) 0.088* 0.104* 0.111* 0.198*
0.518 (1.7) -0.169 (3.2) 0.005 (2.1) -0.094 (2.2) 0.052* -0.002 0.041 0.090*
0.907 (3.4) -0.151 (3.3) 0.005 (2.2) -0.081 (1.8) 0.050* 0.001 0.044 0.152*
-0.495 (1.2) 0.198 (1.9) .. -0.081 (2.1) 0.074 0.113* 0.208* 0.07
-0.504 (1.0) 0.191 (1.5) - -0.081 (2.2) 0.074 0.115* 0.211* 0.072
-2.508 (2.3) 0.441 (2.5) 0.090 (1.5) 0.127 (1.8) 0.166* 0.144* 0.135* -0.116*
-2.490 (2.0) 0.437 (2.2) 0.090 (1.5) 0.131 (1.5) 0.131* 0.161* 0.144* -0.118*
0.103 (2-1) .. -0.095 (3.6) 0.057 (1.5) -0.614* 1.758* 0.574* 0.061*
0.138 (2.7) - -0.082 (3.1) 0.061 (1.4) -0.512* 1.508* 0.480* 0.068
-0.318 (2.2) 0.071 (2.6) -0.005 (0.3) -0.043 (1.7) 0.069 0.117* -0.159* -0.221*
-0.301 (2.1) 0.704 (2.6) -0.004 (0.8) -0.240 (1.5) 0.066 0.109* -0.163* -0.203*
0.156 (1.9) -0.011 (1.4) .. -0.030 (0.7) 0.104* 0.113* 0.128* 0.108*
0.170 (2.5) -0.023 (2.9) -- 0.045 (1.1) 0.040 0.094* 0.068* 0.086*
0.458 (2.3) -0.057 (1.7) .. -0.008 (0.5) 0.075* 0.102* 0.095* -0.065*
0.169 (2.3) -0.001 (1.2) - -0.012 (0.8) 0.051* 0.082* 0.080* -0.084*
CONTINUATION TABLE 5.2

































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 5.2.B: Stochastic Frontier Production Functions
Industries 




















[1513] Pork Industry 71.04 15.3 (9) 15.59 2.08 0.95 1.843 0.19 0.563 „ T 312
(H) [0.00] [0.08] [0.01] [4.14] [3.89] [0.29] [52]
[1533] Preserved fruit & vegetables 79.49 85.3 (8) 26.21 2.05 0.94 0.433 0.113 . . . . H 348
(H) [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] 11-76] [2.55] [58]
[1551] Milk& derivates 44.85 13.1 (9) 102.1 2.02 0.93 _ . . 0.064 8.487 E 138
(H) [0.00] [0.15] [0.00] [3.86] [5.70] [23]
[1582] [1584] Confectionary 64.17 24.4 (9) 62.9 2.17 0.97 — .. 0.091 36.72 E 222
(H) [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [6.36] 11.49] 137]
[1596] Beer 16.40 64.4 (8) 21.12 2.19 0.94 1.412 0.168 — — H 162
(H) [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [1.86] [6.82] [27]
[1710] Preparing textile fibre 35.17 9.69 (9) 42.54 1.99 0.92 . . . . 0.017 6.918 E 492
(H) [0.00] [0.28] [0.00] [0.21] [18.14] [82]
[1720] Weaving Industry 12.79 5.92 (9) 8.45 1.93 0.80 - . . 0.074 7.899 E 198
(H) [0.00] [0.74] [0.48] [4.90] [7.73] [33]
[1740] Housing textiles 30.56 9.05 (8) 14.47 2.31 0.88 . . 0.087 10.55 E 192
(H) [0.00] [0.33] [0.01] [7.25] [5.08] [32]
[1754] Lace, narrow, 13.91 4.37 (8) 11.12 2.36 0.76 0.569 0.147 - - H 114
(H) embroidery, wadding [0.00] [0.82] [0.03] [1-24] [1.70] [19]
[1822] Outwear excl. workwear 90.88 21.6 [9] 60.07 1.95 0.96 _ . . 0.133 29.12 E 372
(V) [0.00] [0.01] [0.00] [11.35] [1.77] [62]
[1824] Hats and other 75.94 503.4 (8) 134.25 2.05 0.96 2.33 0.248 0.442 - T 144
(H) apparel accessories [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [2.74] [2.70] 10.21] [24]
[1930] Footwear 14.14 24.05 (9) 16.64 1.98 0.86 0.884 0.156 0.154 - T 198
(V) [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [1.23] [1.64] [0.02] [33]
[2051] Wood containers 74.45 43.8 (8) 10.42 2.14 0.96 1.351 0.120 0.163 -• T 192
(H) [0.00] [0.00] 10.31] [1.53] [1.75] [0.03] [32]
CONTINUATION TABLE 5.2.B
[2112] Paper & Paperboard 65.84 47.48 (9) 16.14
(V) [0.00] [0.00] [0.05]
[2123] Other paper products 21.03 19.4 (9) 31.96
(H) [0.00] [0.02] [0.00]
[2413] Inorganic quemlcal 142.9 10.3 (9) 40.69
(V) [0.00] [0.00] [0.00]
[2416] Plastic In primary form 17.08 49.3 (9) 33.21
(H) [0.00] [0.00] [0.00]
[2430] Paints & inks 24.74 13.14 (8) 1.15
(H) [0.00] [0.10] [0.89]
[2441] Basic Pharmaceutical 52.62 27.65 (9) 43.84
(H) Products [0.00] [0.00] [0.00]
[2466] Quemlcal s for 15.15 19.94 (8) 4.25
(V) final consumption n.e.c. [0.00] [0.01] [0.48]
[2513] Rubber products 17.8 15.72(8) 25.13
(V) excl. tyres [0.00] [0.04] [0.00]
[2524] Plastic products n.e.c. 10.84 15.95 (8)
(V) [0.00] [0.04]
[2611] Flat glass 15.35 5.11 (8) 9.35
(V) [0.00] [0.74] [0.06]
[2681] Abrasive products 31.03 5.86 (9) 1.51
(V) [0.00] [0.64] [0.87]
[2742] Aluminium 124.07 24.16(8) 243.7
(H) [0.00] [0.00] [0.00]
[2860] Cutlery and tools 54.25 15.71 (9) 59.55
(H) [0.00] [0.07] [0.00]
[2874] Fasteners, screw, 29.19 14.63 (8) 17.94
(V) chain and springs [0.00] [0.06] [0.01]
[2875] Metal products n.e.c. 15.23 21.63 (8) „
(H) [0.00] [0.00]
2.19 0.96 1.131 0.112 0.229 — T 270
[1.64] [1.60] [0.05] [45]
2.2 0.89 0.911 0.137 0.225 T 156
[1.50] [1.83] [0.03] [26]
1.96 0.97 2.125 0.179 0.515 . . T 432
[4.10] [3.26] [0.28] [72]
2.16 0.91 1.088 0.198 0.234 T 402
[1.99] [1.78] [0.04] 167]
2.04 0.9 — _ 0.086 7.123 E 126
[3.95] [3.34] [21]
1.94 0.92 0.544 0.175 0.029 _ T 372
[0.34] [1.03] [0.001] [62]
2.03 0.8 2.098 0.233 0.525 _ T 432
[3.58] [2.60] [0.23] [72]
2.02 0.82 1.701 0.158 0.264 „ T 216
[2.05] [1S2] [0.06] [36]
1.99 0.74 — _ 0.003 5.991 E 588
[0.03] [22.6] [98]
2.29 0.83 0.861 0.155 0.06 „ T 102
[0.29] [0.46] [0.001] [17]
204 0.91 _ _ 0.087 20.77 E 96
[4.96] [1.46] [16]
1.93 0.97 1.951 0.248 0.522 _ T 258
[2.93] [2.52] [0.19] [43]
2.1 0.93 1.659 0.159 0.381 „ T 246
[2.52] [1.99] [0.11] [41]
2.05 0.87 . . „ 0.069 10.11 E 192
[6.05] 16 91) [32]
1.96 0.81 1.133 0.156 0.417 „ T 750
[4.84] [4.44] [0.17] [125]
CONTINUATION TABLE S.2.B
[2912] Rums & compressors 46.67 16.24(9)
(V) [0.00] [0.06]
[2922] Lifting & handling machinery 10.44 28.33 (8)
(H) [0.00] [0.00]
[2924] General purpose machinery B5.4 1.91 (9)
(V) [0.00] [0.99]
[2932] Agricultural 41.22 21.96 (9)
(V) mach. excL tractors [0.00] [0.00]
[2940] Machinery for tools 78.52 17.99 (9)
(V) [0.00] [0.03]
[2952] Mining & earth equipment 86.52 9.20 (9)
(V) [0.00] [0.41]
[2971] Electric domestic appliances 7.95 16.04 (8)
(H) [0.00] [0.04]
[3002] Computers 39.47 52.1 (9)
(V) [0.00] [0.00]
[3110] Electric motors, 93.64 31.3 (9)
(V) generator, transformers [0.00] [0.00]
[3162] Electric equipment 43.54 1197(8)
(V) for engines [0.00] [0.00]
[3210] Electrical valves & tubes 33.18 19.72 (8)
(V) [0.00] [0.01]
[3220] Electronic capital goods 42.05 3.70 (9)
(V) [0.00] [0.93]
[3320] Instruments for testing 13.81 15.21 (9)
(V) checking, measuring [0.00] [0.05]
[3410][3420] Motor vehicles 13.16 19.20 (9)
<H) [0.00] [0.02]
[3530] Aircraft and spacecraft 53.85 17.9(9)
(V) [0.00] [0.03]
[3611] Seats & chairs 9.97 16.79(9)
(H) [0.00] [0.04]
[3614] Furniture, excl. office, 12.24 38.0 (9)
(V) shop and kitchen [0.00] [0.00]
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87.6 2.01 0.9 0.857 0.147 0.321 T 450
[0.00] [3.70] [4.00] [0.07] [75]
2.49 1.98 0.68 78.82 1.140 5.59 T 366
[0.31] [0.44] [0.97] [0.46] [61]
45.5 2.2 0.82 1.891 0.199 . . H 402
[0.00] [3.22] [12.7] [67]
40.98 2.18 0.94 1.331 0.169 H 150
[0.00] [1.681 [6.22] 125]
11.97 2.16 0.94 1.456 0.184 . . H 402
[0.21] [2.75] [9.58] [67]
24.77 2.10 0.95 . . . . 0.127 25.82 E 138
[0.00] [4.35] [0.37] [23]
5.98 1.96 0.73 . . . . 0.161 20.34 E 150
[0.21] [4.81] [1.41] [25]
14.87 2.16 0.92 0.277 0.167 0.0006 T 300
[0.09] [1.04] [0.04] [0.01] [50]
41.59 2.12 0.94 1.182 0.186 0.264 T 312
[0.00] [2.36] [2.71] [0.07] [52]
66.35 2.05 0.79 1.21 0.17 0.563 T 822
[0.00] [7.87] [7.151 [0.31] [137]
14.16 2.18 0.9 0.557 0.147 0.069 T 468
[0.10] [1.87] [2.15] [0.006] [78]
69.82 1.99 0.89 2.25 0.248 0.804 T 288
[0.00] [4.89] [3.83] [0.43] [48]
- 1.98 0.75 1.262 0.216 0.653 T 552
[6.28] [5.30] [0.31] [92]
3.33 1.85 0.79 0.318 0.149 — H 354
[0.44] [1.11] [1.98] [59]
30.07 2.18 0.93 1.481 0.169 0.297 T 324
[0.00] [2.89] [2.97] [0.11] [54]
7.19 1.99 0.85 3.622 0.142 . . H 240
[0.10] [1.11] [1.62] [40]
12.03 1.92 0.71 1.998 0.245 0.659 T 312
[0.02] [3.84] [2.87] [0.27] [52]
N otes for Tables 5.2.A and Table 5.2.B
Table 5.2.A (split into three pages) presents the estimates of the coefficients of the model 
and Table 5.2.B (split into three pages) presents the specification tests. In Table 4.2.B ’’lambda” 
stands for A,sigma stands for (aj 4- <x2), mu/varv stands for f i / a v , and varv stands for crv .
The model is (jfjj-) =  a* +  bt +  7 In +  (3 (jftfj +  ^ ( t ? )  ®9it +  V'/it +  va — ua 
where y*t=log(output), =log(employment), A:^=log( capital), y^=real growth rate of indus­
try output, fn =  stock over total sales (in deviations with respect to the trend), Oi=firm-specific 
dummies, &t=time dummies.
LSDV are least squares dummy variables estimators, with dummies for time periods (bt) and 
firm fixed effects (a»). ALSDV are Aigner, Lovell and Schmidt maximum likelihood estimators, 
with time period and firm specific dummies. No dummies are included for the years 1993 and 
1994, which are subsumed in the constant.
* indicates that estimates are significant at at least 5% level. Values in parenthesis are 
t-statistic.
LSDV statistics. For the Wald tests (x2) the values in brackets are the associated proba­
bilities. The fixed effect test is for joint significance of firm dummies; The Hausman test is for 
specification (fixed vs random effect model); the Breush-Pagan test is for heteroscedasticity; 
and, the Durbin-Watson statistic is for first order autocorrelation.
ALSDV statistics. The null hypothesis of time-variant inefficiency is based on the signifi­
cance of A, (<j2 +<r2), Q, crv under different distribution assumptions. For the truncated normal 
(T) distribution of the uu the relevant statistics are A, (o-j; + a j )  and fi/(Tv; for the half normal 
(H) , A and (a j +  <t2); and for the exponential distribution (E) 9 and <jv. If the appropiate 
statistics are not significant, then the null hypothesis of the uu being zero is not rejected. Es­
timations were carried using LIMDEP v.7.0. See Greene (1993) for further detail about these 
techniques.
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[1513] Pork industry 23 56.5 29 13.8
[1533] Preserved Fruit&vegetables 23 73.9 34 52.9
[1551] Milk& derivates 12 41.7 11 45.5
[1584] Confectionary 13 84.6 22 36.4
[1596] Beer 16 31.3 10 10.0
[1710] Preparing textile fibre 47 68.1 34 17.6
[1720] Weaving industry 17 41.2 16 31.3
[1740] Housing textiles 17 70.6 15 20.0
[1754] Lace,narrow .embroidery,wadding 8 37.5 11 27.3
[1822] Outwear excl. workwear 37 37.8 25 24.0
[1824] Hats & other apparel accessories 9 44.4 15 33.3
[1930] Footwear 19 31.6 14 28.6
[2051] Other wood products 22 50.0 9 44.4
[2112] Paperboard 14 35.7 31 51.6
[2123] Other paper products 14 42.9 12 66.7
[2413] Inorganic quemical 13 38.5 59 54.2
[2416] Plastic in primary form 16 56.3 49 46.9
[2430] Paints & inks 4 25.0 16 62.5
[2441] Basic Pharmaceutical 11 45.5 51 72.5
[2466] Quemicais for final consumption 13 46.2 58 50.0
[2513] Rubber products excl. tyres 15 46.7 21 28.6
[2524] Plastic products n.e.c. 27 48.1 71 29.6
[2611] Flat glass 6 50.0 10 30.0
[2681] Abrasive products 8 87.5 9 66.7
[2742] Aluminium 14 35.7 29 51.7
[2860] Cutlery and toots 12 58.3 29 62.1
[2874] Fasteners, screw,chain &springs 14 42.9 18 44.4
[2875] Metal products n.e.c. 40 62.5 85 31.8
[2912] Pums & compressors 15 73.3 60 55.0
[2922] Lifting&handling machinery 29 62.1 32 59.4
[2924] General purpose machinery 15 73.3 52 50.0
[2932] Agricultural mach. Excl. tractors 14 50.0 11 45.5
[2940] Machinery for tools 28 60.7 39 53.8
[2952] Mining&earth machinery 5 80.0 18 66.7
[2971] Electric domestic Appliances 11 45.5 14 57.1
[3002] Computers 15 33.3 34 67.6
[3110] Electric motors,generators 16 75.0 36 55.6
[3162] Electric equipment for engines 41 73.2 96 53.1
[3210] Electrical valves &tubes 24 62.5 54 61.1
[3220] Electronic capital goods 10 80.0 38 65.8
[3320] Instruments for testing, measuring 22 45.5 70 47.1
[3410] Motor vehicles 22 86.4 37 67.6
[3530] Aircraft and spacecraft 16 68.8 37 24.3
[3611] Seats & chairs 17 70.6 22 0.0
[3614] Furniture excl office,shop, kitchen 23 56.5 29 20.7
Source: Own elaboration using data from FAME. Owner-controlled private independent companies have a 
dominant shareholder with a 90 percent chance of wining a vote.
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Lower quartile 0.74 0.69 0.74 0.72
Median 0.78 0.73 0.79 0.77
Upper quartile 0.85 0.81 0.86 0.84
Interquartile range 0.11 0.12 0.12 0.12'
Hypothesis test Equality of Stochastic Equality of Stochastic
distribution dominance distribution dominance
Year Statistic Statistic Statistic Statistic
1993 4.35 0.00 3.37 0.00
1994 3.97 0.00 3.21 0.00
1995 3.08 0.00 2.55 0.00
1996 5.23 0.00 4.77 0.00
1997 6.88 0.00 5.19 0.00
1998 3.26 0.00 3.23 0.00
Exporters have an export/sales ratio above 2.5%; domestic-orientated exporters have an export/sales ratio 
below 2.5%.
Heavy exporters have an export/sales ratio above 25%; light exporters have an export/sales ratio below 25%.
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Table 5.6: The determinants of technical efficiency levels in UK manufacturing. 1993-1998.
Constant Size Age Foreign Exporter N R-sq
All industries -1.343 (38.40) 
Import industries -1.206 (28.32) 



















Horizontal NT industries 
Import industries -1.468 (18.27) 













Vertical NT industries 
Import industries -1.072 (21.04) 













Dependent variable is the firm-specific time-invariant efficiency level, exp(a(i)).
Observations with value of zero and one are not included in the logistic model 
(i.e. the 45 "best practice" firms in each industry)
In brackets heterokedastic-robust t-statistics. Regression includes industry dummies. 
Explanatory variables: Size=sales, age=number of years since registration in Company House, 
foreign=dummy that takes value of one if the firm is foreign-owned subsidiary, zero otherwise; 
Exporter=dummy that takes value of one if the firm is a regular exporter 
(positive sales abroad with export/sales ratio above 2.5% every year)
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Table 5.7: The determinants of changes in Short-Run Efficiency, 1996-1998
Independent-private firms Subsidiary firms
owner manager domestic foreign
all firms controlled controlled all firms owned owned
lagged short-run efficiency 0.368 0.336 0.375 0.228 0.118 0.241
(2.50) (1.31) (2.18) (1.14) (0.33) (1.72)
rival firm efficiency 0.368 -0.223 0.196 1.092 1.299 1.029
(0.86) (0.68) (1.75) (2.62) (1.71) (2.55)
lagged market share -0.095 -0.065 -0.141 -0.008 -0.009 -0.007
(3.56) (2.91) (2.48) (0.93) (0.64) (0.81)
lagged profits -0.265 -0.202 -0.319 -0.137 -0.205 -0.108
(2.37) (1.61) (1.91) (2.25) (1.28) (2.28)
lagged export/sales 0.021 0.038 0.014 0.074 0.124 0.038
(1.40) (1.68) (1.42) (1.62) (1.71) (1.18)
industry dummies (p-value) 0.98 0.98 0.98 0.99 0.99 0.99
year 1997 -0.015 -0.021 0.012 -0.024 -0.004 0.005
(0.57) (0.48) (1.20) (0.19) (0.66) (0.63)
year 1998 0.018 0.032 0.022 0.003 0.006 0.003
(0.64) (0.20) (1.35) (0.65) (0.58) (0.21)
Adjusted R-squared 0.11 0.14 0.09 0.08 0.12 0.07
Number of observations 714 420 294 1335 882 453
Dependent variable is —(uu — u n -1). Lagged dependent variable A u u - i  and contempora­
neous rival firm efficiency Aujt are instrumented by A uu - 2  and A u jt- i , Aun-2>respectively. 
Regression includes (ommitted) 20 two-digit SIC industry dummies.
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Figure 5.1: K ernel density functions of RTE index according to  export status.
m
CN
E x p o r t in g  f l r m a  
—  —  Won—Exporting  f i rm *
0 . 5 0.6 0 . 7 0 . 9 1.0
Efficiency index
E xporters have an export/sa les  ra tio  above 2.5% 
D om estic-orientated firms have an export/sa les  ra tio  below 2.5%.
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Figure 5.2: Kernel density functions of RTE index according to  export intensity.
------------------- H e o v y  e x p o r t e r
—  —  Light ex p o r te r
0 . 5 0.6 0 .7 0 .9 1.0
Efficiency index
Heavy exporters have an export/sa les  ra tio  above 25%. 
Light exporters have an export/sales  ra tio  below 25%.
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